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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND THE PROMOTION OF 
CONSERVATIONIST NORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
MAY 2011 
KEMI GEORGE, B.A., OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas 
 
 
 
The political economic pressures of development contribute to unsustainable 
environmental practices in developing countries, and marginalize civil society 
participation.  This dissertation looks at the following countries where policymakers are 
faced with strong incentives to foster rapid economic growth.  In Jamaica, the bauxite 
industry demands mining rights in sensitive mountainous ecosystems.  In Mexico, the 
tourist industry demands access to construct in vulnerable coastal environments in the 
southeast.  In inland Mexico, unregulated agriculture threatens ecosystems in the Yucatán 
Peninsula.  Finally, tourist and energy industries in Egypt demand access for 
infrastructure in sensitive ecosystems in the Red Sea region.  In all of the cases, the 
preferences of these sectors threaten to displace local communities, while creating 
unsustainable pressures on the environment.  At the same time, the projected revenues 
from these sectors justify continued environmental exploitation. 
In response, transnational networks of environmental advocates and epistemic 
communities mobilized throughout the 1990s, lobbying the Global Environment Facility 
  
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
for conservationist projects in each country, and then lobbying governments to effectively 
implement the projects.   
This research finds that three conditions were necessary for transnational 
networks to influence policies associated with project implementation.  First, networks 
must generate an internal scientific agreement on the dimensions of the environmental 
problem.  By doing so, they can delegitimate competing arguments, strengthening their 
own claims.  Second, networks must build social ties with policymakers in powerful 
agencies.  Social ties increase the likelihood that policymakers will adopt the norms of 
the network.  Third, networks must reframe the discourse on environmental management.  
At present, policymakers and industry argue that environmental management should be 
assessed by its contribution to economic development, validating only those policies that 
lead to sustained revenue generation.  By reframing environmental management as an 
issue impacting the wellbeing of domestic populations, networks can argue for the greater 
participation of actors marginalized by the dominance of privileged productive sectors in 
resource management.  Moreover, by linking sustainable resource use to the interests of 
domestic populations, networks can generate political capital to oppose the most 
unsustainable environmental practices.  This research thus builds on the epistemic 
communities approach by highlighting the importance of democracy in knowledge-
building and environmental governance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: ECONOMY, BIODIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC 
COMMUNITIES 
Introduction 
Global environmental governance is a product not only of representatives of 
governments acting in what they perceive of as their national interest, but also of non-
state actors acting in the interest of what they consider to be globally applicable norms.  
Scholars such as Khagram,1 Wapner,2 Keck and Sikkink,3 and Haas4 point out that non-
state actors can influence the conduct of international environmental treaties and global 
management frameworks when they persuade policymakers and governmental 
representatives that a particular course of action is appropriate in a given context.  
Further, these scholars note that this persuasive capacity does not only depend on 
marshaling material resources.  Transnational corporations (TNCs) may have profit 
margins that exceed the GDP of small states, but environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs) have to rely on carefully chosen arguments to convince 
                                                 
1
 Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water 
and Power (New York: Cornell University Press) 
2
 See Paul Wapner, 1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (New York: 
SUNY Press) 
3
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998 Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press) 
4
 Peter Haas 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination. International Organization 46: 1-35 
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policymakers to act in a certain manner.   
Recognizing the potential impact of non-state actors on environmental 
governance, institutions in the UN constellation have reiterated calls made in Agenda 21 
that civil society actors be included in global governance efforts.  For example, UNESCO 
has called for the inclusion of the civil society in the management of Biosphere Reserves, 
both on functional grounds, as civil society actors may serve as potential sources of 
expertise, and normative grounds, to improve the democratic nature of policymaking.5  
The Global Environment Facility (GEF),6 created to foster environmental capacity and 
will in LDCs, likewise asserts that non-state actors should play a role in managing 
biodiversity at the grassroots level.   
Of course, that non-state actors advocate for their internally held ideas about 
appropriate management does not mean that they will be successful.  Formal inclusion in 
stakeholder processes may obscure the fact that authority over environmental 
policymaking remains concentrated in state hands.  Government agencies are under no 
obligation to listen to the recommendations of the civil society, and may jealously guard 
their authority over policymaking.  If non-state actors matter in global environmental 
governance, under what conditions and when are they most likely to do so? 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., UNESCO, 2006, Biosphere Reserves: Biodiversity and Stakeholders. 
Available online at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001465/146566e.pdf 
6
 The GEF was created between 1990 – 1992 as a funding mechanism to LDCs, to foster 
compliance with several internationally important environmental goals, including 
biodiversity conservation, ozone depletion, and land degradation.  As a result, it was 
made the official funding mechanism for several multilateral environmental agreement 
(MEAs), including the CBD. 
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This research is particularly interested in the impact of non-state actors on 
environmental policymaking and governance in less developed countries (LDCs) for two 
related reasons.  First, certain global environmental problems, such as deforestation, 
biodiversity loss, water access issues and desertification are manifested almost 
exclusively within the developing world.7  Moreover, these problem areas can generally 
be managed unilaterally, distinguishing them from transboundary and global 
environmental issues such as acid rain, ozone depletion and transnational waste 
movement, which require that regulatory policies be coordinated internationally.  As a 
result, effective management of these problems will depend strongly on persuading LDC 
governments to implement meaningful environmental reforms. 
Second, it is suggested that the environmental problems faced by developing 
countries, in conjunction with their position in the global production of capital, has led to 
a situation in which LDC governments are only going to respond to very specific 
arguments for environmental management.   In particular, arguments that highlight the 
potential for national economic development are likely to be more persuasive to LDC 
policymakers.  This research investigates the efforts of transnational activists in 
developing countries to determine whether non-state actors are constrained by the need to 
                                                 
7
 See inter alia, Marc Williams, 2005, The Third World and Global Environmental 
Negotiations: Interests, Institutions and Ideas (Global Environmental Politics, 5: 48 – 
69); Adil Najam, 2004, Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in 
Desertification Negotiations (Global Environmental Politics, 4: 128 – 154); Susan Sell, 
1996, North-South Environmental Bargaining: Ozone, Climate Change and Biodiversity 
(Global Governance, 2: 97 – 118) pp. 110.  See in particular, Marian Miller, 1995, The 
Third World in Global Environmental Politics, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner) for a 
discussion of the Third World as a negotiating bloc in global biodiversity governance. 
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appeal to economics to promote better environmental behavior. 
 
Less Developed Countries, the Environment, and Development 
The idea that LDCs have a particular relationship to the environment and to 
development was made internationally prominent in the early 1970s.  In the lead up to the 
1972 Stockholm Conference, Maurice Strong and 26 experts from developing countries 
published the Founex Report, in which they argued that the environmental problems of 
less developed countries (LDCs) were fundamentally different from those of highly 
industrialized countries (HICs).  In brief, LDCs face structural factors that differentiate 
them from HICs.   
First, the environmental problems of immediate consequence to LDCs are not 
generally those receiving most attention in the international arena.  Rather than 
confronting global “green” environmental issues such as biodiversity loss, ozone 
depletion and transboundary acid rain, the pressing environmental issues facing LDCs are 
predominately those associated with local, “brown” developmental problems, such as 
access to sanitary drinking water, communicable diseases and a chronic lack of adequate 
housing,8 all of which are exacerbated or caused by poverty, technological disadvantages 
                                                 
8
  Dana R. Fisher and Jessica F. Green, 2004, Understanding Disenfranchisement: Civil 
Society and Developing Countries’ Influence and Participation in Global Governance for 
Sustainable Development (Global Environmental Politics, 4: 65 – 84) pp. 68; Adil 
Najam, 2004, Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in 
Desertification Negotiations (Global Environmental Politics 4: 128 – 154); Jordi Diez 
and O. P. Dwivedi, 2008, Global Environmental Challenges: Perspectives from the 
Global South (Broadview Press); Roberts and Parks in 2007, A Climate of Injustice: 
Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press)..  
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and low capital development.  Currently, the Millennium Development Goals, drafted in 
2000 as a blueprint for eradicating global poverty, explicitly links underdevelopment to 
environmental problems endemic to LDCs.  
Second, global environmental problems such as climate change, transboundary 
acidification and ozone depletion, are predominantly the result of action taken by HICs 
during the era of industrialization.9   LDCs that do experience negative externalities of 
these problems, for example the low-lying Maldives and poverty-stricken coastal 
Bangladesh, both vulnerable to climatic disruptions and rising oceanic levels, are 
suffering from the poor environmental behavior of other, richer states.  Poor states are 
also less likely to be able to mitigate environmental catastrophe. Global environmental 
governance then takes on strong undertones of injustice, as LDCs bear a disproportionate 
burden of the costs of management.10 
Third, in the practice of international politics, LDCs tend to be disenfranchised.  
Environmental governance is generally dominated by HICs, either because international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, are dominated by HICs, or because negotiations 
                                                 
9
 CFCs are historically concentrated in: the United States, which produced about half of 
global CFCs in the 1970s; the UK; France; Germany; Italy; and the Netherlands. See 
Peter Haas et al, eds., Institutions for the Earth, pp. 29. There are also some natural 
sources of atmospheric chlorine. NASA identifies volcanic eruptions as contributing to 
this factor, but notes that anthropogenic sources comprises at least 75% of chlorine in the 
atmosphere, NASA, Major and Minor Sources of Stratospheric Chlorine, 2001, retrieved 
April 2006 from http://www.nas.nasa.gov/About/Education/Ozone/depletion.html  
10
 Roberts and Parks in 2007, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South 
Politics, and Climate Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press) 
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require a level of expertise and technical knowledge beyond the reach of most LDCs.11   
Fourth, many of the environmental problems associated with LDCs are ostensibly 
solvable by industrial development.  As countries become richer and more industrialized, 
they will better be able to reduce domestic environmental vulnerability, and respond to 
pressing issues such as water access and housing problems.  Therefore, LDC 
governments would arguably be better served by focusing on domestic economic 
development to address the “poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and sheer misery”12 
characterizing domestic natural resource use, rather than spending scarce resources on 
assisting the international society to address ‘global’ environmental problems.   
Fifth, LDCs are highly indebted.  The pressure of debt-servicing in the global 
South, as well as the dependence of these countries on the export of agricultural 
commodities means that LDCs are stuck in a perpetual game of ‘catch-up’ to the model 
of development exemplified by the developed world.  This contributes to further 
subordination of the environment to development, as LDCS attempt to solve their 
economic problems and address chronic underdevelopment by increasing the stress on 
their production of primary goods and agriculture.13   
                                                 
11
 Roberts and Parks, 2007, A Climate of Injustice 
12
 Margaret Biswas and Asit K. Biswas, 1982, Environment and Sustained Development 
in the Third World: A Review of the Past Decade (Third World Quarterly 4 (3): 479 – 
491) pp. 484. 
13
 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global 
Agreements (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 19. This situation is neither 
ecologically nor politically sustainable in the long term. The 1987 WCED Report noted 
the interplay of global markets and the comparative disadvantage of LDCs in the 
international capital markets by observing that “economic policies of some major 
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The combination of these factors means that environmental management in LDCs 
poses significant opportunity costs to governments. Curbing deforestation or addressing 
biodiversity loss might be environmentally friendly at the global level, but at a domestic 
cost for LDCs, which have to limit, inter alia, road construction, agricultural expansion 
and the construction of living areas for a growing population.14  Given these economic 
and environmental pressures, one concern is that attempts to promote environmentally 
friendly ideas and behavior will be constrained by the overwhelming concern of LDC 
governments to promote short-term growth, almost always by exploiting natural 
resources.  Can transnational civil society networks persuade policymakers in LDCs to 
adopt environmentally friendly ideas, particularly when the benefits of managing goods 
like biodiversity are diffused globally and the costs concentrated domestically?  Can 
ideas about environmentalism prevail over the economic developmental concerns of 
LDCs?   
The Role of Ideas in International Relations 
By focusing on the use of ideas and persuasion to shape state behavior and 
governance, this research takes a constructivist approach to explaining international 
relations.  In short, constructivism asserts that ideas deployed by non-state actors can 
                                                                                                                                              
industrial countries had depressed and destabilized the international economy, which 
aggravated these pressures on developing countries,” cited in Steven Bernstein 2001, 
The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism pp. 65 
14
  See Steven Bernstein, 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmetnalism; Marian 
Miller, 1995. The Third World in Global Environmental Politics. Colorado: Lynne Reiner 
Publishers; Phillip Fearnside, 1986; Human Capacity of the Brazilian Rainforest; 
Columbia University Press, New York  
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shape behavior by precluding or endorsing certain policy options.  This diverges from 
much of traditional IR which limits the study of causal variables to the distribution of 
military capabilities and other material resources among unitary actors (almost always 
states) with fixed, definable interests.   
The kinds of ideas deemed consequential in constructivism may vary.  Causal 
arguments may clarify that certain actions will result in outcomes that are harmful to 
existing interests.  Norms, or ideas about appropriate behavior by a specific group of 
actors in a given context, may indicate that certain actions are simply inappropriate.   
In political science, the power of ideas has been used to explain several prominent 
international outcomes.  The downfall of the Soviet Union; international support for 
sanctions against apartheid South Africa; the stability of the international currency 
regime; the tendency of states to create meaningless but costly institutions for 
environmental governance; and global reluctance to use nuclear weapons have all been 
attributed to the responses of states to internationally held norms, rather than to changes 
in material conditions.  The Soviet Empire was brought down by internal conflicts 
between the ideas of democratic capitalism and Soviet statism, not by changes in the 
distribution of military power between the two poles.15  The international society, 
including the US and the UK, both of which had economic ties to South Africa, imposed 
crippling sanctions against the apartheid regime to protest the idea of institutionalized 
                                                 
15
 See Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1994.  Ideas do not Float Freely: transnational coalitions, 
domestic structures, and the end of the cold war.  International Organization 48: 185-
214; Frederking, Brian.  2000.  Resolving Security Dilemmas: A Constructivist 
Explanation of the INF Treaty (Ashgate) 
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racial hierarchy.16  Despite the decline of US hegemony and the loss of the gold standard, 
the international system of states maintained internationally stable trade through the 
principle of competitive currency devaluation.17  States have adopted a norm of 
environmental multilateralism, and thus create treaties and institutions to address 
problems such as global deforestation, even when there is no additional problem-solving 
capacity gained by doing so.18  Although contemporary conventional weapons may 
exceed the destructive power of nuclear weapons, international revulsion against using 
nukes has meant a de facto 65-year ban on their use, despite the eruption of several 
military conflicts in that time-span.19  In all of these examples, norms affected how states 
behaved. 
 
Constructivism, Networks, and Global Environmental Governance 
This research continues in the tradition of constructivism by attempting to explain 
when norms matter, what kinds of norms matter, and identify which actors deploy norms 
                                                 
16
  See Audie Klotz, 1995.  Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against 
Apartheid (Cornell University Press); Audie Klotz, 2002, Transnational Activism and 
Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences.  (European 
Journal of International Relations 8 (1):  49 – 76). 
17
   John G. Ruggie. 1982, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic System (International Organization 36 (2): 379-
415). 
18
 Radoslav Dimitrov, 2005, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest 
Politics (Global Environmental Politics, 5: 1 – 24) 
19
   See Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, 1996.  Norms and Deterrence: the Nuclear 
and Chemical Weapons Taboos.  In Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National 
Security.  New York: Columbia University Press  
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to constrain behavior.  To be sure, some constructivist approaches restrict the study of 
relevant actors to focus on the state.20  However, this research is developed from existing 
approaches that focus on the role of non-state actors known as transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs), loosely-organized coalitions of “actors working internationally on an 
issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchange of information and services.”21   
TANs have been instrumental in several instances of global environmental 
governance.  Existing studies point out that TANs have: persuaded Brazilian 
policymakers and the World Bank to endorse environmental impact assessments of 
Amazonian development on indigenous communities;22 lobbied states to push for the 
adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling in the International Whaling 
Convention (IWC);23 convinced the World Bank to allow independent review of the 
                                                 
20
 See Alexander Wendt, 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of it. International 
Organization 46, 2; Alexander Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. 
New York Cambridge University Press. 
21
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998 Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press) pp. 2.  As networks oriented around a shared purpose, 
one not based on national loyalties, TANs challenge the primacy of the sovereign 
nation-state as the primary organizing principle of relevant action in international 
politics.  Some scholars however, such as Lucy Ford, are critical of the idea that the 
global civil society represents a fundamental change in the ordering of power and 
preferences in global governance.  Rather, they argue, the global civil society reproduces 
the same divisions of labor and international hierarchy (2003, Challenging Global 
Environmental Governance: Social Movement Agency and Global Civil Society, Global 
Environmental Politics 3 (2): 120 – 134). 
22
 María Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 2004. Global Environmentalism and Local 
Politics (Ithaca: SUNY). 
23
 Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen, 2004, Non-state Influence in the International 
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environmental and social impact of dams in India;24 assisted states to negotiate the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Seas;25 and persuaded consumers in Western Europe to 
boycott Shell in protest against deep sea disposal of oil storage structures.26   
These cases demonstrate the dynamic, multilevel activity of TANs.  They may 
shape international outcomes by constraining the language and negotiation of 
international treaties, influencing the mandates of international organizations, or by 
influencing the behavior of other politically significant transnational non-state actors, 
who then shape state behavior from the ground up by domestic, grassroots activism.27 
 
Epistemic Communities  
In explaining how TANs generate norms and persuade target audiences to change 
behavior, this research relies strongly on the epistemic communities approach.  Epistemic 
communities are knowledge-based networks of individuals who are recognized as experts 
                                                                                                                                              
Whaling Convention, 1970 – 1990 (Global Environmental Politics, 3: 61 – 86). 
24
 Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water 
and Power (New York: Cornell University Press) 
25
 Ralph B. Levering, 1997, Brokering the Law of the Sea Treaty, Transnational Social 
Movements and Global Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press).  See also the 
discussion of environmental TANs in chapter 4 of Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 
1998. Activists Beyond Borders. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press). 
26
 Paula Owen and Tony Rice, 1999, Decommissioning the Brent Spar (F&N Spon 
Press). 
27
 See Paul Wapner, 1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (New 
York: SUNY Press) for a discussion of the various levels of engagement (both at the 
state and sub-state levels) of global civil society actors, such as TANs. 
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in one field of research, and who share a consensus on: causal beliefs; normative 
concerns; appropriate policy recommendations; and scientific validity claims.28  Keck 
and Sikkink indicate that epistemic communities are different from TANs by 
distinguishing the principled ideas held by TANs from the shared causal ideas driving 
epistemic community action, and by arguing that TANs rely on interpretation and 
meaning, whereas epistemic communities do not.29  However, it is not clear that there is a 
decisive difference between the two categories of networks.  Both Haas30 and Litfin31 
point out that epistemic communities deliberately selected certain cognitive models to 
interpret data, understand problems and explain complex processes to policymakers 
negotiating a treaty to curb ozone depletion.  Further, Litfin, Haas and Karvonen and 
Brand32  assert that epistemic communities are also motivated by principled beliefs and 
                                                 
28
  Peter Haas 1989. Do Regimes Matter?: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control. International Organization 43: 377-403; Peter Haas 1992. 
Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International 
Organization 46: 1-35; Steven Bernstein 2001. The Compromise of Liberal 
Environmentalism. Chichester, New York: Columbia University Press; Radoslav 
Dimitrov 2003. Knowledge, Power and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation. 
International Studies Quarterly 47: 123 – 150;  
29
 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press pp. 30. 
30
 Peter Haas, 1992, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to 
protect stratospheric ozone, in Peter Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power and International 
Policy Coordination (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 187 - 224) 
31
 Karen Litfin 1994. Ozone Discourses. New York: Columbia University Press 
32
 Andrew Karvonen and Ralf Brand, 2009, Technical Expertise, Sustainability, and the 
Politics of Specialized Knowledge, (in Gabriela Kutting and Ronnie D. Lipschultz, ed., 
Environmental Governance: Power and Knowledge in a Local-Global World, New 
York: Routledge).  
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Khagram, Riker and Sikkink indicate that epistemic communities may constitute 
important actors in broader transnational networks.33  Finally, principled networks often 
use scientific knowledge to buttress their policy claims.34  This dissertation will treat 
epistemic communities as a particular subset of transnational networks by virtue of the 
fact that, while consensually held scientific knowledge is an important constitutive 
element in epistemic communities, they nevertheless share features with TANs, including 
shared principles that transcend national identity.  
The use of consensually validated scientific knowledge distinguishes epistemic 
community action from other kinds of TANs, as moral claims, unlike scientific 
reasoning, do not rely on hypothesis testing and the validation of causal relationships 
pertinent to an emerging problem.35  The fields of expertise of epistemic communities 
include natural science, but these networks may be comprised of social scientists, 
including economists and legal scholars.36   
                                                 
33
 Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, 2002, From Santiago to 
Seattle, in Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and 
Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 
34
 Tony Rice and Paula Owen, 1999. Decommissioning the Brent Spar. London: E & FN 
Spon; MJ Peterson, 1992, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists and the Intenrational 
Management of Whaling (International Organization 46: 146 – 186). 
35
 Peter Haas, Policy Knowledge: Epistemic Communities. In Smelser, Neil and Paul 
Bates eds, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. New York. 
See also Audie Klotz, 2002. Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The 
Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences. European Journal of International 
Relations 8 (1): 49 – 76; “…scientific expertise and [purely] principled ideas are not the 
same… epistemic communities are not moral movements” (pp. 52).  
36
 See for example John Ruggie’s book on the spread of “embedded liberalism” in 
international markets in the post World War II era for an example of an economic 
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Scientific reasoning and shared causal beliefs not only distinguish epistemic 
communities from other kinds of advocacy networks, but also are the causal mechanisms 
by which epistemic communities shape environmental governance.  Scientific knowledge 
claims are commonly seen as ‘objective,’ ‘competent,’ and ‘valid,’ and science portrayed 
as derived from a “permanent, ahistorical” truth.37  It should be noted, however, that the 
perceived objective, impartial nature of science, while generally accepted by the lay 
public, is often contested by academics, analysts and advocates.38  Nevertheless, the 
perception of scientific consensus reduces uncertainty, de-legitimates competing claims, 
and clarifies appropriate courses of action.39  When science-based communities generate 
a consensus about causal relationships in a problem area, they have a powerful cognitive 
tool to convince target audiences, including state policymakers, corporations, and 
                                                                                                                                              
epistemic community.  John Ruggie,1998. Constructing World Polity. Routledge  
37
 See Steinar Andresen et al 2000. Science and Politics in International Environmental 
Regimes. New York: Manchester University Press; Radoslav Dimitrov 2003. Knowledge, 
Power and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation; Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink 1998. Activists Beyond Borders.  
38
 For approaches critical of the idea of science as impartial, see Karen Litfin 1994. 
Ozone Discourses. New York: Columbia University Press pp. 24; Andrew Karvonen and 
Ralf Brand, 2009, Technical Expertise, Sustainability, and the Politics of Specialized 
Knowledge, (in Gabriela Kutting and Ronnie D. Lipschultz, ed., Environmental 
Governance: Power and Knowledge in a Local-Global World, New York:Routledge).  
These critical approaches are particularly concerned about the authority accorded to 
scientific knowledge, particularly since doing so privileges one value set at the expense 
of others. 
39
 Steinar Andresen et al, 2000, Science and Politics in International Environmental 
Regimes; Radoslav Dimitrov 2003. Knowledge, Power and Interests in Environmental 
Regime Formation; Peter Haas 1992 Introduction: epistemic communities and 
international policy coordination; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998; Thomas 
2003).  
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secretariats of international institutions to adopt a certain understanding of the world and 
act appropriately.   
At the same time, networks motivated by principled beliefs may yet play an 
important role in the advocacy efforts of epistemic communities.  Principled networks 
can provide financial, political and intellectual support to emerging epistemic 
communities, all of which may improve the ability of these knowledge-based networks to 
generate credible, up-to-date information. 
The epistemic communities approach has been applied to explain several 
instances of global environmental governance.  The development of the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe’s convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP),40 the creation of a Mediterranean Action Plan to manage oil pollution,41 and 
the negotiation of the regulatory Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer42 have been attributed to efforts networks of scientific 
researchers to persuade target audiences of the need to modify behavior to an emerging 
problem.  Though the particulars differed, the causal explanation in each case was that a 
                                                 
40
 Levy, M.A. 1993, European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy, in P.M. 
Haas, R.O. Keohane and M.A. Levy (eds) Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective 
International Environmental Protection, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) pp. 75 – 132; J. 
Wettestad, 1997, Acid Lessons? LRTAP Implementation and Effectiveness (Global 
Environmental Change 7(3): 235–249). 
41
 Peter Haas, 1990, Saving the Mediterranean (New York: Columbia University Press); 
Peter Haas, 1989, Do Regimes Matter: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control. (International Organization 43: 377-403). 
42
 Peter Haas, 1992, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to 
protect stratospheric ozone, in Peter Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power and International 
Policy Coordination (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 187 - 224) 
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scientific consensus among a network of publicly recognized experts was used to 
persuade policymakers to implement policy in accordance with the conclusions derived 
from the arguments of the experts.43   
 
Issue-framing and the Socio-Political Context of Knowledge 
At the same time, the success of epistemic communities depends on more than 
getting the science right.  While scientific authority is an important cognitive tool 
available to epistemic communities, civil society networks nevertheless have to persuade 
target audiences, whether policymakers or CEOs, that their claims are salient, and that 
their interests are congruent with the pre-existing interests of managers.44  This requires 
that epistemic communities and TANs negotiate the social and political norms in which 
they operate, as causal arguments that violate institutionalized norms will be dismissed 
by target audiences, even if the underlying science is valid.45  It is this need to appeal to 
domestic norms that suggests that epistemic communities will have to frame their 
arguments in language that is likely to appeal to the worldview of managers.   
                                                 
43
 See among others: Steinar Andresen et al, Science and Politics in International 
Environmental Regimes (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001); William C. 
Clark et al, 2003, Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change; Miranda Schreurs et 
al, 2003, Issue Attention, Framing and Actors; Radoslav Dimitrov, 2003, Knowledge, 
Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation (International Studies 
Quarterly 47). 
44
 Amitav Acharya, 2004, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter?  Norm Localization 
and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism (International Organization 58: 239 – 
275). 
45
  Steven Bernstein, 2001, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. 
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In discussing the success of a transnational epistemic community in persuading 
policymakers to adopt international regulations on ozone management, Karen Litfin 
points out that skillful issue-framing, as much as scientific credibility played a significant 
role.  Prior to 1986, there was no international support for a strong regulatory regime to 
curb the production and consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODSs).46  
Uncertainty over the rates of increased ozone loss from additional emissions of ODSs, 
and an approach that discussed ecological and human effects of ozone depletion led to 
little agreement among experts on what the significance of ozone loss was.   
However, between 1986 and 1987, scientists linked the discovery of an anomaly 
in the ozone layer over the Antarctic with a change in the perception of the problem to 
focus on stratospheric chlorine loading and increased skin cancer rates.  With this model 
of the problem, scientists then suggested that “…something unprecedented and 
potentially catastrophic was happening in the stratosphere.”47  This normative 
interpretation of the problem led to greater support from US Congressmen for a stronger 
international approach to ozone governance, and eventual adoption of the regulatory 
                                                 
46
 As a result, the negotiated regime was a framework treaty, the 1985 Vienna 
Convention, which committed Parties only to further study of the relationship to 
anthropogenic chlorine and stratospheric ozone.   
47
  Karen Litfin, Ozone Discourses pp. 139. Other potential environmental consequences 
observable as a result of ozone depletion are: disruption of the oceanic food cycle, a 
decrease in the productivity of terrestrial agriculture, and an increase in the degradation 
of synthetic materials. See Karen Litfin, Ozone Discourses (Columbia University Press: 
New York, 1994); Steinar Andresen et al., Science and Politics in International 
Environmental Regimes. (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000); William Clark 
et al, 2001, Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion and Climate Change, p. 38. Haas et al, 
Institutions for the Earth, passim.  
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Montreal Protocol. 
The strategic change in the description of the problem of ozone depletion suggests 
that the ability to choose appropriate frames (or the set of metaphors, symbolic 
representations, and cognitive cues used to interpret an issue, provide a rationale for 
action, and mobilize support)48 is an additional important cognitive tool increasing the 
success of scientific arguments.  By extension, when emerging problem areas are framed 
in such a way as to resonate with the predetermined interests and institutionalized norms 
of target audiences, managers are more likely to self-identify as potential stakeholders, 
and internalize the arguments presented.49   
 
 
Economics, Politics, and Management in Developing Countries 
 
If frames and institutionalized norms affect how knowledge is propagated by non-
state norm entrepreneurs, then one concern about environmental management in LDCs is 
that institutionalized economic norms will constrain the propagation of environmental 
arguments.  In other words, environmental management in LDCs may be limited by the 
norms and historical development particular to the developing world.  This dissertation 
investigates this concern by testing the hypothesis: H1: transnational advocacy networks 
                                                 
48
  Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ed. 1996. Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements (New York: Cambridge University Press).  
49
 Ronald B. Mitchell, William C. Clark, and David Cash, 2006, Information and 
Influence, in Mitchell, Cash and Clark, eds., Global Environmental Assessments: 
Information and Influence (Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 310 
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must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order 
to influence LDC governments.  Focusing on national economic development encourages 
advocacy networks and other norm entrepreneurs to link environmental management to 
prominent, economic productive sectors.  These vary across cases, and are described in 
more detail throughout. 
 
Influence, Knowledge and Power 
Influence is a function of power; networks exercise influence when they convince 
policymakers to take action that they ordinarily would not have.  However, this 
knowledge-based view of power is not materialistic, nor is it manipulative in the sense 
that it is a product of networks convincing policymakers to act against their objectively 
determined interests.50  From a constructivist perspective, interests are not fixed, but are 
constituted by norms, and hence subject to change in ways not entirely dependent on 
material realities.  Thus, by exercising knowledge-based power, networks do more than 
bring problems to light.  They attempt to negotiate meanings and shape the discourse 
around an emerging issue-area.51 
As discussed in this research, the successful exercise of influence by networks 
                                                 
50
 See in particular, Karen Litfin, 1994, Ozone Discourses, pp. 15; Lukes’ Third Face of 
power indicates that power is exercised by an actor A when A convinced B to take 
action contrary to B’s objective interests. 
51
 Clark et al illustrate this iterated conception of influence in William C. Clark, Ronald 
B. Mitchell, and David W. Cash, 2006, Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental 
Assessments (Chapter 1 in Roland B. Mitchell et al, eds.  Global Environmental 
Assessments: Information and Influence.  Cambridge: MIT Press) pp. 11. 
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means that policymakers will look to epistemic communities for information and 
theories, accept the conclusions drawn by scientists, and adopt the policy implications 
therein.52   Further, the frameworks used by policymakers to understand an emerging 
problem may also change, indicating a deeper level of influence.  In practice, this means 
a concordance between the proposals made by networks and the policies and 
management approaches adopted by policymakers, provided that these represent a change 
from the previous manner of doing things.  If the first hypothesis is correct, the influence 
of knowledge networks in LDCs will be sharply constrained by the need to appeal to 
national economic development norms, even if scientific consensus is present.  
Consequently, transnational activism in LDCs will be affected by different factors than 
activism in the industrialized world. 
This hypothesis is tested in conjunction with additional tests of hypotheses drawn 
from the epistemic communities literature.  As suggested above, the epistemic 
communities approach asserts that knowledge consensus is the causal variable through 
which networks generate influence.  However, if issue-framing is sufficient to cause 
influence, then consensus may be unnecessary, a proposition which may undermine the 
epistemic communities approach.  To determine whether consensus matters, this 
dissertation will also test the following hypothesis.  H2: scientific consensus increases the 
influence of transnational advocacy networks.   
Finally, tests of these hypotheses are carried out simultaneously with tests of the 
                                                 
52
  See Steinar Andresen et al. 2000. Science and Politics in International Environmental 
Regimes, passim.  
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influence of socialization on learning.  Socialization is the regular exchange of 
information and ideas between actors.  It contributes to the development of shared 
perceptions among connected actors, and improves the chance that knowledge produced 
among interacting agents will be mutually accepted and legitimated.53  Finally, 
socialization can promote framing alignment,54 or the development of shared interests, 
values and beliefs between various groups.55  Consequently, the literature on social 
processes and knowledge generation suggests the following hypothesis: H3: socialization 
increases the influence of transnational advocacy networks. 
 
A Heuristic Approach to Hypothesis Testing 
These hypotheses indicate that there are three independent variables that can 
                                                 
53
 See María Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 2004. Global Environmentalism and Local 
Politics: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Brazil, Ecuador, and India (State 
University of New York); Roland B. Mitchell, 2006, Information and Influence (Chapter 
11 in Roland B. Mitchell et al, eds.  Global Environmental Assessments: Information and 
Influence.  Cambridge: MIT Press). 
54
  David Snow et al, 1986, Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation (American Sociological Review, 51: 464 – 481), pp. 464; 
Miranda Schreurs et al, 2001, Issue Attention, Framing and Actors, pp. 354; Mario Diani, 
1996, Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: Insights from Regional 
Populism in Italy (American Sociological Review, 61: 1053 – 1069). 
55
 The idea that the frames adopted by a social advocacy network function to provide an 
internally consistent rationale for action is mentioned in sociological studies of social 
movements, for example in Mario Diani, 1996, Linking Mobilization Frames and 
Political Opportunities: Insights from Regional Populism in Italy (American 
Sociological Review, 61: 1053 – 1069), David Snow et al, 1986, Frame Alignment 
Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation (American Sociological 
Review. 51, no. 4 (August) : pg. 464 – 481), as well as in previously mentioned political 
science studies of transnational social movements by Sanjeev Khagram, María 
Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 
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explain the success or failure of transnational network advocacy: issue-framing, 
knowledge consensus, and socialization.  What will be investigated here is how these 
variables interact in the propagation of knowledge from advocacy networks to 
policymakers.  Understanding how transnational networks function in LDCs will require 
multiple tests of these variables in order to determine which are sufficient and/or 
necessary.  For example, if knowledge consensus is the only variable that corresponds 
with network influence in LDCs, then a narrowly-focused epistemic communities 
approach would suffice.  This would undermine the argument that environmental 
advocacy in the developing world is subject to a particular economic logic.  However, if 
variation in knowledge consensus does not correspond with influence, and the primary 
variable predicting influence is economic issue-framing, then this research would suggest 
that the primary factor increasing network influence in LDCs is not scientific coherence, 
but carefully chosen symbols and metaphors. 
Of course, there are other possibilities, including the chance that the three 
independent variables: framing; consensus; and socialization, all interact together to lead 
to the dependent variable: network influence.  Parsing the impact of these variables is 
best carried out by a heuristic investigation of network advocacy. 
A heuristic approach is also sought in this case as the relationship in the literature 
between socialization, political openness and influence is ambiguous.  In short, it is not 
clear if more or less political openness is conducive to socialization.  This has 
implications for the study of activism in the developing world, since LDCs tend to be 
more politically closed systems.   
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On one hand, science should be credible.  For science to be considered credible, 
the conclusions drawn should not be derived from an already-established political 
agenda, but rather based on a neutral (as far as possible) assessment of the facts at hand, 
as knowledge that is produced with a visible political bias is easier to delegitimate.56  
Scientific credibility is more likely to emerge in politically open states, where ENGOs 
and academic research institutions are free to formulate ideas and research programs, 
communicate with policymakers and establish relationships with transnational 
researchers.57   
On the other hand, socialization between expert networks and policymakers may 
paradoxically be stronger in closed political systems.  There, the production of policy-
relevant knowledge is more likely to be controlled by policymakers concerned about the 
implications of allocating scarce benefits to political constituencies.58  Political elites are 
more likely to be invested in the pronouncements of research programs.59  Scientific 
community members may also be drawn from government bureaucrats or state agencies, 
reinforcing the states’ involvement in the production of knowledge.  As a result, scientists 
conducting policy-relevant research in autocratic countries may be more likely to 
                                                 
56
   See Steinar Andresen et al, 2000, Science and Politics in International Environmental 
Regimes, pp. 10 and passim; Karen Litfin, 1998, Ozone Discourses.  
57
 María Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 2004. Global Environmentalism and Local 
Politics 
58
   Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, Activists Beyond Borders 
59
 See Steinar Andresen et al. 2000. Science and Politics in International Environmental 
Regimes, passim; Karen Litfin, 1998. Ozone Discourses.  
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socialize with policymakers.   
 
The Interplay Between Comparative Politics and IR 
Thus, domestic politics affect the use of transnationally held knowledge that is 
generated in response to global problems.   As such, this research includes a necessary 
comparative element to the study of the influence of knowledge networks.  As illustrated 
in the figure below, knowledge is shaped at multiple levels, and is affected by 
relationships between states, between non-state actors within a network, and between 
governments and their citizens.   
Consequently, investigating the influence of advocacy networks on policymaking 
in developing countries depends on several tests of combinations of the three identified 
independent variables: framing, consensus and socialization.  In addition, for a heuristic 
investigation into the impact of political openness on influence, this research depends on 
taking a comparative study of transnational activism in countries under varying stages of 
political liberalization.  By doing so, this research will investigate whether and how 
developmental concerns particular to developing countries constrain the advocacy efforts 
of transnational environmental networks.  
 
 
Biodiversity Management in Developing Countries 
As indicated above, one prominent global environmental issue that is associated 
with the developing world is biodiversity management.  Restricting the study of 
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environmental advocacy to cases focused on carrying out biodiversity management 
confers certain advantages.  First, focusing on one environmental issue area allows 
comparability across cases.  Second, global biodiversity management, as currently 
conceptualized, has significant scope for actors to proffer their own interpretations of 
social reality and problem dimensions. 
The cases studied here center on the domestic implementation of the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) but involve other biodiversity-oriented 
MEAs, such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the Convention on Migratory 
Species (CMS).60  As a framework convention, the CBD leaves substantial room for 
implementing states to interpret treaty obligations.  For example, Article 8 of the CBD 
recommends that Parties create and manage protected areas for in situ conservation, 
while the IUCN has also recommended an international standardization of protected areas 
management pursuant to the CBD.  However, states complying with the CBD are free to 
manage protected areas to the extent that policymakers see fit.61    Protected areas can 
range from zones restricted only to scientific researchers for the purpose of knowledge 
and data gathering, to “cultural landscapes,” with human populations daily utilizing the 
natural resources within, to sites of tourism, to ‘paper parks,’ legally created areas that 
                                                 
60
 An aggregation of regimes treating one issue-area may be referred to as a “regime 
complex.”  See Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, 2004, The Regime Complex for 
Plant Genetic Resources (International Organization, 58 (2): 277 – 309). 
61
  See K. J. Mulongoy and S. P. Chape (eds), 2004. Protected Areas and Biodiversity pp. 
9 – 10.  
  
 
 
 
 
26 
 
have no management practices in place.62   Technically, states may therefore be in 
compliance with biodiversity treaties if they create additional protected areas, regardless 
of whether these additional areas signify an improvement in management or not.  As a 
result, transnational networks may significantly impact biodiversity management, by 
proposing which geographic areas are relevant to biodiversity management, how to 
evaluate appropriate management policies in protected areas, and how to measure 
biodiversity.   
 
Case Selection 
A short description of the research methodology follows.  Cases were selected by 
searching for GEF-funded projects carried out in developing countries to implement the 
CBD.  Projects were identified by examining the online GEF database, which maintains a 
list of funded efforts in LDCs pursuant to various MEAs.  In addition, screens were 
applied to the universe of LDCs carrying out GEF-funded biodiversity management 
projects in order to narrow case selection by removing those cases which were less likely 
to have the material conditions to support epistemic community emergence.   
Among the universe of LDCs, cases had to demonstrate a base level of an 
institutional capacity for science and technology, conditions identified as conducive to 
the emergence of epistemic communities in countries.63  This consists of governmental 
                                                 
62
  K. J. Mulongoy and Chape, S. P. 2004. Protected Areas and Biodiversity pp. 9 - 10  
63
 Peter M. Haas, 2001, Epistemic Communities and Policy Knowledge, in: 
International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier), S. 
11578–11586.  Thomas Risse-Kappen, 1994.  Ideas do not Float Freely: transnational 
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support for research, level of scientific development, and capacity of the state to generate 
scientific knowledge and investigate environmental issues.  A rough measure of this 
characteristic was taken by comparing several existing indicators. 
First, countries with minimal resources, in particular those which have to spend a 
great deal of their income on debt-servicing, are unlikely to be able to support a 
substantial science community.64  Using the World Bank classifications of indebtedness, 
which calculates debt service to gross national income for 2005, and the ratio of debt 
service to exports from 2001 – 2005, low-income countries that were highly indebted 
were eliminated from the sample as unlikely to have the necessary resources to support 
scientific research. 
Second, this rough measure was refined by comparing the 2005 Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) measure of social and institutional capacity65 and the World 
Bank Governance Research Indicators Database (GRID), for the years 1996 – 2004.66  
The ESI score is an aggregate measure of four components: environmental governance; 
                                                                                                                                              
coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war 
64
 Peter M. Haas, 2001, Epistemic Communities and Policy Knowledge, in: 
International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier), S. 
11578–11586 
65
 Found in Appendix B of Esty et al 2005. 
66
 Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Maasimo Mastruzzi, 2005; Governance Matters IV: 
Governance Indicators for 1996 – 2004; World Bank; Washington, DC; Retrieved 
February 2006 from 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters_IV_main.pdf  
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eco-efficiency; private sector responsiveness; and science and technology, each of which 
are aggregates of several other indicators “evaluating the institutions and underlying 
social patterns of skills, attitudes, and networks that foster effective responses to 
environmental challenges.”67  The GRID comprises 6 indicators of governance that affect 
the capacity of governments to implement policies in response to new information: voice 
and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory burden; rule of law; and control of corruption.68  Governments that score 
comparatively low on measures of governance could confound research, as poor 
governance could inhibit the effective implementation of environmental policy, even if 
epistemic communities are successful in transmitting claims to policy makers.  Cases that 
scored below the median on these indicators were considered less useful tests, and 
excluded from consideration, as they are unlikely to have the necessary structures for 
effective biodiversity management.   
Further, the research question requires investigating the relationship between 
                                                 
67
 Esty, Daniel, Marc Levy, Tanja Srebotnjak and Alexander de Sherbinin, 2005; 2005 
Environmental Sustainability Index: Benchmarking National Environmental 
Stewardship; (Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy: New Haven), pp. 11.  
Although the methodology of calculating all the indicators is not entirely clear, nor the 
weighting of each, the indicators measure relevant socio-political phenomena affecting 
the ability of scientific research communities to emerge and conduct scientifically 
legitimate research.  These include measures of: government effectiveness; knowledge 
creation in environmental science, technology and policy; World Economic Forum on 
Survey on environmental governance; Gross tertiary enrollment rate; Innovation index; 
and number of researchers per million people. 
68
 Appendix D of Kaufman et al 2005 provides definitions of the concepts used, which 
include “the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions,” Kaufman et al 
2005, 130 – 132. 
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political openness and socialization, and so case selection had to include variation for the 
sake of comparison.  To order the remaining cases, I compiled a series of measures of 
political democratization, namely: Freedom House ratings from 1975 – 2005; the 
Reporters sans Frontiers Press Freedom Index of 2005; the 2002 and 2003 Polity IV 
indicators of Democracy, Polity and Autocracy; and the Polity IV 2003 measures of 
Levels of Authority from 1970 – 2003.  By investigating GEF biodiversity projects in 
developing countries, screening countries to ensure they had an institutional base for 
science, and choosing countries that varied according to their levels of political 
development, the following four projects were selected. 
 
Jamaica 
The first project studied was carried out in Jamaica.  Jamaica is currently 
classified as a parliamentary democracy, even though the country has had longstanding 
problems with political patron-clientelism.  Under this system, political decision-makers 
have historically formed tacit alliances with economic elites, using political power to 
create favorable environments for capitalist growth, even where such policies may 
conflict with the interests of the mass public.  Nevertheless, the measures of political 
openness indicate that Jamaica is institutionally and in practice a fairly robust democracy.  
For example, the country has never scored below a 3 on any Freedom House indicator 
since 1973.  Similarly, the Polity IV measures score Jamaica as receiving a 10 (highly 
democratic) continuously since 1962, only falling to an eight in the early 1990s.  The 
project studied in this case is the Project on Sustainable Conservation of Globally 
  
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats, intended to manage biodiversity in the Cockpit 
Country, an area of roughly 450km² located between the western and northwestern 
parishes of Trelawny, St. Elizabeth and St. James (see Figure 1.1).  
 
Mexico 
In comparison to Jamaica, Mexico is relatively autocratic.  Despite the history of 
regular presidential and parliamentary elections, culminating in the first transition 
between parties in 2000, the country has long been described as corporatist.  Power has 
historically been centralized and concentrated in the executive branch of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, which has traditionally managed to avoid ceding accountability to 
the mass public through a combination of electioneering, and practices such as the de 
facto appointment of presidential successors by party elites.  Nevertheless, the above 
measures of political organization indicate that the country has, since 2000, become 
markedly more democratic, though still falling short of Jamaica in terms of length of 
experience with democracy.  Again, using Freedom House data for comparison, Mexico 
has historically scored fours and fives on measures of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
prior to the 2000 transition.  Polity IV data also show a transition to democracy (scored as 
a six) in 2000, only after decades of autocracy. 
Two projects are studied in this country.  The first, the Proyecto para la 
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM) is carried 
out along the eastern coast of the state of Quintana Roo to manage the reef ecosystem 
(see Figure 1.2). The second Mexican project studied is the Proyecto del Corredor 
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Biológico Mesoamericano (CBMMx) carried out in the states of Quintana Roo, Yucatán, 
Campeche and Chiapas (see Figure 1.3).  These projects are formally related in that the 
SAM was conceived of as a component of the CBMMx, and initially designed as an 
extension of the CBMMx project to the marine and coastal ecosystems along the eastern 
part of the Yucatan peninsula.69  However, administration of the two is being carried out 
by different state agencies, and separate agencies were created in Mexico to monitor and 
administer the project.  Further, the ENGOs, scientific community members and some of 
the political institutions involved in managing the two projects differ.   
 
Egypt 
The final case is a project being carried out in Egypt.  Egypt is the most autocratic 
of the three, with only minimal concessions to democratic institutions.  Freedom House 
scores over time are universally measured as unfree since data was recorded in 1973.  
The Polity IV index similarly ranks Egypt as continually autocratic since the 1950s.  
Elections are held regularly, but party lists and eligibility are tightly controlled, and again 
power is concentrated in the executive branch.  Moreso than Mexico, the executive 
branch is closely identified with the current president, Hosni Mubarak, giving a 
comparatively personalist dimension to Egyptian political organization than is the case in 
the other two countries.  In this case, the project studied is the development of the Project 
                                                 
69
 See, for example, UCP, 2002, Reporte de Avance no. 2 (Belize City: Unidad 
Coordinadora del Proyecto) pp. 10; World Bank, 2001, Documento de Evaluacion sobre 
el Proyecto Propuesto por EU$ 15.2Millones… (CCAD) pp. 13, describing the SAM as 
designed to administer the “marine elements” (author’s translation) of theCBMMx. 
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for Sustainable Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, to be carried out in Egypt 
along the coast of the Red Sea and the Sinai peninsula (see Figure 1.4).  
 
Operationalizing Concepts  
TANs and Epistemic Communities 
Having identified cases, it was then necessary to operationalize and construct 
measures of epistemic communities and TANs in order to determine which kinds of 
networks were involved in advocacy.  Likely core groups of epistemic communities and 
transnational networks were identified by reviewing documents associated with the GEF-
funded projects, and determining which ENGOs were officially involved in project 
implementation.  Subsequently, snowball sampling was used to identify and bound the 
population of networks to which these ENGOs may have been members.  These measures 
were then triangulated with analyses of archival materials, such as project documents, 
workshop reports, meeting minutes, and jointly-produced studies to bound the 
populations of the tentatively identified networks.   
Population bounding is, at best, an approximate exercise.  Network membership is 
amorphous, as it depends on informal and perhaps tenuous connections between people, 
not just on formalized relationships that can be discovered through investigating 
participation in recording meetings, or through identifying authorship of jointly produced 
documents.  As a result, the chapters, in describing the size of the various networks, gives 
a range of potential members based on analyses of organization size, the research focus 
of identifiable members, which are triangulated as much as possible through archival 
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analyses of meetings, committees, and other recorded data on network participation.  
Nevertheless, the numbers throughout are not precise. 
As described above, epistemic communities are networks of science-based 
professionals with publicly recognized expertise in a particular domain, and holding an 
intersubjective consensus about a problem in their area.  Again, a scientific consensus 
distinguishes epistemic communities from other kinds of TANs, and is considered one of 
the primary independent variables being tested in this research.  Using Dimitrov’s 
understanding of consensus, I disaggregated the concept into 3 indicators: the presence of 
agreement on 1) causes, 2) consequences and 3) extent of an environmental issue.70  
Some level of disagreement on one or more of these indicators would weaken consensus, 
but as long as a network held a core agreement, it would be coded as an epistemic 
community.   
There may be cases in which one network evinces more internal agreement than a 
comparative network, which allows some determination to be made that one case may 
depict greater consensus than another.  However, in the absence of finely tuned measures 
of cognitive perceptions, it is still useful to consider knowledge consensus as an ordinal 
variable, that is, that a hierarchical ordering of cases is possible, but the degrees of 
separation between their ranks is difficult to measure.  To determine if a network held an 
intersubjective consensus, I used multiple sources, including elite interviews and project 
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 Radoslav Dimitrov, “Knowledge, Power and Interests in Environmental Regime 
Formation.” International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2003): 123 – 150.  As suggested by 
Dimitrov, disagreement would be most problematic for an epistemic community when 
there is a lack of consensus on the consequences of a problem.    
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documents to identify whether members of a network agreed on the causal relationships 
relevant to an emerging issue area, whether they were aware that agreement within the 
network was shared, and whether they were accurate in their assessment of the causal 
relationships under study. 
Of the four cases studied here, epistemic communities were active in only two of 
them, in Jamaica and in the Mesoamerican reef system in Mexico.  In the remaining two 
cases, a transnational network emerged to advocate for improved environmental 
management, but lacking an intersubjectively recognized agreement on the pertinent 
causal relationships, was not measured as an epistemic community.  Making a clear 
distinction between network types was necessitated by virtue of the fact that in the first 
two cases, TANs played an important supportive role in the advocacy efforts of the 
epistemic communities.  In these cases, the relationship between the TAN and the 
epistemic community was described, as well as the reason for classifying the networks as 
different actors. 
 
Issue Framing 
In addition, the frames used by networks had to be measured.  The proposals 
advanced by networks were analyzed to determine whether and how networks were using 
a consistent set of metaphors, cognitive cues, and descriptive language to justify action.  
This variable is a nominal variable, and described in more detail in the cases.  If the 
frames used to communicate with policymakers and managers differed from the internal 
reasoning used by networks to justify action, they were described as engaging in external 
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strategic framing based on their interpretation of the internalized value systems of their 
external audience.71  
 
Socialization 
Finally, it was necessary to measure the extent of socialization between 
policymakers and networks.  In the generation of policy-relevant knowledge, 
socialization may be manifested by such processes as jointly conducted reports between 
norm entrepreneurs and target audiences, mutual participation in workshops, and 
exchange of staff.  In each of the cases, the kinds of relationships between networks and 
audiences were qualitatively assessed.  Socialization was considered strong if multiple 
points of contact existed between audiences and networks, and the exchange or 
recruitment of personnel between populations was considered a particularly strong 
indicator of socialization.  Since the precise measures of socialization will vary across 
cases, it is again useful to consider socialization as an ordinal variable.  The measures of 
socialization varied, and are described in more detail in each chapter. 
 
The Dependent Variable: Network Influence 
 Finally, the end result would be the existence of network influence on the actions 
taken by managers to regulate biodiversity.  Influence existed when policymakers and 
managers looked to epistemic communities for information and theories, accepted the 
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  See in particular, Mayer N. Zald, 1996, Culture, Ideology and Strategic Framing 
(chapter 11 in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, ed. Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements.  New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
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conclusions drawn by scientists, and adopted the policy implications of the advocacy 
groups.  Therefore, when networks had influence, target audiences would change their 
behavior, whether as policies and practices, in such a way that they would converge on 
the preferred practices of the advocacy networks.  Since, as will be demonstrated in the 
case studies, biodiversity management is a multisectoral issue, measuring influence 
required evaluating the behavior of several actors in each case, including in the private 
and public sectors.   
Measuring influence required comparing the stated preferences of network 
members, as discussed in internally generated project documents and interviews, with the 
following behavioral outputs:  First, influence occurs if the network exercises control 
over project design, such that the essential components of biodiversity management as 
preferred by the network are included.  This includes determining the biodiversity-
relevant area covered by the GEF funds; identifying which species are targeted for 
protection; or specifying management tools (measurement criteria, for example) to be 
adopted as a condition of the project. 
Second, control over the terms of the project does not necessarily equate to 
influence if the government is laggardly on carrying out substantive changes in policy.  
Thus, another indicator of influence would be the adoption of policies by natural resource 
management agencies such that new action corresponds with proposed policies suggested 
by network members.  I triangulate upon this measure by conducting interviews and 
archival analyses to determine if newly adopted regulation was effectively implemented, 
rather than existing as toothless formal declarations.  For example, if the responses of 
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policymakers and managers are limited to general exhortative statements extolling the 
virtues of conservation, but without real efforts to regulate environmentally harmful 
activity, or if policymakers create empty policy, such as ‘paper parks,’ protected areas 
without a meaningful regulatory framework, no influence can be said to have occurred.   
Third, influence occurs if the network’s recommendations lead to changes in the 
practices of private sector actors, such as corporations, cooperatives, or other non-state 
entities.   
Unfortunately, network influence does not always mean that there will be 
measurable improvements in environmental degradation.  Natural disasters, time-lag 
problems, external threats, and a lack of clear information may all prevent the 
recommendations of epistemic community members from having a measurable impact on 
biodiversity conservation, even if adopted by policymakers and private-sector managers.  
This is of particular concern, given that the management efforts started in these projects 
are still ongoing, and the projects that have formally concluded did so less than 3 years 
ago.  Thus, while desirable, recording changes in population of important species would 
provide a measure of low discriminant and convergent validity.   
Thus, to test the argument, the following steps were taken: in each case, the 
transnational network was identified and measured, determining whether the network was 
an epistemic community comprised of like-minded scientists, or a TAN.  The advocacy 
efforts of the network were process-traced, to discover whether individuals repurposed 
arguments and justifications for action to persuade policymakers and managers of the 
economic rationale for taking environmental action.  The level of socialization between 
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the network and target audiences was described by examining the strength of contact 
between the two populations.  The regulations and practices adopted by policymakers and 
managers were compared with the recommendations of identified networks to verify 
whether or not networks had any influence on biodiversity management.  These steps 
then led to conclusions about the effect of scientific consensus, strategic framing, 
socialization, and domestic political organization on the efforts of transnational networks 
to inform and influence the management of biodiversity in LDCs. 
 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
In Chapters 2, I describe the case study of the Project on Sustainable 
Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats carried out in the Cockpit 
Country of Jamaica.  In that case, a transnational epistemic community emerged during 
the 1990s and early 2000s to advocate for the protection of sensitive ecosystems in an 
area threatened by bauxite mining.  The epistemic community, concerned about the 
ecological integrity of the Cockpit Country, had to contend not only with various natural 
resource policymaker agencies in the environmental and agricultural ministries, but also 
managers in the powerful bauxite industry, and peasant and agricultural residents, all of 
whom had sometimes incompatible preferences.  
Chapter 3 presents the SAM project carried out in Mexico.  Again, this case 
involved an epistemic community engaging with competing interests of various actors.  
Here, these consisted of policymakers in the environmental and agricultural ministries, 
managers in the transnational hotel sector, and peasant and subsistence populations.  An 
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important theoretical distinction between this case and Jamaica, is that this biodiversity 
project took place in a post-transitional autocratic country.     
Chapter 4 investigates a case that takes place under the same level of political 
openness, as the CBMMx was also carried out in Mexico.  Moreover, this case study did 
not involve an epistemic community, as the transnational network that emerged to 
advocate for improved biodiversity management did not hold an intersubjective 
consensus on the relevant causal relationships in the Yucatán peninsula.  The advocacy 
efforts of the TAN in this case focused on natural resource policymakers and 
marginalized agricultural populations throughout the Yucatán.  Nevertheless, the absence 
of consensus in this case allowed for more robust tests of the importance of scientific 
agreement on the influence exercised by transnational networks. 
Chapter 5 presents the final empirical case study, illustrating the Project for 
Sustainable Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds carried out in Egypt.  As with the 
CBMMx case study, this project involved a transnational network that did not generate an 
intersubjective consensus.  Further, by discussing a case study in an autocratic polity, this 
dissertation further engages with questions about the effect of autocracy and centralized 
decision making on the advocacy efforts of transnational networks. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss alternative hypotheses to observed variation in the case 
studies.  In particular, I engage with the neoliberal institutionalist school of international 
relations theory, which indicates that properly designed institutions can constrain state 
behavior and lead to effective global management, in this case, of the environment.  
Institutions allow states to generate predictable rules, and bargain for concessions to 
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promote desirable behavior.  As indicated above, the countries involved are signatories, 
not only to the CBD, but also to various other regional and international biodiversity-
oriented MEAs.  Accordingly, the projects described may be embedded in different 
institutions for each country.  It is therefore possible that any variation observed in these 
cases could be due, not to differences in the strength and cognitive skill of epistemic 
communities, but rather to the strength of regimes of the relevant country.  Variation in 
observed implementation will therefore be tested against the institutionalist approach to 
see whether the comparatively methodologically untidy and far less parsimonious 
epistemic communities approach has more explanatory power. 
In the conclusion, the summation of the causal relationships is given, clarifying 
which independent variables are necessary and/or sufficient to lead to transnational 
network influence on policymakers in developing countries.  In addition, the impact of 
political openness on socialization is discussed, as well as final statements on the chance 
of improving project design and advocacy efforts for improved global biodiversity 
management. 
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Table 1.1: Multiple Levels of Knowledge 
 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
International Transnational Domestic 
Impact on 
Knowledge 
International treaties and 
obligations create the 
impetus for gathering 
knowledge on global 
environmental problems 
Internal relationships in 
knowledge networks affect 
the likelihood that 
networks develop an 
intersubjective consensus 
Political relationships between 
the state and its citizens affect 
the ability of transnational 
networks to socialize with 
relevant policymakers 
International 
indebtedness limits the 
appeal of environmental 
norms to LDCs 
Shared understandings 
determine the frames 
adopted by networks 
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Figure 1.1: Map of the Jamaican Cockpit Country 
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Figure 1.2: Map of The Mesoamerican Reef Region  
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Figure 1.3: Map of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor – Mexico 
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Figure 1.4: Map of the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway 
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CHAPTER 2  
JAMAICA AND BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT IN THE COCKPIT 
COUNTRY 
 
Introduction 
In the case study carried out in Jamaica, a transnational network of ecologists, 
ornithologists and geologists developed an interest in biodiversity management in the 
Cockpit Country, a roughly 450km² area of karst limestone located within the parishes of 
Trelawny, St. Elizabeth and St. James (see Figure 1.1).  As an epistemic community, this 
network of scientists held a consensus about the causal processes of human activity in the 
Cockpit Country, appropriate policy responses and a rationale for conserving the 
biodiversity and endemism in the area.  The advocacy efforts of the community centered 
on carrying out the GEF-funded Project for Sustainable Conservation of Globally 
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats, an effort to implement the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).  As described in the introduction, this chapter investigates how 
epistemic communities attempted to engage with policymakers, and whether the 
developmental pressures and political systems of developing countries constrained the 
arguments employed by epistemic communities.  
To test this argument, as well as the corresponding hypotheses, I identified the 
relevant actors: policy makers, an epistemic community, knowledge brokers, and a 
transnational advocacy network (TAN).  I process-traced how concern about biodiversity 
management in the Cockpit Country led to the constitution of a transnational social 
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network.  I also tested whether policymakers in natural resource management agencies 
learned from the epistemic community’s understanding of environmental processes, by 
examining the output of state responses in terms of policy and management approaches to 
the claims of the epistemic community.   
A qualitative analysis of the data indicates that the epistemic community had 
mixed success in promoting environmentally friendly policies in the Cockpit Country.  
While there are overlapping policy jurisdictions, biodiversity management in the Cockpit 
Country was subject to the management authority of two ministries, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Environment.  Further, authority within these ministries 
can be further disaggregated across subordinate agencies.  Within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Forestry Department, the Mines and Geology Division, and the Ministry 
itself functioned as three distinct nodes of authority, while the Ministry of Environment 
had a subordinate agency in the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA).  As 
these five agencies were responsible for distinct aspects of biodiversity management, the 
network’s advocacy efforts can be described as consisting of five different campaigns, 
under the overall goal of improving the environment. 
Of these agencies, the only policymaker institution whose subsequent 
management approach demonstrated influence by the epistemic community network was 
the Forestry Department.  The Department adopted recommendations made by the 
community, changed management procedures, and supported the epistemic community’s 
biodiversity management framework.  However, this was not matched by similar success 
in the Mines and Geology Division, the Ministry of Agriculture, NEPA, or the Ministry 
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of Environment.   
Of the three variables discussed in the hypotheses: issue-framing, socialization, 
and scientific consensus, the only variable positively associated with influence in this 
case was socialization.  As an epistemic community, the network used its scientific 
consensus as a cognitive tool in all campaigns; consequently, it did not vary with 
epistemic community influence.  Further, the one area in which the community used 
economic issue-framing, that is, to lobby the Ministry of Agriculture, there was no 
measurable influence on policy.  The only variable that distinguished the advocacy 
campaign targeting the Forestry Department from the rest was the presence of a high 
level of socialization between the Department and the network.  This suggests that 
socialization is a necessary variable, and that economic issue-framing is neither 
necessary, nor sufficient.  However, it is not clear from this data whether socialization is 
sufficient to cause influence if consensus is absent.  Nevertheless, this chapter 
demonstrates that credible science is insufficient to lead to network influence in 
developing countries.  The following explains how the epistemic community emerged to 
advocate for improved biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country, and details the 
successes and failures of its advocacy efforts. 
 
Overview of Threats to the Cockpit Country 
The Cockpit Country is identified by the World Bank, the UN and Jamaican 
policy makers and civil society as a site of high biodiversity, measured as a variation in 
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the number of species and genetic variation within species.72  This wealth of biodiversity 
is due to the unique geomorphological characteristics of the region.  The isolated conical 
hills and depressions characterizing the area have, in combination with poor species 
dispersal capability, led to the creation of numerous microhabitats and specialized 
evolution.73  Of 150 species of plants have been identified in the area, 101 are endemic.74  
This highly sensitive biodiversity is subject to a range of human activity, both from 
subsistence and small-scale activities from marginalized, agrarian populations, and from 
large-scale extractive activities from powerful economic sectors.   
 
Subsistence and Small-Scale Agriculture 
The Cockpit Country is sparsely settled by various agrarian communities.  These 
communities, consisting of marginalized rural populations, engage in a variety of small-
scale activities, such as: subsistence agriculture; logging; charcoal production; hunting 
and collection of local species; and very occasionally, acting as ad hoc tour guides in for 
                                                 
72
 World Bank, 1999, Jamaica Cockpit Country Conservation Project (Project Proposal 
for GEF: World Bank) p. 1; National Environmental Protection Agency, 2003, National 
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (Kingston: NEPA), passim; The Nature 
Conservancy, 2003, Jamaica National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan: National 
Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston: TNC), pp. 1 
73
 Susan Koenig, with Ann Hayes-Sutton, George Proctor and Peter Vogel, 2000, 
Cockpit Country Conservation Report: Biodiversity Assessment (Prepared for NRCA: 
Kingston, p. ii).   
74
 Southern Trelawny Environmental Agency, 2000, Biodiversity Manual (Trelawny: 
STEA) pp. 6 
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tourists.75   
The impact of these communities on local biodiversity is exacerbated by 
socioeconomic factors common to developing countries, such as high wealth 
concentration and an inequitable distribution of resources.  In the Cockpit Country, 3% of 
landowners control 62% of the available farmland in the area, and as such, small farmers 
have to rent or lease land from larger property owners or otherwise conduct incursions 
into virgin forested areas.  In turn, this contributes to migratory farming and fragmented 
and dispersed agricultural plots.76  As agricultural productivity decreases, farmers turn to 
logging for fuelwood and timber production to generate income.77  
Yam production, one of the main agricultural practices, requires the harvesting of 
yam sticks for crop cultivation, where saplings are cut and stripped to provide a support 
                                                 
75
 “Small scale” agriculture refers to farming carried out on agricultural plots of 10 
hectares or less, and the majority of agriculture in the area is practiced on farms of 4 
hectares or less.  Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land 
Management Report (prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) passim; ENACT 
Programme, 2003, Policy on Strategic Environmental Assessment (draft) (Government 
of Jamaica: Kingston, Jamaica) p. 15.  Logging is not generally a result of industrial, 
large-scale activity, but carried out on a small scale, with teams of 3-4 individuals 
working with chainsaws, and transporting materials manually through the area. Balford 
Spence, Land Management Report, pp. 17-18; Forestry Department, 2001, National 
Forest Management and Conservation Plan (Forestry Department: Kingston, Jamaica) 
pp. 40. 
76
 Tony Weis, 2000, Beyond peasant deforestation: environment and development in 
rural Jamaica (Global Environmental Change 10: 299 – 305), p. 302.  David Barker and 
David J. Miller, 1995, Farming on the Fringe, pp. 281. Several farmers owned more than 
one plot, with a modal class of 3 plots per farmer, cited in this 1995 study. 
77
 Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report pp. 40. 
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for the biomass of the plant.78  The removal of saplings prevents the regeneration of the 
forest, contributing to overall deforestation; in turn, this exacerbates forest degradation 
caused by the conversion of forest cover to monoculture in agricultural production.79  
Nationally, the parish of Trelawny is the primary yam and yam-stick producing parish.80  
Other kinds of decentralized agriculture include marijuana, which creates inroads into 
virgin territory as farmers seek hidden lands for cultivation.81   
Clearing the forest for agriculture or logging creates ecological vulnerabilities and 
gaps that may allow invasive species to gain access to vulnerable areas as well as 
introduces crops as alien invasive species in sensitive habitats.82  Industrialized 
                                                 
78
 Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan.  
79
 See inter alia, Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land 
Management Report (prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) passim; ENACT 
Programme, Policy on Strategic Environmental Assessment (draft) (Government of 
Jamaica: Kingston, Jamaica, 2003) pp. 19; NRCA, 1999, Jamaica: Toward a Watershed 
Policy, Green Paper no. 2/99 (Kingston, Jamaica: 1999) pp. 5 – 6. 
80
 The eastern and southeastern buffer zones provide approximately 42% of Jamaica’s 
national yam output, and of a total 15 million yam-sticks produced nationally per 
annum, an estimated 6 million are produced in the Cockpit Country. See inter alia, 
Balford Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land Management Report 
(prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) pp. 15 
81
 Balfour Spence, 1999, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land 
Management Report (Kingston: NRCA) pp. 17 
82
 The Nature Conservancy, Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan: A Summary, 
Appendix D; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment 
Facility Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally 
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared 
Resource (retrieved October 2005 from 
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 55; also NEPA, National 
Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity, passim; Forestry Department, 2001, Forestry 
Policy 2001 (Kingston: the Forestry Department) 
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commercial sugarcane production takes place in the southwestern and northeastern zones 
of the Cockpit Country, and production of citrus takes place in the northwestern zone.83  
In addition to contributing to monoculture and forest clearance on a larger scale than that 
caused by peasant communities, industrial agriculture introduces chemicals from 
pesticides and fertilizer, which may leach into soils and enter the hydrological regime as 
biological toxins.84   
 
Bauxite Mining in the Cockpit Country 
Since the Cockpit Country contains bauxite deposits, bauxite mining is also a 
potential and significant threat to biodiversity (see Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite Deposits 
in the Cockpit Country).85  Further, bauxite mining, as shall be described below, is a 
nationally prominent industry.  Ore is extracted through the standard open-cast method, 
which entails removing the entire layer of topsoil and vegetation covering a deposit.  
Immediate impacts of this process include deforestation, forest degradation,86 and the 
                                                 
83
 Balfour Spence, 1999, GEF Cockpit Country Land Management Report pp. 18. 
84
 See inter alia, Steve Bass and Tighe Geoghan, 2007, Incentives for Watershed 
Management in Jamaica: Results of a Brief Diagnostic. CANARI Technical Reports 314 
(CANARI: Kingston) pp. 7; NEPA, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity, 
passim.  
85
 See inter alia, Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report pp. 93; David Barker 
and David J. Miller, 1995, Farming on the Fringe. In Barker, D. & D. F. M. McGregor 
(eds) Environment and Development in the Caribbean: Geographical Perspectives, 
(Kingston: The Press, UWI, pp. 271 – 292) pp. 282; Karyl Walker, “Cockpit Country 
Worry.” (Sunday Observer, 19 November 2006); Kayenne Taylor. 1999, Report on the 
Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit Country Conservation Project, pp. 93 
86
 National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA), 2003, National Strategy and 
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emission of potentially toxic fumes and dust.87  In addition, the use of heavy machinery 
in mining areas requires the construction of access roads, which segment ecosystems, 
allow further access into formerly pristine areas and contribute to deforestation.88   
The interaction of these processes can cause widespread soil erosion, downstream 
run-off and sedimentation, exacerbating the loss of forest cover, in turn causing 
eutrophication in aquatic ecosystems.89  The relationship between human activity and 
environmental degradation in Cockpit Country is thus quite complex, especially since the 
environmental resources of this area are highly interdependent.   
 
Tensions in National Economic Development 
These processes complicate the idea that national development may conflict with 
environmental management.  As described in the Founex Report, national economic 
development may be a way for developing countries to supersede their “poverty, 
malnutrition, illiteracy and sheer misery.”90  Moreover, since poverty, malnutrition and 
                                                                                                                                              
Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica. (National Environment and Planning Agency: 
Kingston); NEPA, National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan Development Project: 
Sector Assessment Reports – Mining, (prepared by Morrison, Dennis and Michael 
Mitchell. National Environment and Planning Agency: Kingston, 1999b). 
87
 NEPA, 2003, NBSAP pp. 27 – 28.  Mick Day, 1993, Karst Terrains: Environmental 
Changes and Human Impact (Catena Supplement 25: 109 – 125) pp. 121. 
88
 UNEP, 2000, GEF Project Document, pp. 56. 
89
 Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of 
audiocassette recording 
90
 Margaret Biswas and Asit K. Biswas, 1982, Environment and Sustained Development 
in the Third World: A Review of the Past Decade (Third World Quarterly 4 (3): 479 – 
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misery are exacerbated by environmental problems such as water scarcity and land 
degradation, there is a sense that industrial development is the solution, not only to 
economic woes, but also to environmental problems.   
However, this should be problematized.  In Jamaica, bauxite mining is seen as a 
harbinger of economic growth and national development.  While mining can attract a 
substantial amount of foreign income and is a significant contributor to GDP, mining in 
the Cockpit Country would directly harm the ability of rural communities in the Cockpit 
Country to conduct subsistence activities, either from being directly physically displaced, 
or because the removal of plant cover for ore extraction precludes agricultural activity.  
In other words, national development, if conceptualized as an industrial process, could 
conflict with the environmental and economic wellbeing of already marginalized 
populations.   
 
Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management 
The policy makers responsible for managing natural resources within the Cockpit 
Country are located in a variety of Ministries and Agencies (see Table 2.1: List of Policy 
Makers).  Despite reforms in the Jamaican environmental governance structure since 
1991, authority over environmental management has remained dispersed across various 
state actors, with 52 identifiable articles of legislation pertaining to environmental 
management.91    
                                                                                                                                              
491) pp. 484. 
91
 NEPA, 2003, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biological Diversity in Jamaica. 
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NRCA/NEPA and the Ministry of Environment  
The National Resources Conservation Agency (NRCA) was created in 1991 as 
the executive agency of the Ministry of Environment.92  In 2001, the NRCA was merged 
with two urban planning agencies, the Town Planning Department and the Land 
Development and Utilization Commission, to form the National Environmental Planning 
Agency (NEPA).  The agency regulates the use of fauna through the implementation of 
hunting seasons, licenses for the removal of species for research purposes, and the 
conduct of environmental impact assessments (EIAs).93  The Ministry of Environment, 
lead agency of the NRCA/NEPA, can propose certain areas to be managed as National 
Parks with the approval of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
(Kingston, Jamaica: NEPA) pp. 13; see also Jamaica’s National Biodiversity Strategy 
and Action Plan: National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston, Jamaica) pp. 
3.  
92
 The environmental portfolio has been transferred to various other ministries since its 
inception.  In 1992, the portfolio was created in the Ministry of Tourism and the 
Environment.  In 2000 the portfolio of Environment was shifted to the Ministry of Land 
and Environment; in 2001, as the Ministry of Local Government and the Environment; 
in 2007 as the Ministry of Health and the Environment.  Throughout the dissertation, the 
Ministry will be referred to as the Ministry of Environment for consistency.  Information 
taken from Author interviews with Jean Jo Bellamy, from notes taken from phone 
interview.  Author interview with Franklin McDonald, from notes taken from phone 
interview.  C. Easton and associates, 2004, ENACT Jamaica Case Study: A Governance 
Model in Capacity Enhancement for Sustainable Development (Kingston: ENACT 
Programme, 2004). 
93
 Author interviews with Yolanda Mittoo.  Taken from handwritten notes; NRCA Act, 
retrieved October 2006 from http://www.nrca.org/legal/nrca_act_Ipart1.htm; Town, 
Planning and Development Act, retrieved October 2006 from 
http://www.nrca.org/legal/town_planning_act.htm; Land Development and Utilization 
Act, retrieved October 2006 from http://www.nrca.org/legal/LDUC_ACT.htm 
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The Ministry of Agriculture 
The Ministry of Agriculture, which contains three relevant agencies in the 
Forestry Department, the Mines and Geology Division, and the Jamaica Bauxite Institute 
(JBI), is a key actor in biodiversity management.94  The Ministry of Agriculture can 
declare areas as Forest Reserves, bestowing management authority to the Forestry 
Department.  In addition, the Ministry regulates the issuance of mining licenses over the 
Cockpit Country to bauxite companies. 
 
The Forestry Department 
The Forestry Department, executive agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, gains 
jurisdiction over resource management when the Ministry declares Forest Reserves. In 
these reserves, the Department can regulate activities such as tree clearance, road 
construction and the killing of wildlife, in particular avifauna.95  Since the 1950s, most of 
the area known as the Cockpit Country has been declared a Forest Reserve (see Map 2.2: 
Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country). 
                                                 
94
 Between 1994 and 2008, the Department of Mining was a part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (94 – 97), Ministry of Mining and Energy (97 – 02), Ministry of Land and 
Environment (02 – 05), Ministry of Agriculture (06 – 07), Ministry of Agriculture and 
Lands (07 – June ’08) and the Ministry of Mining and Telecommunications (’08 – 
present).  Mines and Geology Division, 2008, Background Information (retrieved 
December 2007 from 
http://www.mgd.gov.jm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=38
). 
95
 See the 1996 version of the Forest Act in the Forestry Department, 1996, The Forest 
Act 1996.  See also later modifications to the Forest Act that expanded the role of the 
Forestry Department to manage species and biodiversity in the Forestry Department, 
2001, The Forest Regulations and in 2001, Forest Policy.  
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The Department of Mining, the JBI and the Ministry of Agriculture 
The Department of Mining, also known as the Division of Mines and Geology, 
grants mining licenses and evaluates the environmental soundness of post-mining 
activity.96  Its research division in the Jamaica Bauxite Institute (JBI), a quasi-state 
organization established in 1974, acts as the Government’s technical adviser in mining 
and regulates and monitors the activities of industrial bauxite companies.97  The JBI also 
conducts EIAs on mining activities and, where necessary, develops planning strategies 
for population relocation and post-mining land use and restoration.98   
 
The Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
The primary role of the Cabinet in managing the biodiversity in the Cockpit 
Country is the regulation of land use policy.  Cross-cutting agency jurisdictional claims 
can become conflictual, as agencies with different mandates may seek to implement 
incompatible management strategies in the same territorial area.  For example, leases 
established under the Mining Act allow bauxite companies to access subterranean 
                                                 
96
 Dennis Morrison & Michael Mitchell, Mining; National Environment and Planning 
Agency, National Strategy and Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica (National 
Environment and Planning Agency: Kingston, 2003) pp. 14. 
97
 Ivette Torres, The Mineral Industry of Jamaica, (Kingston, Jamaica 1998), pp. 1 – 3. 
Also Shanti Persaud, author interviews conducted July 3, 2006.  Taken from handwritten 
notes. 
98
 Shanti Persaud, author interviews conducted July 3, 2006.  Taken from handwritten 
notes. See also Dennis Morrison & Michael Mitchell, Mining, pp. 14. 
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resources in Forest Reserves, even though standard open-cast mining would result in the 
complete removal of all forest cover.99  Where necessary, the Cabinet may clarify 
competing jurisdictional claims and acceptable land use policy under existing or modified 
environmental regulations.   
 
Transnational Mobilization around the Cockpit Country 
The Emergence of the Cockpit Country Epistemic Community 
As with the policy makers, the groups and individuals that comprise the epistemic 
community relevant to policy management in the Cockpit Country come from a variety 
of backgrounds and specializations (see Table 2.2: List of Epistemic Community 
Members).  Although scientists had been conducting research on the biodiversity in the 
Cockpit Country for decades, the emergence of a social network sharing a rationale for 
action, causal claims and beliefs in appropriate policy began in 1995, when a 
transnational bird-watching ENGO called the Gosse Bird Club became an affiliate of 
Birdlife International under the leadership of Catherine Levy, changing its name to 
Birdlife Jamaica.100  In the mid to late-1990s, Birdlife Jamaica and Peter Vogel, a 
herpetologist from the Department of Life Sciences at the University of the West Indies 
                                                 
99
 The Forest, 1996, The Forest Act and 2001, Forest Regulations.  Government of 
Jamaica, 1947, The Mining Act (amended 1998). 
100
 Mike Schwartz, Susan Koenig. Author interviews, conducted July 30, 2006, 
transcript of audiocassette recording.  Also, Catherine Levy. Author interview, 
conducted June 30, 2006, handwritten notes of telephone interview; Catherine Levy, 
2008, Tribute to Audrey Downer: 1918 – 2007 (retrieved December 2008 from 
http://www.jamaicachm.org.jm/Article/PDF/August2008.pdf).  John Fletcher, author 
questionnaire, received December 9, 2008.  Taken from transcript of typed responses. 
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(UWI), became concerned about a global decline in populations of migratory Yellow- 
and Black-billed parrots.  Since 95% of the world’s population resides temporarily in the 
Cockpit Country,101 this area became an important site for study.  
The onset of interest in the mid-1990s grew, as other researchers joined the 
network.  Birdlife Jamaica hired Susan Koenig, an ornithologist from Arizona, to assist in 
the Cockpit Country parrot study.102  In 1998, Koenig and British freelance researcher 
Mike Schwartz, created the Windsor Research Centre (WRC), a decision motivated in 
part to establish alliances with other organizations, in particular the transnational ENGO 
the Nature Conservancy (TNC).103  In 1999, Birdlife Jamaica, WRC and TNC planned 
the Cockpit Country Conservation Project, an NRCA implemented effort to conserve the 
Cockpit Country as an area of bird habitats and sensitive biodiversity.  Like the eventual 
Project on Sustainable Conservation, this was to be funded by the GEF as relevant to the 
                                                 
101
 University of the West Indies, 2008, Amazona Parrots (retrieved December 2008 
from http://www.mona.uwi.edu/lifesciences/parrot.htm).  Susan Koenig. Author 
interviews, conducted July 30, 2006, transcript of audiocassette recording.  Birdlife 
International, 2006, Bauxite Mining threatens unique Jamaican wildlife (Press release 
available at http://www.birdlife.org/news/news/2006/10/cockpit_country.html). 
102
 Mike Schwartz, Susan Koenig. Author interviews, conducted July 30, 2006, 
transcript of audiocassette recording.  At the time, Koenig was also planning to carry out 
a project to study parrot populations in Dominica.  John Fletcher, author questionnaire, 
received December 9, 2008.  Taken from written responses. 
103
 TNC had considerable assets, claiming over US$4 billion in total assets for the fiscal 
year ending in 2005.  The Nature Conservancy, Consolidated Financial Statements, 
retrieved December 2006 from 
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/annualreport/files/arfinancials2005.pdf.  The Nature 
Conservancy, About Us, retrieved December 2006 from http://www.nature.org/aboutus/. 
Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 12, 2006; Ann Hayes-Sutton, author 
questionnaire received September 27, 2006. 
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CBD, especially Articles 7 and 8.104  However, the project was aborted in 1999 when the 
government of Jamaica refused to use IUCN classification to create a protected area, 
leading to the withdrawal of World Bank financing.105   
 
The Emergence of a Core Pool of Knowledge 
Although aborted, the generation of studies and inter-network links for this 
project contributed to the emergence of a core pool of knowledge and transnational ties 
among concerned actors on Cockpit Country biodiversity.  In 1999, preparation for the 
Cockpit Country Conservation Project led to the production of various reports, including 
a Biodiversity Assessment of the Cockpit Country by Koenig, Ann Hayes-Sutton of 
TNC, and George Proctor, a botanist from UWI and a Land Management Assessment 
conducted by Balfour Spence, a geologist from UWI.  These studies were then circulated 
among research organizations in the network, including Birdlife Jamaica, TNC, the WRC 
and STEA, a local ENGO created in 1996 to advocate for ecotourism in the region.106  
                                                 
104
 World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project (Project prepared for the 
GEF) pp. 1 – 5.  Susan Koenig et al, 2000, Cockpit Country Conservation Project: 
Biodiversity Assessment (Kingston: prepared for NRCA, World Bank).  Susan Koenig, 
author interviews conducted August 3, 2007, taken from audiocassette recording.  Adam 
Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country (Farquharson Forum – A Guest 
Column). 
105
 Adam Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country (Farquharson Forum – A 
Guest Column).  Convention on Biological Diversity, Articles 7 and 8, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml. 
106
 Windsor Research Centre, 2008, Cockpit Country Fact Sheet (retrieved December 
2008 from http://www.cockpitcountry.org/factsheet.html).  The findings of these reports 
and the maps proposed by the community were cited in, inter alia:  Susan Koenig and 
Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted August 3, 2007, taken from audiocassette 
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This growing set of information identified some of the major threats to biodiversity in the 
Cockpit Country, focusing on agriculture, mining and the introduction of invasive 
species.107  Moreover, the reports began outlining the policy preferences of the emerging 
network, including the creation of a National Park in the Cockpit under IUCN guidelines, 
and establishing a geographic outline of what the community felt was the Cockpit 
Country ecosystem (see Figure 1.1).108   
The Forestry Department of Jamaica also became part of the emerging epistemic 
community in this time of emerging interest.  In 1998, the Department concluded a 
decade long LANDSAT study using satellite imaging to determine the net contribution of 
certain types of human activity to deforestation.  This report found that bauxite mining 
was the greatest national contributor to deforestation, and also established the officially 
accepted rate of deforestation nationwide as 0.1% loss in forest cover per annum.109  In 
                                                                                                                                              
recording; TNC, Cockpit Country – Conservation Action Plan – A Summary (Kingston: 
TNC); Adam Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country 
107
 UNEP, 2003, Global Environment Facility Document Document for project titled 
Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: 
Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource (retrieved October 2005 from 
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 97.  Balfour Spence, 2000, 
Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land Management Report (Kingston: NRCA / 
World Bank). 
108
 Balfour Spence, 2000, Land Management Report pp. 3; Susan Koenig et al, 2000, 
Biodiversity Assessment, Figure 3.1 on pp. 12.  The map produced in the Biodiversity 
Assessment was cited on the WRC website, and provided by the TNC to the author 
during field research. 
109
 Forestry Department, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan. 
Retrieved June 2006 from http://www.forestry.gov.jm/PDF_files/ForestPlan.pdf, 2001b 
pp. 19 – 20, pp. 66 
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2000, the Forestry Department started a joint program with the WRC to receive bird-
banding training in order to conduct species monitoring and population assessments of 
birds in the Cockpit Country.110  The Department also created formal working 
relationships with WRC and STEA through the creation of memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs).111  In particular, one of the goals of the MOUs was the creation of Local Forest 
Management Committees (LFMCs), joint training workshops conducted by the Forestry 
Department, STEA and the WRC to share information on subsistence agriculture, and 
promote environmentally friendly practices among residents of local communities.112     
The Forestry Department also incorporated the 1999 studies into its own 
management plans, using the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment to determine which areas 
were of critical importance to management.113  In 2001, TNC began a Parks in Peril (PiP) 
                                                 
110
 Kevin Porter, author interviews conducted over several days in August, 2006.  Taken 
from handwritten notes.  Respondent staff member in the Forestry Department, author 
interviews conducted over several days in August 2006.  Taken from handwritten notes.  
Susan Koenig, author interviews between August 1 and August 6, 2006.  Taken from 
handwritten notes, and transcript of audiocassette recording. 
111
 Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and Management Plan  
(Kingston: the Forestry Department) pp. 45; Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted 
July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording; Owen Evelyn, author interviews 
conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.   
112
 Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and Management Plan  
(Kingston: the Forestry Department) pg. 45; Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted 
July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording; Owen Evelyn, author interviews 
conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.   
113
 In the terminology of the Forestry Department, these were referred to as Critical 
Emphasis Areas.  See Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Conservation and 
Management Plan  (Kingston: the Forestry Department) pp. 34.  Susan Koenig, author 
interviews conducted August 2005. Handwritten notes.  
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project to set priorities for biodiversity management and recommend appropriate 
management strategies.114  The Forestry Department also used this research to design 
internal strategies for the conservation and management of forest resources and 
biodiversity.115   
 
Creation of the Project and Constitution of the Network 
In 2001, Birdlife Jamaica and regional partner ENGOs in the Dominican Republic 
and the Bahamas began to advocate for international funds to manage biodiversity in the 
habitats of migratory birds.  These organizations lobbied for GEF funds to create a 
Project on Sustainable Conservation for Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats as 
relevant to Party obligations under several Articles of the CBD, including Articles 7 and 
8.116  With a total budget of almost US$2 million, the Project on Sustainable 
                                                 
114
 TNC, 2008, Parks in Peril: Conservation Area Planning (retrieved December 2008 
from http://www.parksinperil.org/howwework/methods/cap.html); Kimberly John, 
author interviews conducted July 12, 2006; Ann Hayes-Sutton, author questionnaire 
received September 27, 2006. 
115
 See the text of the Forest Plan in the pp. 9, Section E.10.  See also United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Facility Project Document for 
project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: 
Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource (retrieved October 2005 from 
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 54; The Nature Conservancy, 
2005, Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan: A Summary (TNC: Kingston) pp. 3.   
116
 United Nations Environmental Programme, 2003, Global Environmental Facility 
Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important 
Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource 
(retrieved October 2005 from www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 
49; Convention on Biological Diversity, Articles 7 and 8, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml. 
  
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Conservation in Jamaica was slated to begin in October 2003 and was scheduled to run 
for 42 months under the implementation of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and Birdlife Jamaica.117  In Jamaica, it was agreed that the project would take 
place in the Cockpit Country.  While the precise boundaries of the area covered by the 
new GEF-funded project remained unclear, due to the fact that the Cockpit Country was 
not a legally defined area, the Project for Sustainable Conservation did reference the 
same area size – 450 km2 – as the area given in the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment 
study.118   
After 2001, the network continued to grow, as researchers from international 
academic institutions and domestic organizations joined the advocacy efforts.  These 
included Mick Day, a University of Wisconsin specialist in karst geography, and Dayne 
Buddo, the former director of the Jamaica Clearing House Mechanism (CHM).119  
Precisely bounding the population is complicated by the fact that there are numerous 
scientists who conduct work and contribute to knowledge on the Cockpit Country, yet 
                                                 
117
  See UNEP, Global Environment Facility Project Document, pp. 1. 
118
 UNEP, 2003, GEF Project Document, pp. 51 – 52. 
119
 Mick Day and Susan Koenig, 2002, Cave Monitoring Practices in Central American 
and the Caribbean (Acta Carsologica 30(1): 123 – 134); Dayne Buddo, author 
interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording. The CHM is 
a quasi-state organization in the National History Division of the Institute of Jamaica, 
created in 2002 in order to fulfill Jamaica’s obligations as a signatory to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity with a mandate to conduct sourcing and standardization of data 
and methodology among researchers, and facilitate the exchange of information among 
scientists.  NEPA, The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, pp. 43. Forestry 
Department, National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston, c. 2000) pp. 10; 
Interviews with Dayne Buddo, Jamaica Clearing House Mechanism. Lacunae are often 
identified when CHM staff members participate in ecological workshops 
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should not be considered part of the epistemic community.  In fact, in a database of 
research relevant to Cockpit Country conservation maintained by the WRC, over 270 
scientists have been identified as involved with knowledge production.120   
However, the vast majority, although they do not challenge the core claims of the 
epistemic community, do not self-identify, nor were they identified by the core members 
as participating in the process of policy advocacy.  Their contribution was ad hoc or and 
motivated not by shared principled policy beliefs, but by opportunistic linkages between 
their personal goals and the goals of the epistemic community, for example in attaining 
funds for dissertation research.121    
Nevertheless, some of this work has been significant to the core information of 
the epistemic community.  L. Alan Eyre, a geographer from UWI authored a series of 
studies in the late 1980s calling attention to the high rate of deforestation in Jamaica and 
Cockpit Country in particular, and was one of the most important contributors to the body 
of early scientific knowledge on environmental degradation in the area.122  David Miller, 
                                                 
120
 Database drawn from Windsor Research Centre, Researchers Database, retrieved 
August 2006 from http://wrc.cockpitcountry.com/rdbsearchresearchers.php 
121
 Interviews with Kurt McLaren and Michaela D’Andrea.  Most autonomous natural 
scientists, particularly those from international institutions, do not regularly contribute to 
project reports or policy documents.  The Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan 
(CAP) had over 21 organizations participate in the 2005 workshop, including  the 
Jamaican Caves Organization, Mountain Pioneer Farmers Association, Environmental 
Fund of Jamaica, and Appleton Estate.  (Drawn from the participant list of the Cockpit 
Country Conservation Action Planning Workshop Participants List, provided by 
Kimberly John of TNC).   
122
 Eyre’s work cited by epistemic community members as influential in project 
documents include: “Slow death of a tropical rainforest: the Cockpit Country of Jamaica, 
West Indies”. In: Luria, M., Steinberger, Y. and Spanier, E. (eds.) Environmental quality 
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Duncan McGregor and David Barker, geographers from UWI, have also conducted 
policy relevant research on the economic catalysts for peasant agricultural expansion in 
the area, and its impacts on environmental degradation.123  The core network of the 
epistemic community consisted of a group of approximately twenty to thirty researchers, 
fourteen of whom are listed by name, training and organizational affiliation in Table 2.2: 
List of Epistemic Community Members.   
 
Maintaining the Network 
This network maintained cohesion through a variety of network-building linkages, 
including physical meetings and electronic communication during the progress of the 
project.  In interviews with respondents from the WRC, STEA, TNC, UWI, the CHM and 
the Forestry Department, these links were described as regular, yet generally informal or 
semi-formal affairs, based around the principle of information exchange with identified 
authorities on Cockpit Country biodiversity and management.   
The physical meetings took place either in the Cockpit Country itself, or in 
Kingston.  In the Cockpit Country, the WRC maintained a high profile, due to its physical 
location within the area.  For example, the WRC continued the process of regular bird-
banding training with Forestry Department rangers, including those listed below, from 
                                                                                                                                              
and ecosystem stability – Vol IVA – Environmental quality. (ISEQS Publication: 
Jerusalem, Israel, 1994) pg. 599–606; and “The tropical rainforests of Jamaica.” Jamaica 
Journal, 26(1989):26–37. 
123
 For a good survey of their work, see the volume produced by D.F.M. McGregor, D. 
Barker, and S. Lloyd (eds.)  Resource Sustainability and Caribbean Development (The 
Press: Mona, Jamaica, 1998) passim. 
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2000 until the time of writing.  The Forestry Department maintained its LFMCs in the 
Cockpit Country region with periodic meetings between the Forestry Department, local 
community residents, and the assistance of the region’s ENGOs, namely STEA and the 
WRC, as well as with TNC.  Finally, by virtue of establishing a research outpost within 
the Cockpit Country, the WRC offered room and board, and hence face-to-face contact to 
visiting researchers from UWI and foreign academic institutions, including researchers 
such as Mick Day from the University of Wisconsin, who came to study the area. 
The Kingston meetings had less direct involvement by the WRC.  Dayne Buddo 
from the CHM described an information exchange system maintained by a series of ad 
hoc committee meetings covering the period of the project, ranging in frequency up to 
three times a week, and attended primarily by members of UWI and TNC.  At the same 
time, the physical meetings were only a part of the information exchange and network 
building process.  In 2002, shortly after the TNC launched its PiP program, it held virtual 
conferences with biodiversity experts, administered in part by Susan Koenig of WRC, 
and WRC and CHM maintained online research databases stocked with submitted studies 
conducted by researchers, including those within the network.  Moreover, the process of 
conducting joint studies on Cockpit Country biodiversity that began in the late 1990s 
continued, as combinations of individuals from the WRC, STEA, UWI and TNC 
composed shared reports and manuals on Cockpit Country conservation between 2000 
and 2007.   
A rough diagram of these links can be seen in Figure 2.4: Diagram of Epistemic 
Community Links.  This diagram also suggests that certain organizations, by virtue of 
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the preponderance of connections they shared with other groups and actors, functioned as 
the centrally important organizations of the network.  This perspective was reinforced by 
the fact that these organizations, namely WRC, the Forestry Department, TNC and UWI, 
were also the institutions universally cited as key in environmental advocacy by 
policymakers and researchers involved in Cockpit Country management.   
 
The Cockpit Country Epistemic Community Develops a Managerial Approach 
In interviews, epistemic community members indicated that they were primarily 
concerned about the ecological impacts of biodiversity loss on the Cockpit Country.  
Under this perspective, biodiversity was framed internally as a matter of ecological 
importance, in that each living component of the Cockpit Country ecosystem was 
considered integrally important in maintaining national ecological health and a 
functioning biosphere.  The following section summarizes the internal justification for 
management as given in interviews and documents circulated within the network. 
 
The Impact of Biodiversity Loss 
One concern given about biodiversity management is that the impacts of loss of 
key elements of biodiversity would not be restricted to their immediate area.  In addition 
to being a site of endemic flora, the limestone rainforest, provides a habitat for local and 
migratory fauna.  Arthropods, invertebrates and crustaceans as well as charismatic 
species of Giant Swallowtail butterflies and Black and Yellow-billed parrots, all 
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contribute to ecosystem stability by maintaining intricate trophic relationships.124  This 
interconnectivity was described as a motivating factor in epistemic community interviews 
and documents: 
If you’re looking at it as a scientific point of view, if you lose elements of 
biodiversity, a particular segment of biodiversity, it’s going to impact the 
entire biodiversity. Whether it’s trophic levels, relationships, you’re going 
to impact the entire thing.125  
 
Selective removal of large timber species could cause unpredictable losses 
of biodiversity, far greater than predicted by the proportion of forest 
removed, because of the associated losses of host-specific parasites, 
epiphytes or other symbiotic and commensal organisms.126  
 
And sometimes, you know, you don’t lose something because of a direct 
impact; you lose it because of an indirect impact, because you moved its 
food source… So, sometimes it’s indirect, and you end up wiping out 
these endemic species, these rare species.127  
 
Endemism was also highlighted as an important dimension of concern, as it gives 
an additional dimension of fragility and uniqueness to Cockpit Country ecosystems, as 
described by epistemic community member Dayne Buddo:   
There’s one section in Cockpit Country where there’s this particular road, 
right? There’s this part, these plants are only found in that section, in that 
place, and nowhere else in the world.  I mean, that is remarkable!  Only in 
                                                 
124
 STEA, Biodiversity Manual pp. 8.  Kimberly John, author interviews conducted July 
12, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette recording.   
125
 Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette 
recording 
126
 Susan Koenig, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Report: Biodiversity Assessment 
(Prepared for NRCA/NEPA: Kingston) pp. 30. 
127
 Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette 
recording. 
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that section, that one small section.128   
 
Identifying the Primary Ecological Threats 
Concerns about ecological integrity and the irreplaceable loss of endemic 
biodiversity unified the epistemic community behind the perception that bauxite mining 
was the primary threat to biodiversity in the Cockpit Country.  In interviews and policy 
documents, members emphasized the permanent transformation and disruption of 
ecological relationships that would occur if open-cast mining took place in the area.  
From this perspective, none of the available management strategies could cope with the 
severity of biodiversity loss caused by bauxite mining.  As Spence observed in 1999, 
“[mining] should not be allowed in the Cockpit core because land reclamation will not 
restore the original ecosystem to acceptable levels,”129 and it would become impossible to 
manage the Cockpit Country for other resources, including forest conservation:  
[Forest management] would be obsolete if bauxite mining takes place in 
the Cockpit Country.  There will be no trees to take anyway.  That’s a 
huge threat.  Really above what an NGO can do, really above what 
scientists at the University [of the West Indies] or Institute [of Jamaica] 
can do.  You’re talking about a Minister, almost, decision.  You can’t have 
bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country.  It’s the last place that you want to 
have that.130 
 
The network also shared a concern about the expansion of agriculture and logging 
                                                 
128
 Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette 
recording.  Emphasis based on author interpretation of phrasing of respondent. 
129
 Balfour Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Land Management 
Report (prepared for NRCA: Kingston, Jamaica) pp. 34. 
130
 Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006.  Transcript of 
audiocassette recording. 
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in the Cockpit Country.  Yam harvesting in particular is problematic because of the 
potential to clear vast tracts of land and contribute to deforestation by preventing the 
regeneration of the forest.131  Other threats, such as commercial agriculture, were not 
widely cited as of primary concern by epistemic community members. 
 
Creating a Managerial Framework 
Accordingly, the epistemic community developed an internal set of policy 
preferences that emphasized the ecological importance of biodiversity in the Cockpit 
Country.  These preferred policies were based in part on the ecoregion mapping 
conducted by the emerging epistemic community in 1999, including the Biodiversity 
Assessment, which divided the Cockpit Country into a proposed core area of sensitive 
biodiversity and a buffer zone.132  Throughout the entirety of the Cockpit Country, the 
epistemic community sought a moratorium on mining and a fundamental change in the 
harvesting of yam-sticks.  In the area proposed as a buffer zone, the community sought 
the promotion of sustainable agriculture and regulated timber extraction.  In the core, the 
community also sought a ban on agricultural incursions.   
At the same time, there was some contention within the network about the 
appropriate regulation of agricultural activity in the Cockpit Country.  While all network 
members were opposed to bauxite mining in the area, some members, mostly Jamaican-
                                                 
131
 The Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation 
Plan (Kingston: Forestry Department) pp. 12. 
132
 World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project, pp. 1; Susan Koenig et al, 
1999, Biodiversity Assessment pp. 11 
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born scientists, agreed that sustainable agriculture in the Cockpit Country buffer zone 
was acceptable.  Sustainable agriculture, if managed correctly, could incorporate local 
communities into governance efforts, promoting biodiversity conservation while 
simultaneously maintaining economic wellbeing for marginalized and rural populations, 
as described by interview respondents such as Hugh Dixon of STEA, and Kimberly John 
and Ann Hayes-Sutton of TNC: 
[When] you get the little bits of research… you start to say, “Hey, I can 
use the resource, because I know it’s renewable. And I can know what 
levels I can use it, to make it renewable to sustain it over time,” as against 
indiscriminate use of it.133 
 
I think that all life is obviously, and not so obviously connected, and we 
need to make sure that we keep it working if we want to survive. The fact 
is that we wouldn’t, human beings or humanity wouldn’t be alive if we 
didn’t maintain and manage biodiversity.134  
 
I do not agree that there are species that should never be used for 
economic purposes, nor do I agree that there are some uses (such as 
hunting) that should never be considered, provided such use can be shown 
to be consistent with the conservation of the species... I believe that 
conservation of biodiversity is not just important but fundamental to the 
maintenance of humanity.135 
 
However, a small fraction of the community, three of the approximately two 
dozen members, including both Schwartz and Koenig of the WRC, indicated greater 
opposition to agricultural incursions into the Cockpit Country even from marginalized 
                                                 
133
 Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted July 31, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette 
recording. 
134
 Kimberly John author interviews conducted July 12, 2006. Transcript of 
audiocassette recording. 
135
 Ann Hayes-Sutton, author questionnaire received September 24, 2006.  Transcript of 
typed responses. 
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and subsistence populations.  In interviews, these respondents suggested that permitting 
infrastructure development in the Cockpit Country, such as access to electricity and 
maintained roads, would have a detrimental effect on biodiversity management, by 
contributing to further access into ecologically sensitive zones.  These three took a 
preservationist approach not shared by most of the network, as suggested in the following 
quotes from Schwartz and Koenig. 
…I’m part of the human plague that has descended upon this planet... I 
would be very happy if everyone on this planet voluntarily decided to go 
extinct and leave it to the rest of the animals to have a chance to exist 
[laughing].136  
 
So, we need to set a good example to this future species that takes over the 
world… [We] should voluntarily go extinct to protect the rest of 
biodiversity.137  
 
However, this internal tension was not fundamentally threatening to the coherence 
of the network.  First, these comments did not become a visible part of the internal policy 
debate, and second, maintaining cohesion against the overarching threat of bauxite 
mining remained the primary goal of the epistemic community.   
 
Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN): A Wider Network of Policy Advocacy 
As the epistemic community became constituted around the ecological 
importance of Cockpit Country biodiversity, a larger transnational advocacy network 
                                                 
136
 Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006. 
Transcript of audiocassette recording. 
137
 Susan Koenig, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006. 
Transcript of audiocassette recording. 
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(TAN) emerged to parallel the interest of the research network.  This TAN consisted of a 
range of organizations including: community based organizations (CBOs) of Accompong 
Maroons, descendants of escaped slaves and indigenous Indians; Birdlife International; 
the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ); the Jamaica Environmental Advocacy 
Network (JEAN); the Jamaica Environmental Trust (JET); the Jamaica Caving 
Organization (JCO); the Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust (JCDT).138   
The membership of this network overlapped with that of the epistemic 
community, insofar as Mike Schwartz from WRC and Diana McCauley of JET were 
members of both networks.  In addition, the information generated by the epistemic 
community, highlighting the risk to Cockpit Country ecology posed by bauxite 
expansion, was crucial in raising awareness about the potential encroachment of bauxite 
companies on Cockpit Country biodiversity. 
However, the TAN functioned as a different network, as the organizing principles 
were different from those of the epistemic community. While TAN organizations 
recognized the findings of the epistemic community, including the threat assessment and 
the proposed boundaries of the ecoregion,139 the TAN was not motivated by scientific 
reasoning, nor was the network solely concerned about the ecological ramifications of 
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 World Bank, 1999, Jamaica Cockpit Country Conservation Project (World Bank) pp. 
1; Kenneth Bilby, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Social Component – 
Maroon Component (Kingston: NRCA), passim. 
139
 See Jamaica Caves Organization, 2008, Jamaica Caves Organization Advisory 
(available at http://www.jamaicancaves.org/cockpit-country-bauxite-mining.htm); 
Jamaica Environmental Advocacy Network, 2007, Cockpit Country Fact Sheet 
(Kingston: Press release prepared by JEAN) 
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Cockpit Country biodiversity loss.  For example, TAN organizations, such as the 
aforementioned Accompong Maroons, value the Cockpit Country not only for its role in 
providing economic opportunities, but also for its cultural importance as a historic site in 
which rebel slave garrisons resisted British colonialism.140  Nevertheless, the TAN 
assisted the advocacy efforts of the epistemic community by, among other things, 
contributing funding to the Project on Sustainable Conservation and TNC’s PiP project, 
aiding in the generation of scientific knowledge.141   
 
Framing Alignment 
The constitution of a shared ecological focus within the epistemic community 
demonstrates the process of framing alignment, where actors in a network converge on a 
set of norms, by exchanging information, ideas and building horizontal links.142  In 
                                                 
140
 Kenneth Bilby, 1999, Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Maroon Component, 
passim. See also Peter Haas, 2001, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective 
International Environmental Protection. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press) and 
Haas, 2001, Policy Knowledge: Epistemic Communities (International Encyclopedia of 
the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. Smelser, Neil and Paul Bates. New York) for a 
discussion on the conceptual separation of epistemic communities from other kinds of 
social networks due to the production of the former of scientific knowledge and 
research. 
141
 See TNC, 2006, Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan – a Summary (Kingston: 
TNC), References and Acknowledgements; UNEP, Global Environment Facility Project 
Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Caribbean 
Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource (retrieved 
October 2005 from www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 54.   
142
 David Snow et al, 1986, Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation (American Sociological Review, 51: 464 – 481), pp. 464. See 
also Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders pp. 2-3. Taken from 
the literature on social movement organizations (SMOs), the concept of frame alignment 
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particular, the effort towards creating mutually intelligible information required that 
researchers conduct investigations and create relationships with specialists outside their 
area of expertise.  Besides building connections to other potential allies, this process led 
to a shared understanding of the integrated ecological relationships in the Cockpit 
Country, as described in the following quote by Susan Koenig.   
…[When] you start doing one little bit of research, then the system has its 
story to tell you, and you start seeing the interactions with the other 
animals and the system…  Also, I was kind of the resident biologist...  So 
everyone kind of directs the questions to me and so I started doing bat 
monitoring for Windsor Great Caves, because “birds fly, bats fly, so 
therefore Susan must know something about bats.”143   
 
This also assisted the network in converging upon shared expectations and ideas 
about the important environmental relationships in the Cockpit Country.  The idea that 
bauxite mining was the primary threat did not become a unifying idea until after 2000, as 
ENGOs such as the WRC did not focus initially consider bauxite an imminent danger to 
biodiversity:   
[When] we did our analysis, we were supposed to be looking at the active 
threats, not the potential threats.  And there was no bauxite mining taking 
                                                                                                                                              
explains the internal dynamics within networks converging on a shared set of norms.  
See also Mario Diani, 1996, Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities: 
Insights from Regional Populism in Italy (American Sociological Review, 61: 1053 – 
1069), pp. 1058. 
143
 Susan Koenig, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006.  
Transcript of audiocassette recording.  Also based on interviews with Mick Day, Dayne 
Buddo, Mike Schwartz and Marilyn Headley.  While conducting field research in the 
Cockpit Country, the author engaged in trust building with the members of the WRC.  
During this time, the WRC was engaged in collecting and categorizing species of snakes 
and frogs for taxonomy and population monitoring.  In particular, the TNC Parks-in-
Peril (PiP) Project, commissioned by the World Bank, played a key role in this norm 
transmission. 
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place.  Therefore, it kind of dropped, might have been lower ranked than 
otherwise...144   
 
The diminution of bauxite mining as a major threat was also demonstrated in the 
1999 Biodiversity Assessment, which, while recognizing bauxite mining as a potential 
threat, focused on a management approach aimed at improving practices among local 
subsistence and agrarian populations.145  This benign neglect of bauxite mining as a 
policy concern was justified on the basis of the logistical difficulties of extending mining 
into the difficult-to-access area.146  It was simply too cost-prohibitive for bauxite 
companies to consider extractive efforts in the late 1990s.  
However, after 2000, national policy developments and industrial practices in the 
bauxite sector indicated mounting national interest in developing access infrastructure in 
the Cockpit Country. First, the government of Jamaica began planning the construction of 
Highway 2000, a major thoroughfare traversing the southern coast of the island, with a 
                                                 
144
 Mike Schwartz, author interviews conducted between August 1 and August 6, 2006. 
Transcript of audiocassette recording.   
145
 Susan Koenig, Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Biodiversity Assessment, 2000 
pp. 57. This report also neatly captures epistemic community members’ understanding 
of what ‘intrinsic value’ entails: “Intrinsic value includes recognizing that a species 
deserves to survive for its own sake, regardless of whether it is deemed ‘aesthetically-
pleasing’ or ‘interesting’ and recognizing the contribution of biodiversity in the 
maintenance of a healthy environment” (Ibid pp. 57).  Ann Sutton, author 
questionnaires, conducted September 24, 2006; Mick Day, author questionnaire, 
conducted September 24, 2006. 
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 Mick Day, author questionnaires, conducted September 24, 2006; Ann Sutton, author 
questionnaires, conducted September 24, 2006.  Marilyn Headley, author interviews 
conducted July 6, 2006 
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link between the north and south coast passing through the Cockpit Country.147  Although 
the plan for this north-south link was abandoned due to the foreseen difficulties of 
constructing the highway within Cockpit Country, the initial proposal indicated that the 
government was considering the possibility of major and unprecedented infrastructure 
development in the Cockpit.148  Second, as bauxite deposits were being depleted 
nationwide, companies began increasing the scope of mining activities across the island, 
and it increasingly seemed as if Cockpit Country with its projected reserves would be an 
imminent target for mineral extraction.149  Consequently, by 2001, the network agreed 
internally that mining was an imminent concern.  
[Now, the TNC’s] analysis or our analysis gives bauxite mining as the 
biggest threat.  And we certainly agree with that.150   
 
 
Measuring the Epistemic Community’s Knowledge Consensus 
Along with adopting a framework that shared a focus on ecological relationships, 
the network established an intersubjective consensus to explain the causal relationships 
between human activity and environmental degradation.  In interviews, respondents in 
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 Balfour Spence, Land Management Report, pp. 21.  Kayenne Taylor, 1998 Report on 
the Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit Country Conservation Project pp. 
94 – 95.  Marilyn Headley, author interviews conducted July 6, 2006. Transcript of 
audiocassette recording 
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 Marilyn Headley, author interviews conducted July 6, 2006. Transcript of 
audiocassette recording. 
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 Shanti Persaud, author interviews conducted July 3, 2006.  Taken from handwritten 
notes. 
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the epistemic community and the broader scientific community indicated that there was 
no contention, either within the network or externally, about the severity and extent of the 
anthropogenic threats facing biodiversity management in the region.  As a result, the 
network in this case evinced the characteristics of an epistemic community, namely a 
knowledge consensus and a rationale for action.   
 
Measuring Consensus on Bauxite Mining 
Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Causes  
The idea that bauxite mining was an overwhelming threat to biodiversity in the 
Cockpit Country after 2000 was universally shared within the epistemic community.  
First, bauxite production has a privileged position in Jamaican national development.  
Bauxite mining is a significant percentage of annual GDP, between 8.5% and 10% per 
annum.  In 1999 production stood at 13 million tonnes per annum, or 7% of the total 
world supply.151  Second, governmental agencies also directly benefit from bauxite 
production.  Between 2004 and 2006, the JBI received J$5m in interest from bauxite 
deposits and J$11.5m from commercial projects.  The government has 50% ownership in 
Clarendon Alumina Production, one of the bauxite companies possessing prospecting 
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 Although this figure is the contribution of mining in all sectors, bauxite mining 
makes up 99% of the total revenues of the mining sector.  See the NRCA reports 
prepared by Dennis Morrison and Michael Mitchell, Sector Assessment Reports – 
Mining, 1999 pp. 2-3; STATIN, Jamaican Statistics (Retrieved August 2007 from 
http://www.statinja.com/stats.html).  NRCA reports prepared by Dennis Morrison and 
Michael Mitchell, Sector Assessment Reports – Mining, 1999 pp. 2-3; STATIN, 
Jamaican Statistics (Retrieved August 2007 from http://www.statinja.com/stats.html). 
  
 
 
 
 
80 
 
leases in the Cockpit Country.152  Bauxite interests have also been highly placed in other 
agencies, with the appointment in the mid 2000s of Parris Lyew-Ayee, the director of the 
JBI, to the directorship of NEPA.153  Third, there is wide recognition of which specific 
companies are likely to conduct mining in the area.  At the time of writing, the only 
companies with Ministry of Agriculture-issued mining licenses for the bauxite in the 
Cockpit Country were Alcoa and Clarendon Aluminium Production.   
 
Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Consequences  
Further, the common recognition of the ecological importance of Cockpit Country 
biodiversity led to a shared understanding that the consequences of bauxite mining would 
be the irrevocable loss of sensitive biodiversity.  This was facilitated by the 
standardization of industrial extraction practices in the bauxite sector, and awareness of 
these practices within the network.  Concern about the irreparable nature of bauxite 
mining on biodiversity can be found in internally cited reports such as TNC’s Cockpit 
Country Conservation Action Plan,154 STEA’s Biodiversity Manual,155 and in interview 
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 Jamaica Information Service, 2008, The Jamaica Bauxite Institute (retrieved 
December 2008 from http://www.jis.gov.jm/jamaicaBauxiteInstitute/index.asp); Jamaica 
Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2005, Public Bodies – Jamaica Bauxite Institute 
(retrieved from http://www.mof.gov.jm/downloads/2004/ped/JBI.pdf), pg. 96. 
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 Carib Cement, 2005, 2005 Annual Report (retrieved December 2008 from 
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 The Nature Conservancy, Cockpit Country Conservation Action Plan: A Summary. 
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responses from network members Owen Evelyn from the Forestry Department, and other 
respondents from UWI.  
You will notice that in the [National Biodiversity Strategy and] Action 
Plan, the primary threats, or potential threats, is bauxite mining. Okay? 
We regard it as probably the most significant threat, because most of the 
Cockpit is bauxite...  Other threats are not that extensive. But the bauxite 
is extensive, because if they go inside, it will affect all the biodiversity 
planning that we have identified.156  
 
[Any] kind of intrusive land cutting that the bauxite company would do 
would just basically kill the area.  There would be nothing left.157 
 
 
Bauxite Mining: Agreement on the Extent  
During the period of transnational mobilization and network-building, there had 
been no mining in the Cockpit Country.  Nevertheless, there was a shared understanding 
within the network about the likely extent of bauxite mining in the region due to the 
recognition of certain details.  The community shared maps illustrating the presence, size, 
and location of bauxite reserves in the Cockpit Country (see Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite 
Deposits in the Cockpit Country).  These maps and figures were cited in reports such as 
the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment conducted by Koenig of the WRC, Vogel of 
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 Southern Trelawny Environmental Agency (STEA), Biodiversity Manual (Kingston, 
Jamaica c. 2003), pp. 15.   
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 Owen Evelyn, author interviews conducted June 23, 2006. Transcript of 
audiocassette recording. 
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 UWI researcher, author interviews not for attribution.  Transcript of audiocassette 
recording. 
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Birdlife/UWI, Hayes-Sutton of TNC and Proctor of UWI158 and the Land Management 
Assessment conducted by Spence.159  Since the network was convinced by 2001 that 
bauxite companies intended to mine the Cockpit, these maps contributed to a growing 
alarm about the likely scope of bauxite extraction activities in the area: 
…[Mining] is the biggest threat.  It’s an inevitable threat, and it’s going to 
be a significant impact on the Cockpit Country.160 
 
…[The] whole issue that they will face in the near future, as you probably 
would have heard, is that [the Cockpit Country is] supposed to be a huge 
bauxite reserve.  And so if we do run out of areas of bauxite outside the 
Cockpit Country, they’re going to actually head in there.161    
 
Consequently, the epistemic community demonstrated a shared agreement about 
the scientific knowledge on every indicator of knowledge about bauxite mining and 
environmental degradation.  As described above, a qualitative assessment of the status of 
scientific knowledge indicates that, for this process, scientific consensus within the 
network is both present and strong. 
 
Measuring Scientific Consensus on Agriculture and Logging  
In comparison to the state of knowledge on the effect of bauxite mining on 
environmental degradation, there was less agreement within the epistemic community on 
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 Koenig et al, 1999, Biodiversity Assessment (figure 3.8, pp. 23). 
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 Spence, c.2000, Land Management Report (figure 6).  
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 Dayne Buddo, author interviews conducted July 20, 2006. Transcript of audiocassette 
recording. 
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the causes, consequences and extent of agricultural environmental degradation.  This was 
due to a lack of clear information in some sectors, differences in methodology within the 
network, and a qualitative difference between the network’s approach to understanding 
the ecological impact of bauxite, and its approach to agriculture.  Nevertheless, the 
observed dissensus was not described by the network as a cause for undermining the core 
knowledge consensus. 
 
Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Causes  
First, marijuana cultivation is illegal in Jamaica, though regularly carried out as 
part of the informal economy.  Similarly, unauthorized logging and unauthorized farming 
of licit crops takes place in the Cockpit Country.  In these cases, activities which are 
hidden from the view of policymakers do not follow any formal reporting systems. Thus, 
for some agricultural activities, it is difficult to isolate specific actors, practices and 
conduct accurate models of the environmental impact of agricultural activity.162   
As a proxy indicator for the lack of agreement on the causes of subsistence 
agriculture, epistemic community members do not have a consistent ranking scheme of 
the severity of the threat of agricultural activity. The terms used to classify and evaluate 
the different activities, namely “agriculture,” “yam-stick cultivation,” and “forest 
conversion” are not used in a consistent manner across policy documents. TNC’s threat 
assessment for its PiP program lists the three as distinct, each with differing levels of 
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 O. B. Evelyn and R. Camirand, 2003, Forest cover and deforestation in Jamaica: an 
analysis of forest cover estimates over time (International Forestry Review, 5: 354 – 
363) pp. 355; David Barker and David J. Miller, 1995, Farming on the Fringe, passim. 
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importance, and separating the low-ranked yam-stick harvesting from broader 
agricultural practices.163  The Forestry Department, while ranking yam-stick harvesting as 
a prominent threat, also separated it from agriculture, while the 1999 Land Management 
Assessment produced by Spence of UWI included yam production in agriculture, calling 
it the “most significant immediate threat” to biodiversity management in the Cockpit 
Country.164  Nevertheless, network members from the Forestry Department, WRC, STEA 
and UWI all ranked yam-stick harvesting, whether included as an agricultural activity, or 
counted separately, as the prominent agricultural threat in the region, with only TNC as 
an outlier. 
 
Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Consequences  
A lack of clear information also inhibits collecting scientific information on the 
consequences of subsistence agriculture and logging on biodiversity.  For example, a 
1995 study of subsistence agriculture in the Cockpit Country revealed samples of small 
farmers who completely bulldozed forested areas for cattle, but also indicated that other 
farmers painstakingly conserved the natural forest during crop cultivation.165 Although 
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Cockpit Country Management Report: Land Management Report (prepared for NRCA: 
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marijuana cultivation may contribute to further incursions into sensitive areas, it may 
inadvertently lead to the conservation of certain broad-leafed tree species due to their 
utility as aerial camouflage.166  As a result, precisely accounting for the impact of 
agricultural activity on biodiversity in the Cockpit Country would require an extensive 
qualitative survey of decentralized, under-reported activity; failing this, the current 
models have some inescapable element of uncertainty. 
 
Agriculture and Logging: Agreement on the Extent  
Finally, the fact that agricultural activity was considered to be less severe of a 
threat than bauxite mining contributed to another element of uncertainty.  With bauxite 
mining, it was assumed that any such activity would lead to complete destruction of 
biodiversity.  Since agricultural activity was less traumatic, the network relied on more 
finely gradated assessments of environmental degradation, which led to some 
disagreement when network members could not agree on a shared methodology for 
measuring the extent of biodiversity loss.   
The Forestry Department used its LANDSAT study to fix the rate at 0.1% loss of 
forest cover per annum, a figure that is also recognized currently by TNC.167   At the 
same time, UWI scientists have produced reports positing a range from a low of 0.03% to 
a high of 11.3% loss per annum.168  Spence’s 1999 Land Management Assessment 
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 Balfour Spence, GEF Cockpit Country Management Report pp. 18. 
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 Forestry Department, National Conservation and Management Plan pp. 23 – 24.   
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 See a survey of the rates of deforestation in O. Evelyn and R. Camirand 2003, Forest 
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claimed the rate of deforestation in the Cockpit Country between 1961 and 1991 at 
0.97%, and the 1999 Biodiversity Assessment cited studies by L. Alan Eyre fixing the 
rate of loss at 2.8%.   
One of the cited reasons for this recognized discrepancy is the presence of 
methodological differences, particularly in distinguishing between native and non-native 
species, and in projecting rates of change of foliage cover over time.  Indeed, this was 
one of the conclusions of the 1999 Cockpit Country Conservation Project reports by 
TNC, WRC and UWI network members.169  However, there were no references to this 
disagreement in the contemporary policy proposals and internal documents, even as there 
was a verbal acknowledgement of this difference in interviews.   
To reiterate, there was universal agreement on the dimensions of bauxite mining 
and its causal impact on biodiversity loss.  In contrast, there was some disagreement 
between TNC and the rest of the network about the precise causes of agricultural 
degradation, some diffuse uncertainty about the consequences of agricultural degradation, 
and despite an official acceptance of the Forestry Department’s figure, acknowledgement 
by all members of disagreement on the extent of agricultural degradation in the Cockpit 
Country.  Nevertheless, these disagreements did not surface in the network’s policy 
                                                                                                                                              
cover and deforestation in Jamaica: an analysis of forest cover estimates over time 
(International Forestry Review 5: 354 – 363) pp. 355.  Forestry Department, 2001, 
National Forest Conservation and Management Plan pp. 23 – 24.  Balfour Spence, GEF 
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discussions, and although consensus was certainly higher in the case of bauxite mining, it 
was nevertheless present throughout the network on the anthropogenic causes of 
biodiversity loss in the Cockpit Country. 
 
Measuring Network Socialization with Managers 
While consensus was relatively uniform across the threats observed by the 
network, there was substantial variation in the degree of socialization between the 
epistemic community and targeted policymakers in natural resource management 
agencies.   
 
High Socialization with the Forestry Department 
There were very robust ties between the Forestry Department and the network.  In 
fact, the Department functioned as part of the epistemic community.  As indicated above, 
this meant that researchers from the civil society and the governmental agency shared 
information and knowledge about causal relationships and the importance of biodiversity 
in the region through joint reports, training sessions, and information exchanges.  Further, 
the Department conducted LFMCs with STEA, TNC and WRC.  However, the strength 
of this relationship between policymaker and epistemic community distinguishes the 
Forestry Department from other natural resource management agencies in Jamaica.   
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Very Low Socialization between the Network and NEPA 
In the case of the environmental management agency, NEPA, the relationship 
between the network of scientists and the governmental agency was almost antagonistic.  
This was not always the case.  Prior to 2001, when the agency was still referred to as the 
NRCA, members of the emerging epistemic community had established strong 
relationships and created a pattern of information sharing with the environmental agency.  
For example, the NRCA commissioned a series of Sector Assessment Reports in 1999 to 
prepare for the construction of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 
(NBSAP), one of the requirements of the CBD.170  Among some of the researchers 
contacted by the NRCA to contribute information included epistemic community 
members Peter Vogel from UWI and Ann Hayes-Sutton from TNC.   
However, the 2001 restructuring of the agency led to a rupture in the relationship 
between the network and the agency.171  First, epistemic community members were 
concerned about the politics behind amalgamating the NRCA with the Town Planning 
Department, given earlier tensions between those two bodies:  
[The Town Planning Department] wanted to do [a housing scheme], and 
suddenly they found to their surprise and amazement that they couldn’t do 
it, because NEPA – NRCA – had refused permission, because of the 
environmental impact.  And the government took the shortcut route and 
said, “Well, we’ll fix you.  We’re going to amalgamate Planning and 
NRCA into one, NEPA, so this doesn’t happen again.”172 
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Second, after restructuring, the organization had an almost entirely new staff, with 
little institutional continuity from the previous agency.  In interviews, former high-
ranking NRCA staffers indicated that this weakened the regulatory authority of the 
agency, as the loss of expertise severely hampered the credibility and capacity of the 
organization to assess and evaluate environmental processes.173  The perceived decline of 
the NRCA/NEPA as a regulatory power later contributed further to the rupture of 
communication between the civil society and the agency.   
The problem with NEPA from what I understand, is how the appointments 
are made.  The high echelon people are people who are appointed by the 
government, and they might not have any interest in anything per se, other 
than just doing their jobs.  And they aren’t necessarily the best people for 
this position.174   
 
In 2005, tensions between the civil society and NEPA came to a head when 
members of the epistemic community and the environmental TAN, such as the JET sued 
the agency, alleging that NEPA conducted a compromised and flawed environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) of a proposed hotel development on the north coast.  From an 
environmental perspective, the suit was successful, as Justice Brian Sykes barred 
construction of the hotel, asserting that NEPA had failed its mandate.  However, as 
described in interviews with NEPA staff and epistemic community members, the public 
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confrontation between the civil society and the agency created irreconcilable tensions 
between the ENGOs and the environmental ministry. 
 
Low Socialization between the Network and Other Agencies 
While less confrontational, the remainder of relationships between the civil 
society epistemic community members and natural resource management agencies was 
characterized by far less socialization than was the case with the Forestry Department.  
Channels of communication between the various populations of social actors were not 
institutionalized, but rather ad hoc and irregular.  Most of the communication to 
policymakers took place through letter-writing drives and media efforts by a few actors, 
in particular Mike Schwartz of the WRC, Ann Hayes-Sutton of TNC and Diana 
McCauley of the Jamaica Environment Trust (JET), who wrote letters to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and issued press releases during 2005 – 2006.  Occasionally, epistemic 
community organizations would attempt to create more formal communication between 
the populations of policymakers and civil society researchers.  For example, in planning 
for the Conservation Action Plan, TNC held a series of workshops with epistemic 
community organizations from 2004 – 2006, and invited policy makers from the JBI, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment, NEPA and the Forestry 
Department to attend.175  However, only the Forestry Department participated while the 
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JBI, NEPA and the remainder of the Ministry of Agriculture abstained, a pattern of 
agency participation characterized as typical by epistemic community respondents.  
Consequently, the only campaign in which socialization between the network and the 
policymaker agencies existed, occurred in the case of the Forestry Department. 
 
Measuring the Framing Strategies Used by the Network 
Strategic Economic Frames: Persuading Managers 
In assessing the advocacy efforts of the network, economic frames were used 
extensively in communicating with the various managers associated with bauxite mining.  
Between 2001 and 2006, the network deliberately adopted the language of economic 
cost-benefit analysis to “translate” its claims by constructing models indicating that 
biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country was intimately linked to economic 
activity in other nationally important economic productive sectors, and that degradation 
would lead to economic opportunity losses.  Through interviews and policy documents, 
epistemic community members stated that this was a necessary strategy of 
communicating with policy makers that were primarily concerned with fostering national 
development through prominent industrial sectors.   
Since our decision makers, I don’t think they are really well educated 
about ecology and so on… I think it’s best we, to frame the message of 
biodiversity management in something that in a sense seems 
[economically] conservative.176  
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Using Economics to Frame Environmental Impacts 
The productive sector used to highlight the link between environmental 
management and national economic development was the tourist industry.  The choice of 
tourism was considered appropriate, as tourism is a comparable contributor to national 
development, bringing a similar amount of foreign revenue, and in 2003 contributing 
10% of GDP and 50% of national foreign currency earnings.  Including auxiliary 
employment, tourism is credited with contributing to the creation of 1 in every 4 jobs in 
Jamaica.177  According to interviews with the epistemic community network, this link 
was deemed more convincing than appeals to environmentalism. 
We’re trying to communicate to [policy makers] in dollars and cents. 
Which is a language that they more understand than to say, “This is a 
particular species that is only found in Jamaica.” They probably don’t 
relate to it as much, as then saying, “If you lose this, you stand to lose 
millions of dollars in tourism.”178  
 
The link was made possible by the importance of the Cockpit Country to the 
hydrological regime of the north coast.  The Cockpit Country encompasses several 
watersheds, or areas “drained by a single stream, river, or drainage network,” organized 
since 1995 by the Water Resources Authority into two Watershed Management Units 
(WMUs), the Martha Brae and Rio Bueno WMU.179  These WMUs supply municipal and 
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drinking water to the northwestern section of the island, including to economically 
important tourism centers in Montego Bay.  In 2003, TNC began planning a water 
valuation study of the hydrological resources of Cockpit Country, intending to 
demonstrate the economic importance of the region, distributing these results to the 
Forestry Department, the JBI, NEPA, the Ministry of Environment and the Water 
Resources Authority.180   
Water resources were regarded as a key starting point for the valuation of 
the ecological services of Cockpit Country because of the very significant 
municipal, agricultural and tourism interests downstream of the area and 
because it would provide a compelling cost-benefit analysis when 
compared with high-value activities such as bauxite mining.181  
 
What we were going to do is attach a cost, that there’s a price associated 
with the clean water that’s supplied by the Cockpit Country… If you 
compare water with bauxite mining… [compare] the benefits to the 
society and the economy of maintaining the resources.182  
 
[Bauxite] brings revenue into a weak economy, so, you let the land, and 
mine the bauxite, and get out as much as possible, and let’s rake in the 
money…  [The] only thing that is going to stem that exploit, 
indiscriminate exploit, is the ability of the communities to put forward a 
case on the value of the water.183   
                                                                                                                                              
are a total of 26 WMUs in Jamaica and a total of 33 watersheds. 
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audiocassette recording. 
183
 Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted July 31, 2006.  Transcript of audiocassette 
recording. 
  
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
At the same time, community members themselves continued to believe that the 
real goal of environmental management was the maintenance of ecological integrity. The 
same documents and reports that advocated using economic arguments to communicate 
with policy makers observed that the primary goal of these arguments was to “conserve 
the biodiversity of the area in perpetuity,” noting that the water resources were chosen as 
the main focus of the conservation efforts, as “the karstic freshwater ecosystems [are] a 
major component of Cockpit Country’s biodiversity.”184  Further, epistemic community 
members asserted through interviews that economic valuation was an incomplete metric 
in understanding the fundamental value of biodiversity.   
So, to some extent, we have to find, we have to – to make a rational 
decision, you should know what’s the value of the biodiversity, of the geo-
diversity, and compare it with the value of the bauxite.  That’s one 
approach, the economic approach…  [But] we have 67 or something 
different species of mosquito in Jamaica, and they’re all valuable, and 
some are endemic, and we love them too.  I mean, how do you value 
them?  So it is, there is a problem.185 
 
How do you put a value on some of these things?  …We’re talking about 
plant material, you know?  I mean, apart from actually timber, you know?  
How do you value these other, other targets that we have identified?  
We’re talking about the yellow Boa, and the butterfly.  How do you put a 
value to these?186 
 
Consequently, the epistemic community did use economic framing although, as 
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will be seen later, not in every campaign attempt.  As an epistemic community, this 
network also generated an intersubjective consensus on the primary causal relationships 
in the environmental threats studied.  Finally, the network generated socialization 
processes, although limited to the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The following section discusses the epistemic community advocacy, illustrating when the 
network made use of economic frames to communicate its arguments. 
 
Environmental Policy Advocacy 
Ministry of Agriculture: Establish a Moratorium on Bauxite Mining 
Having established an economic argument to curb mining, the epistemic 
community first sought the declaration, by the Ministry of Agriculture, of an official 
moratorium on bauxite mining in the area.  Throughout the period of epistemic 
community advocacy, knowledge brokers conducted a letter-writing drive to Minister 
Roger Clarke, as well as conducting a media drive to convince the government of its 
position.187  Existing environmental regulations were simply ineffective, and the threat of 
bauxite mining was too great to environmental, cultural, and social concerns in the 
Cockpit Country.   
Under Jamaican law, the primary environmental regulatory policy over mining is 
the requirement that companies restore mined land, governed by certification processes 
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from the Department of Mining.188  However, mined lands do not have to be restored to 
their previous ecological relationships, but can be converted to commercial agriculture, or 
simply to grasslands.  In fact, between 1995 and 2000, the bauxite companies Kaiser and 
Alcan planted a total of 3 million trees in restoration efforts, with the vast majority of 
these as commercial fruit trees, grass or fast-growing species,189 a process which 
nevertheless was certified as adequate restoration by the Department of Mining.190  Citing 
uncertainty, the epistemic community argued for the precautionary approach:  
[Mining restoration] is complicated, because once the soil is removed, the 
hydrology of the area is altered, and we don't really understand the 
relationship among soil dwelling microbes, fungi and all other plant and 
animal species, such as pollinating roles, seed dispersal and chemical 
relationships.191 
 
As a result, epistemic community members rejected the idea that mining 
restoration would be an adequate environmental management strategy in the Cockpit 
Country, pointing out: “You cannot restore forest which has been completely cleared.”192   
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 Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and Conservation Plan pp. 
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To be sure, there was some disunity in the community’s campaign with the 
Ministry of Agriculture in this regard.  Instead of supporting the network’s hardline 
stance against mining, the Forestry Department recommended new regulations on post-
mining activity, advocating that companies reforest mined areas, or an equivalent area 
elsewhere with comparable species.  This proposal, referred to as the “no net-loss”193 
strategy, contrasted with the preferences of the civil society members of the epistemic 
community.   
However, in interviews, Forestry Department personnel admitted that the removal 
of forest cover would permanently change the biodiversity composition of the area.  
Staffers admitted that the compromise position was a second-best preference, chosen only 
in assumption of the fact that bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country was inevitable: 
Well, what we are trying to get across to the bauxite companies is that… if 
you’re taking out forest land, you should really start thinking that you 
need to replace some forest somewhere...  Purists don’t agree because they 
say that you’ve lost the forest.  Well, we’ve lost the forest.  So our next 
step now is to get them to put a forest somewhere else.   
 
But you know, you can’t really replace the Cockpit Country.  You can put 
a forest somewhere else, you can pay for a forest to be planted somewhere 
else, but you can’t replant the Cockpit Country.194 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Parks-in-Peril Project, in Bridgette B. Barrett, Strategies Workshop Report, prepared for 
The Nature Conservancy (Kingston: TNC, 2005) pp. 5 
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Ministry of Environment: Establish a National Park under IUCN Guidelines 
One of the longstanding policy recommendations held by the epistemic 
community, was the creation by the Ministry of Environment of an IUCN classified 
National Park to define the borders and management strategy of the Cockpit Country.  
This was one of the core recommendations in the 1999 studies, and the associated 
Cockpit Country Conservation Project.195  Like the proposed moratorium, this suggestion 
rested on the network’s attempt to use economic arguments to highlight the benefits of 
environmental management, by stating that IUCN classification would raise the 
international profile of the Cockpit Country, encouraging international donors to 
contribute funds for domestic biodiversity management.196   
If adopted, this policy would legally establish the buffer zone and core areas of 
the Cockpit Country under Jamaican law.  While much of the area known as the Cockpit 
Country is classified as a Forest Reserve, and while the area is generally recognized in 
common language in Jamaica, and although the GEF-funded project references “the 
Cockpit Country,” the area was not, at the launch of the project, a legally defined 
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 Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, 2004, Categorization of Protected Areas in 
Jamaica (The Nature Conservancy: Kingston), p. 3.  Sacha-Renée Todd, A Framework 
to Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas pp. 3-4.  World Bank, 1999, Cockpit Country 
Conservation Project (Project prepared for the GEF) pp. 1 - 5 
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 Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, Categorization of Protected Areas in Jamaica 
(The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, 2004) passim; Sacha-Renée Todd, A Framework to 
Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas, passim. By one study, tourists visiting the 
BJCMNP spend US$2.5 million in the area per year. According to one study, if the Park 
were to implement access fees, there would be a further gain of US$420,000 per annum, 
making it a model for developing ecotourism as a means for environmental protection 
and sustainable development (see ENACT, Policy on Strategic Environmental 
Assessment, pp. 20). 
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geographical area.  If the IUCN National Park used the boundaries suggested by the 
community, this would increase the size of the area currently protected under Forest 
Reserve status (see Figure 2.2: Map of Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country).197 
Moreover, the adoption of IUCN classification was considered instrumental in 
properly implementing the CBD.  In 1997, the NRCA recommended the adoption of 
IUCN standards in Jamaican protected areas management.  In 2004, Ann Hayes-Sutton, 
citing the Programme of Work on protected areas adopted at the 7th Conference of Parties 
(COP-7) of the CBD, called for the adoption by the Forestry Department and NEPA of 
IUCN classification to create an internationally standardized, protected area in the 
Cockpit Country.198   
Besides complying with the CBD recommendations and the COP-7 
pronouncements, IUCN status was considered a more permanent form of protection than 
are Forest Reserves.  While Forest Reserve status is considered by the government of 
Jamaica to be in technical compliance with Article 8 of the CBD, the legislative structure 
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 See inter alia NEPA, 2003, NBSAP passim; David Barker, 1998, Yam Farmers on 
the Forest Edge of Cockpit Country: Aspects of Resource Use and Sustainability in 
McGregor, D.F.M., Barker, D. & S. Lloyd Evans Resource Sustainability and 
Caribbean Development: Geographical Perspectives, (Kingston: The Press U.W.I), pp. 
357 – 371 
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(The Nature Conservancy: Kingston) pp. 3; Sacha Reneé-Todd, 2006, A Framework to 
Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas (prepared for the Protected Areas Systems Master 
Plan) pp. 3; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004, COP 7 Decision VII/28: 
Protected Areas (Articles 8 (a) – (e)) §31. 
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allows mining leases to be issued in Forest Reserves and National Parks.199  In other 
words, National Parks and Forest Reserves can be overruled by bauxite companies 
interested in extracting resources in the Cockpit Country.200   
 
Ministry of Environment and NEPA: Implement Ecotourism as a 
Management Strategy 
In a related issue, the epistemic community recommended the promotion of 
ecotourism in the Cockpit Country, both as a biodiversity management plan, and as a 
revenue generating activity.  Ecotourism proposals date back to the 1999 campaign, when 
Spence’s Land Management Assessment requested $561,000 Jamaican from the 
government of Jamaica to develop infrastructure for ecotourism in the proposed buffer 
zones and core of the Cockpit Country.201  In 2001, the Project for Sustainable 
Conservation continued the call for ecotourism as a viable means of promoting greater 
                                                 
199
 The Nature Conservancy, 2003, Jamaica National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan: National Implementation Support Partnership (Kingston: NRCA) pp. 12.  Forest 
Reserves, one of the earliest forms of systematic protected areas have been in place since 
1930 with the creation of The Forest Act.  The Forest Act was originally intended 
primarily to regulate extraction and production for industrial timber interests, rather than 
create areas specifically for environmental protection.   Sacha Renée-Todd, A 
Framework to Manage Jamaica’s Protected Areas, pp. 3.   
200
 Earthtrends, 2003, Protected Areas (retrieved December 2008 from 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/data_tables/Bio2_2003.pdf).  Under the epistemic 
community’s and the Forestry Department’s understanding, National Park status would 
not remove the Forestry Department’s control of the area as a Forest Reserve in 
Jamaican law.  Forestry Department, 2001, National Forest Management and 
Conservation Plan pp. 58.   
201
 Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report, passim 
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state interest in conservation, as well as changing domestic practices of subsistence and 
agricultural communities.202   
In part, the administration of the IUCN defined Park could be funded by 
promoting ecotourism and low-impact recreational activities in protected areas of the 
Cockpit, and charging user access fees to foreign and domestic visitors.203  An ancillary 
benefit gained by promoting ecotourism in the Cockpit Country would be the alleviation 
of pressure caused by the concentration of the tourist market on large-scale development 
in high-traffic coastal areas, which have been showing signs of degradation, beach 
erosion and shallow water pollution.204   
As described above, these policy recommendations were organized in such a 
manner as to highlight the economic merit of biodiversity conservation in the Cockpit 
Country.  In contrast, recommendations to the Forestry Department to regulate 
agricultural and subsistence activities did not rely on linking biodiversity management to 
prominent economic sectors important to national development.  When economic 
arguments were used, they referenced the economic livelihood of marginalized, agrarian 
populations. 
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 UNEP, 2000, GEF Project Document pp. 101; UNEP, 2000, GEF Project Document 
pp. 51 - 54. Burnt Hill Road was particularly important to developing an effective 
environmental protection management regime. It is the only one that traverses the 
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Forestry Department: Implement Sustainable Agriculture 
One of the concerns about implementing protected area status in the Cockpit 
Country was the potential for prohibiting agricultural and subsistence activities in the 
region.205  On one hand, this would create additional economic stress for lower-income 
populations who would no longer be able to legally carry out their livelihood.  On the 
other hand, this could create additional environmental pressure, if farmers took 
agricultural activity into secluded and virgin territory, in order to escape governmental 
scrutiny.   
For these reasons, the epistemic community recommended that the Forestry 
Department foster sustainable agriculture as a matter of policy among marginalized 
populations.206  By creating alternative wealth generation opportunities among lower-
income communities, sustainable agriculture could function as an incentive package to 
persuade subsistence populations to eschew the most harmful agricultural practices, 
particularly the use of tree saplings as yam-sticks.   
Again, these policy preferences have been a longstanding goal of epistemic 
community organizations.  The 1999 studies contained recommendations that the 
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 David Barker, 1998, Yam Farmers on the Forest Edge of Cockpit Country: Aspects 
of Resource Use and Sustainability in McGregor, D.F.M., Barker, D. & S. Lloyd Evans 
Resource Sustainability and Caribbean Development: Geographical Perspectives, 
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Forestry Department fund the cultivation of fast-growth trees as yam-stick material, by 
distributing free seedlings to local communities.207  Similarly, STEA had developed in 
1999 a program to promote hedgerows in the Cockpit Country, where fast-growth trees 
used for yam-sticks are planted in rows with cash crops cultivated in the “alleys” between 
the rows.  Besides functioning as renewable sources of yam-sticks, hedgerows can 
minimize surface runoff and erosion.208   
Therefore, as described above, the epistemic community developed a set of policy 
recommendations between 1999 and 2001 about appropriate biodiversity management in 
the Cockpit Country, particularly in regards to in situ conservation.  The community, 
which had generated a knowledge consensus on the relevant dimensions of human 
activity sought the following: the creation of an ICUN National Park by the Ministry of 
Environment and NEPA; a moratorium on bauxite mining by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Mines and Geology Division, and the promotion of sustainable agriculture by the 
Forestry Department.   
 
Evaluating Epistemic Community Influence 
Laggardly Behavior from NEPA and the Ministry of Environment 
Despite holding an intersubjective consensus on dimensions such as the 
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 Balfour Spence, 1999, Land Management Report pp. 36; NEPA, 2003, NBSAP pp. 39 
– 40; Hugh Dixon, author interviews conducted July 31, 2006.  Taken from 
audiocassette recording. 
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boundaries and importance of the Cockpit Country ecoregion, the epistemic community 
did not influence the management of protected areas under the Ministry of Environment.  
The government failed to implement the IUCN Park recommendations, despite their 
occurrence in the 1997 NRCA recommendation, the 1999 Cockpit Country Conservation 
Project proposals, and the PAMP conducted by Hayes-Sutton in 2004.209   
 
Implementing Sustainable Agricultural Reforms by the Forestry Department 
The community did register influence on the policies of the Forestry Department.  
The Department’s 2001 Management Plan incorporated recommendations by the 
epistemic community to produce and distribute seedlings for quick-growth trees.  These 
seedlings, provided for free to subsistence and agricultural communities, were intended to 
be used as yam-sticks, replacing the unsustainable practice of cutting saplings.210  
Further, the Forestry Department actively engaged in promoting sustainable agriculture in 
local communities through the LFMCs, conducted with assistance from epistemic 
community ENGOs.   
More than demonstrating a willingness to adopt policies suggested by civil 
society researchers, the Forestry Department demonstrated a similar adoption of 
ecological arguments for environmental management.  Prior to the emergence of 
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 Adam Rhodes, 2006, Bauxite vs. the Cockpit Country (STEA press release in 
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epistemic community advocacy, the Forestry Department was criticized by civil society 
researchers as uninterested in the ecological relationships of the Cockpit Country, and 
focused on the commercial development of timber: 
I mean, most of the, especially like in the John Crow Mountains, most of 
the deforestation that was created in John Crow was by the Forestry 
Department.  You have this little stupid man basically going in and 
clearing an area of forest, of natural forest, to plant up pine and all kinds 
of crap.211   
 
By the time the project concluded in 2007, the Forestry Department had changed 
its environmental approach.  Of the Jamaican natural resource management agencies, the 
Forestry Department’s regulatory articles and the Forest Act of 1996 and 2001 are the 
only specific references to biodiversity management as an environmental goal.212  
Moreover, at the time of field research, the Department had adopted an approach that, 
like the civil society epistemic community after the period of framing alignment, linked 
forestry management with the wellbeing of fauna, other flora, and ecosystem integrity.   
[Biodiversity] is a new discussion, and I suppose what has changed [are] 
the views of managing forest for different, different reasons…  So 
everybody is talking about the ecosystem, and the habitat, and we even 
talk about birds and bats, which we didn’t do, in the Forestry Department 
before. When we started as the Forestry Department, it was just the trees, 
we just never overlapped.213   
 
As described in interviews with civil society epistemic community members, this 
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 Kurt McLaren, author interviews.  Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording. 
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not only marks a difference between earlier management approaches of the Forestry 
Department, but also distinguishes the current approach of the Department from that of 
the Ministry of Agriculture:   
So the one good thing about the Forestry Department is that the Forestry 
Department have changed their mandates, and they have a new outlook on 
how to go about doing things…  I worked there in ’97 briefly, and it’s just, 
they just realized that forestry was not just about planting trees to cut them 
down, you know?214   
 
Forestry Department’s willingness is not reflected within other branches 
of the Ministry [of Agriculture].215 
 
Governmental Retrenchment in Mining Exploration 
However, the success of the epistemic community in promoting ecological 
management practices in the Forestry Department marked the only instance of network 
direct influence on natural resource management.  While the environmental ministry 
seemed either unwilling or unable to incorporate the claims of the epistemic community, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the mining regulatory agencies were antipathetic to the 
preferences of the transnational civil society network.   
Despite the letter-writing and media drive, these agencies continued to support 
bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country as critical to national development.  In 2004, the 
Ministry of Agriculture granted Alcoa and the Clarendon Alumina Production exclusive 
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licenses to prospect for bauxite deposits.216  In 2006, after Catherine Levy left Birdlife 
Jamaica, the organization lost its Birdlife International affiliate status and left the Project 
on Sustainable Conservation over a year before its completion.217  The WRC and JET 
then became the primary knowledge brokers, maintaining the advocacy efforts to prevent 
mining, but with no measurable success.   
In 2006, the mining licenses, scheduled to expire at the end of the year, were 
being considered for renewal by the Ministry of Agriculture.  In September, communities 
in the Cockpit Country reported that bauxite companies had already begun prospecting 
mining in the area and relocating residents from lands with mining deposits.218  After the 
epistemic community requested information to investigate these reports, the JBI and the 
Ministry of Agriculture insisted that extractive mining was not planned for the Cockpit 
Country, that the licenses would not be renewed, and claimed confidentiality to avoid 
discussing mining plans.219   
In October, concerned about what seemed like stonewalling, the TAN organized 
around epistemic community and organizations associated with the Cockpit Country 
TAN formally organized to create the Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s Group (CCSG).  
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The CCSG began a public campaign to mobilize local and transnational grassroots 
political pressure through petitions, letter writing and by threatening public 
demonstrations in order to pressure the government.220   
From October to November, domestic members of the CCSG continued 
requesting information on mining plans and license renewal from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, in conjunction with press releases highlighting the severe environmental 
harm to the Cockpit Country posed by bauxite mining.  In December, the government 
seemed to respond favorably, inviting TAN and epistemic community members Schwartz 
of the WRC, Dixon of STEA and Diana McCauley of JET to participate with Minister 
Clarke and the JBI in a Mining Policy Consultation, intended to be a multisectoral 
planning workshop to analyze the environmental impact of mining in the Cockpit 
Country.  However, at the Consultation, the Minister revealed that the licenses had been 
granted a week earlier, causing the members of the civil society ENGOs to “storm out”221 
of the meeting and issue a public repudiation of the decision making process two hours 
later.222  From the end of 2006 to 2007, public pressure mounted, as the CCSG TAN 
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continued its public campaign to ban mining in the Cockpit Country.  In 2007, Minister 
Clarke issued a hold on mining and prospecting leases, citing in part, a need to establish 
the legal borders of the Cockpit Country.   
However, tensions between the mining regulatory agencies and the civil society 
continued, as both sides failed to agree on the dimensions of the area.  The epistemic 
community reiterated its call for the borders to comprise the area defined in the 1999 
studies, but now claimed an additional portion of the Cockpit Country region, increasing 
the size of the proposed area from 450km2 to 1,142 km2, while UWI geologist Parris 
Lyew-Ayee Jr., the son of JBI Director Lyew-Ayee, indicated in a study commissioned 
by the JBI that the Cockpit Country ecosystem should only comprise 288 km2 (see 
Figure 2.3: Revised Epistemic Community Cockpit Country Map).223   
The conflict seemed to abate after the 2007 parliamentary elections, when Bruce 
Golding’s government appointed Christopher Tufton as the new Minister of Agriculture, 
who then asserted that the Cockpit Country would be permanently off-limits to mining.  
This development, while positive, emerged less from the persuasive knowledge claims of 
the epistemic community, than from the public mobilization engendered by the TAN.  
However, at the time of writing, the issue of the legal cartographic definition of the 
Cockpit Country had not yet been definitively established. 
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Conclusion 
The results support one hypothesis, undermine another, and are inconclusive in 
the third.  The following table summarizes the predicted and observed relationships 
between the independent variables: economic framing, consensus and socialization, and 
the dependent variable: influence (see Table 2.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted 
Outcomes). 
As the data show, the independent variable that was only present in the campaign 
that evinced network influence, that is, the campaign to persuade the Forestry Department 
to change management practices, was socialization.  This finding supports the hypothesis 
H3: Socialization improves the influence of epistemic communities, and indicates that 
socialization is a necessary, if not sufficient, causal variable.   
As described above, the network socialized extensively with the Forestry 
Department, which had by the late 1990s become highly integrated into the production of 
knowledge with the epistemic community.  As a result, the Forestry Department 
demonstrated a singular interest in learning from the transnational network, promoted 
sustainable practices by issuing seedlings for hedgerows and fast-growth trees to 
minimize yam-stick harvesting and adopted an ecological approach to biodiversity 
management emphasizing the forest’s function as a habitat and food source for local and 
migratory fauna.  This contrasted with their previous management approach, which 
emphasized the production and rapid turnover of commercial timber.  Further, other 
agencies that did not socialize with the epistemic community, namely the rest of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, its mining agencies, and NEPA were either environmental 
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laggards or actively opposed to implementing policy recommendations. 
Second, the data undermine the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks 
must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order 
to influence LDC governments.  The JBI and the Ministry of Agriculture were 
uninterested in arguments that ecological relationships in the Cockpit Country were 
important to national economic developmental interests in the tourist market.  The water 
valuation study was unpersuasive, and the projected national revenues promised from 
ecotourism were found to be unreliable without additional and significant investment 
from the state.224  
The water is critical to tourism, to the people that live in here, so that’s the 
approach we hope to use if and when mining decides they’re ready.  Right 
now we don’t have enough data to substantiate any case.225 
 
What’s the value of a tourism, what’s the value to the tourism industry to 
have a particular forest?  We don’t have those figures.  And we’ve been 
told number and number of times that because we don’t have those 
figures, we really don’t have that sort of a balance to push into the 
economic model that says bauxite will earn so many billion US dollars.226   
 
Throughout the end of 2006, policy makers in the JBI and the Ministry of 
Agriculture indicated privately in interviews and publicly in media statements that the 
economic valuations conducted by the epistemic community were unconvincing.  In 
                                                 
224
 World Bank, 1999, Jamaica Cockpit Country Conservation Project: Preparation 
Report (World Bank) pp. 11. 
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public challenges to the epistemic community’s scientific knowledge between October 
and December of 2006, these policy makers also asserted that the impacts of prospecting 
mining on the hydrological regime were overstated: 
What is the value of the butterfly?  What is the value of the trees?  Who 
cares if there’s one butterfly, or two butterflies, or no butterflies in the 
Cockpit Country?  …Who is the Cockpit Country going to appeal to?  
Not the kids playing video games.227 
 
[Prospecting] will not affect the water or damage the environment. If you 
follow the environmentalists, you would never mine anything.228   
 
Although the end of 2006 saw the cessation of mining leases, this occurred only 
after public opposition to mining raised the political cost of permitting leases in the area.  
In other words, the Ministry of Agriculture did halt the issuance of mining leases, not 
because it learned from the arguments presented by the epistemic community, but rather 
due to concerted public pressure.  Moreover, the fact that communication with the 
Forestry Department did not rely on economic arguments undermines the argument that 
LDC policymakers are most likely to be persuaded by developmental arguments. 
Third, the data are unclear about the hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases 
the influence of transnational advocacy networks.  Consensus was present in all 
campaigns, both the failures and the successes.  This indicates that consensus is 
insufficient to lead to influence, even if recognized, and deployed in a concerted effort by 
publicly recognized experts.  However, the lack of variation on this variable in this case 
does not allow for conclusions as to the necessity of consensus for influence.   
                                                 
227
 Shanti Persaud, author interviews July 3, 2006.  Taken from handwritten notes. 
228
 Minister Roger Clarke, quoted in Jamaica Observer, December 15, 2006. 
  
 
 
 
 
113 
 
As a result, this case study gives an incomplete picture in understanding how 
epistemic communities function in LDCs.  While the actions of the epistemic community 
confirm that policy advocates believe that developmental pressures matter in how 
arguments are deployed, it is not clear that this is the case.  Rather, socialization seems to 
have a greater effect in explaining influence than other factors, including the presence of 
knowledge consensus.  Further understanding the effect of economic and political factors 
on epistemic community advocacy requires additional analyses of case studies, which are 
addressed in the following chapters. 
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Table 2.1: List of Policy Makers in Jamaica 
AGENCY 
JURISDICTION 
EST. THROUGH REGULATES 
The Ministry of Agriculture 
Mining Act/ Forest 
Reserve Act 
Issuance of mining permits to bauxite 
companies.  Parent institution to the 
Forestry Department, JBI and Mining 
Department 
The Forestry Department Forest Reserve Act 
Regulates (monitors and enforces) 
logging and clearing for agriculture 
Jamaica Bauxite Institute Mining Act 
Conducts environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) on proposed 
bauxite mining on behalf of NEPA 
Mining Department Mining Act Certifies restoration in mined areas. 
The Ministry of Environment 
National Resources 
and Conservation 
Act 
Parent institution to National 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) 
NEPA 
National Resources 
and Conservation 
Act 
Regulates (monitors and enforces) 
human activity affecting fauna 
species 
Prime Minister's Cabinet  
Evaluates jurisdictional conflicts 
between agencies and ministries. 
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Table 2.2: List of Jamaican Epistemic Community Members 
ORGANIZATION INDIVIDUALS FUNCTIONS 
SCIENCE 
TRAINING 
Windsor Research 
Centre Mike Schwartz 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Conducts training of Forestry 
Department personel.  Habitat 
health evaluation. Biology 
  
Susan Koenig 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Conducts training of Forestry 
Department personel.  Habitat 
health evaluation. 
Ornitholog
y 
St. Thomas 
Environmental Agency Hugh Dixon 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Socioeconomic surveys Ecology 
The Nature Conservancy 
Kimberly 
Johns 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Underwater ecology. 
Freshwater 
ecology 
  
Ann Hayes-
Sutton Population monitoring (fauna) 
Conservati
on ecology 
The Forestry 
Department Owen Evelyn 
Population monitoring.  Flora 
taxonomy.  Habitat health 
evaluation. Botany 
  
Kevin Porter 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Flora taxonomy Botany 
  
Respondent 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Flora taxonomy.  Habitat health 
evaluation. Botany 
University of Manitoba / 
University of the West 
Indies 
Balfour 
Spence Habitat health evaluation. 
Geology / 
geography 
Clearing House 
Mechanism Dayne Buddo Population monitoring (fauna) 
Marine 
ecology 
University of Wisconsin Mick Day 
Karst limestone ecology.  
Habitat health evaluation 
Geomorph
ology 
University of the West 
Indies Peter Vogel 
Population monitoring (flora, 
fauna) 
Conservati
on ecology 
  
George Proctor 
(retired) Habitat health evaluation. Botany 
Birdlife Jamaica 
Catherine 
Levy Population monitoring (fauna) 
Ornitholog
y 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in Cockpit Country 
Advocacy 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Bauxite Deposits in the 
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Cockpit Country
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Figure 2.2: Map of Forest Reserves in the Cockpit Country 
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‘ 
Figure 2.3: Revised Epistemic Community Cockpit Country Map 
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Figure 2.4: Diagram of Epistemic Community Links in Jamaica 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEXICO AND BIODIVERSITY MANGEMENT IN THE MESOAMERICAN 
BARRIER REEF SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
In Mexico, as in Jamaica, a transnational coalition of researchers mobilized to 
advocate for biodiversity management in a sensitive area in the 1990s.  Again, this 
culminated in the effort of an epistemic community to influence the implementation of a 
GEF-funded project pursuant to the CBD.  This GEF-funded project, the Proyecto de la 
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano, (SAM Project), 
was a regional effort by Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras to implement their 
obligations under Article 8 and 10 requirements of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), for in situ conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
respectively.229   
In this case, however, the area under consideration was not a limestone forest, but 
a reef ecosystem off the eastern coast of the Yucatán peninsula (see Figure 1.2).  
Nevertheless, this case study demonstrates some of the same processes as did epistemic 
                                                 
229
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community advocacy in Jamaica.  Again, there were a series of policymaker agencies and 
managers targeted by the epistemic community.  These consisted of the federal 
environmental secretariat, SEMARNAT, and its subsidiary agency in protected areas 
management, CONANP; the federal agricultural secretariat, SAGARPA, and its fishing 
commission, CONAPESCA; the government of Quintana Roo, its environmental 
management agency, SEDUMA, and its tourism secretariat, SEDETUR; and private 
sector managers in fishing cooperatives and the hotel industry.  In all, these comprised 
nine overlapping campaigns for improved biodiversity management in the reef region.   
As occurred in Jamaica, the epistemic community did not have universal success, 
although comparatively more goals were met.  The network demonstrated influence in 
the management practices and approach of: the federal environmental secretariat, the 
agricultural secretariat, the federal protected areas commission, the fishing commission, 
and the private sector fishing cooperatives.  Again, the impact of consensus is not clear 
from this case: it occurred in all campaigns including those that failed, suggesting that 
consensus is insufficient to lead to influence, even when used in a concerted campaign by 
experts.  Economic framing also does not seem to have an independent impact on the 
chance for network influence, as it was neither necessary for success nor failure.  Finally, 
this case underlined the importance of socialization, as socialization, with one exception, 
corresponded with a successful campaign.  The remainder of the chapter explains how 
issue-framing, socialization and knowledge consensus affected the ability of epistemic 
communities to influence policymaking and biodiversity management in Mexico.  Where 
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documents and interviews were originally in Spanish, I have provided my own translation 
of the material throughout. 
 
Overview of Threats to the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef  
In a reminder of the transnational nature of biodiversity, the area of concern in the 
Mesoamerican basin comprises the territorial waters of the four countries signatories to 
the SAM Project: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize.  Mexican management 
jurisdiction extends across approximately 400 km of coastline, from Yum Balám in the 
northern part of the Yucatán peninsula to Banco Chinchorro, in the southern coast of the 
state of Quintana Roo (see Figure 1.2).   
Like the Cockpit Country, the Mesoamerican basin is a site of internationally 
recognized high biodiversity.  The coral reef, formed by the deposits of calcium by 
polyps presents one of the most visibly striking components of the system, with 
substantial variation in the resident populations of fish, crustaceans and zooplankton, as 
well as within the corals themselves.230  A sample of biodiversity at Mexican sites at Sian 
Ka’an, Xcalak, Banco Chinchorro and Majahual (see Figure 1.2), yields over 90 species 
of coral and 1,000 species of flora and fauna, including endemic and IUCN Red List 
registered species.231   In all, reefs may house up to 3,000 species of marine life.  
                                                 
230
 M. García-Salgado, T. Camarena L., G. Gold B., M. Vazquez, G. Galland, G. Nava 
M., G. Alarcón D. and V. Ceja M., 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrefical 
Mesoamericano (Belize City: SAM), pg. 6 
231
 Hernández, A., F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. Castro y J. Medina-
Flores, 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros de Banco 
Chinchorro. (Cancún: WWF-México) pg. 5; Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP), 
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Biodiversity relevant to the ecosystem is also measured by genetic variation in 
pastures of seagrasses closer to the shore and in coastal mangrove zones.  Mangrove 
zones and seagrass provide shelter to reef-dwelling populations of scaled fish and 
crustaceans in juvenile and larval stages and thus may be considered part of the reef 
ecosystem.232  They also act as filters, removing sediment and organic matter from river 
outlets and coastal runoff, and preventing sedimentation in the reef.233  Because the 
ecosystem comprises terrestrial, reef, and coastal environments, potentially harmful 
human activity consists of both marine and terrestrial activity, including: coastal tourism 
and urban development; inland industrial development; overfishing; and port practices.234   
                                                                                                                                              
2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de Estudios de Impacto Ambiental de 
Proyectos Turísticos en la Zona Comprendida por el SAM (Belize City: SAM) pg. 69.  
Mar Caribe roundtable, Ficha Técnica para la Evaluación de los Sitios Prioritarios 
para la Conservación de los Ambientes Costeros y Oceánicos del SAM (available 
online at: 
http://www.conabio.gob.mx/gap/images/2/29/78_Humedales_Costeros_Arrecife_Xcala
k_Majahual.pdf)., pg. 1 – 5. 
232
 WWF, 2007, How to Profit by Practicing Sustainable Fishing: Lobster Fishing 
Practice Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef (WWF), pg. 5 
233
 M. García-Salgado, T. Camarena L., G. Gold B., M. Vazquez, G. Galland, G. Nava 
M., G. Alarcón D. and V. Ceja M., 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrefical 
Mesoamericano (Belize City: SAM) pg. 100. 
234
 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999,  Threat and Root Cause Analysis (Draft) 
(Presented for Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
System) pg. 5; Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD), 2001, 
Documento de Evaluación de Proyecto sobre el Proyecto Propuesto por EU$ 15.2 
Millones, Incluyendo una Donación del Fondo Fiduciario del Fondo Mundial para el 
Medio Ambiente por la Cantidad de EU$ 11.0 Millones Equivalentes a la Comisión 
Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo para un Proyecto Regional para la 
Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (CCAD) Anexo 
4, pg. 1 – 5. 
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Coastal Tourism and Hotel Development 
Coastal tourism in the Mesoamerican basin is concentrated primarily in the 
northern third of the state, manifested in the development of large-scale and all-inclusive 
hotel resorts in the popular Riviera Maya and the Cancún metropolitan resort area.  
Tourism can also cause direct impacts on reef health when recreational users exceed the 
loading capacity of the area.  Motorized access boats and swimmers can agitate the ocean 
floor, scattering sand on the reef polyps.  Even when snorkelers or divers do not 
intentionally or accidentally touch the highly sensitive polyps, chemicals present in 
sunscreen may be highly toxic to the biota.235   
Indirect impacts stem from the construction of hotels and urban centers on the 
coast.  Hoteliers developing beachfront property have to drain, cut and fill mangrove 
zones with concrete, which contributes to sedimentation, run-off and nitrification in 
marine environments.236  Multiple story buildings erected too close to the coast interrupt 
                                                 
235
  P. C. Almada-Villela, P. F. Sale, G. Gold Bouchot and B. Kjerfve, 2003, Manual de 
Métodos para el Programa de Monitoreo Sinóptoco del SAM (Belize City: SAM) pg. 
136 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 8; UCP 
2003, Diseño e Implementación del Foro de Turismo Sustenible del SAM (SAM: Belize 
City) pg. 3; UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de 
Proyectos Turísticos pg. 63 – 64; M. García Salgado et al, 2006, Línea Base del Estado 
del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano pg. 6.  Also based on conversations with park 
managers at Puerto Morelos National Park. 
236
 Amigos de Sian Ka’an.  1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la 
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México.  (Coastal Resources Center: University of 
Rhode Island, Narragansett) passim.  M. García Salgado et al, 2006, Línea Base del 
Estado del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano pg. 109 – 110; World Wildlife Fund 
México (WWF-México), 2008, Draft WWF MAR Strategic Action Plan (Cancún: 
WWF-México) pg. 70.  Juan José Dominguez Calderón, author interviews conducted 
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the rate of replenishment of beach sand and contribute to a loss of coastline and increased 
beach erosion, which may depress the rate of regeneration and growth within corals.  
Current regulations on water treatment and disposal are insufficient in preventing 
groundwater contamination, as pipelines constructed for waste water disposal are 
ineffectively monitored and designed, and often transmit waste water directly to the water 
table.237   
 
Inland and Riparian Pollution 
Marine pollution may also arise from inland industrial and agricultural 
development, often considerably geographically removed from the reef region.  For 
example, riparian agriculture on the Rio Hondo separating Belize and Mexico contributes 
to marine contamination by the runoff of agricultural pesticides and fertilizer, while 
inland groundwater contamination can flow to the coastal region by the underground 
complex of rivers and limestone caves of the Yucatán peninsula.238   
 
 
Port and Docking Practices 
                                                                                                                                              
January 24, 2008.  Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording. 
237
 Amigos de Sian Ka’an.  1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la 
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México.  (Coastal Resources Center: University of 
Rhode Island, Narragansett) passim.   
238
 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 6 – 7; 
CCAD, 2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 3 
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In addition, inappropriate port practices can harm reef ecosystems.  Improperly 
monitored docking of cruise ships can lead to collisions with reefs, and poorly regulated 
waste disposal practices can result in offshore sewage contamination of marine 
environments.239  The construction of docks and ports for cruise ships also contributes to 
sedimentation and erosion by disrupting the flow of marine currents, often causing 
shorelines to recede.240   
 
Overfishing 
Fishing practices in the region are another source of environmental stress on the 
basin.  Certain species of scaled fish and shell-fish that are targeted for commercial use 
have, since the late 1980s, experienced precipitous declines in population due to 
overexploitation of these resources (see Figure 3.1: Graph of Declining 
Populations).241  Fishermen target the largest species of fish in commercial stocks, 
leading to a gradual diminution of the average size of adult fish in these populations.242  
                                                 
239
 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 10; CCAD, 
2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 4 – 5. 
240
 See Los Amigos documents; CCAD, 2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 
4 – 5.; UCP, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos 
Turísticos, pg. 62, 70 
241
 Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: 
Programa de Acuacultura y Pesca (Quintana Roo: SAGARPA) pg. 56; CCAD, 2001, 
Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 4 
242
 Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal, pg. 56; 
WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in Coral Reefs: Methods for Collecting 
Ecological Data that Support the Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (Cancún: 
WWF-México) pg. 20 
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The impact of overfishing on fish populations and marine ecology is exacerbated when 
population collapses in overexploited species causes fishermen to target populations at 
lower trophic levels.243  Overfishing can negatively affect the viability of the coral reef, 
as herbivorous populations of Parrotfish and other species both depend on coral reefs for 
shelter and curb the growth of algae that may compete with coral species for nutrients 
and living space.244   
 
Tensions in National Economic Development 
This case also demonstrates some tensions between national development and the 
economic wellbeing of marginalized populations.  Tourism is of considerable importance 
to economic growth, both at a national level, and to the state of Quintana Roo.  Thus, 
there is an argument that tourism is a massively important productive sector, as it brings 
substantial amounts of foreign revenue to the nation and the state.  At the same time, 
tourism may contribute to increased short-term revenue among fishing populations.  High 
tourist traffic contributes to demand for seafood, and increased scarcity in the supply of 
commercial populations tends to drive up the final sale price of these fish.245   
                                                 
243
 WWF-México, 2004, MAR Strategic Plan: 2004 – 2009 (Cancún: WWF-México) 
pg. 24; WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices pg. 20  
244
 WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in Coral Reefs: Methods for Collecting 
Ecological Data that Support the Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (Cancún: 
WWF-México) pg. 20 
245
 WWF-México, 2006.  How to Profit by Practicing Sustainable Fishing: Lobster 
Fishing Practices for the Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN/WWF-México) pg. 3. 
  
 
 
 
 
129 
 
In the long run, however, increased demand for fish may be unsustainable.  
However, since tourist development, by contributing to coral reef loss, can deplete fish 
populations, unregulated tourism can create opportunity losses for low-income 
communities who depend on fishing for their livelihood.  As in Jamaica, ‘national 
development’ may directly conflict with the economic interests of marginalized actors. 
In addition, tourist development creates indirect hardships for low-income 
populations.  Inland migrants attracted by the possibility of gainful employment establish 
shantytowns as “support communities” around hotel sites, providing cheap labor 
generally in the form of custodial services or construction to hoteliers.  Because these 
shantytowns develop spontaneously, they are not covered by municipal planning and 
services, nor are they incorporated into the water and sewage treatment plans of the 
hotels.  A lack of oversight in combination with absent treatment facilities means 
residents have incentives to dump refuse directly into the ocean, or in hastily dug pits 
which in turn leach materials into the water table.246   
 
 
 
 
Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management 
                                                 
246
 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis pg. 6; CCAD, 
2001, Documento de Evaluación, Anexo 4, pg. 2.  According to interviews with Los 
Amigos staffers, sewage treatment in Quintana Roo is poorly administered, and in 
Cancún, approximately half of the volume of liquid waste is not treated prior to 
disposal.  Author interviews with Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, conducted February 2008. 
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Federal Policy Makers 
Technically, policy management of the problems described above falls under the 
jurisdiction of various governmental agencies in Mexico, both within the federal 
government, and in state agencies.  The federal branch has supremacy in implementing 
multilateral agreements (such as the CBD and the SAM Project) relevant to reef 
management; national policies including the Constitution, the General Law of Wildlife 
(LGVS) and the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and the Environment (LGEEPA) 
locate authority over relevant environmental processes, such as biodiversity, coastal 
management and natural resource management, in the federal government.247  The most 
relevant federal agencies are located in the environmental ministry, SEMARNAT and the 
agricultural ministry, SAGARPA (see Table 3.1: List of Reef Policy Makers). 
 
SEMARNAP/SEMARNAT and CONANP 
The environmental and fisheries secretariat, La Secretaría de Manejo Ambiental, 
Recursos Naturales y Pesquería (SEMARNAP) was created in 1996 in the federal 
executive branch.  In 2002, under a series of bureaucratic reforms carried out by Vicente 
Fox’s newly elected Partido Acción Nacional, control over fisheries was transferred to 
the agricultural secretariat, La Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Alimentación y 
Desarrollo Rural,(SAGAR); this turned SEMARNAP into SEMARNAT and the 
                                                 
247
 See CONABIO, 2000,  Apéndice: Proceso de Formulación de la Estrategia.  
Estrategia Nacional para la Biodiversidad  (Mexico, DF: CONABIO) pg. 79; 
Federation of Mexican States, 2003, Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública 
Federal, Art. 32. 
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Agricultural Secretariat into SAGARPA.248  Currently, SEMARNAT’s environmental 
management responsibilities include: proposing the creation of federal Natural Protected 
Areas (ANPs) and Marine Protected Areas (AMPs) to the executive branch, and 
establishing appropriate land use policies and management plans for these areas.  Further, 
SEMARNAT can pass regulatory declarations called Normas Oficiales Mexicanas 
(NOMs) that restrict or authorize appropriate environmental activity within ANPs, 
AMPs.  The NOM-059 series, for example, establishes management authority in 
SEMARNAT to issue protection to species identified as nationally important and/or 
under threatened.249   
SEMARNAT has additional subordinate agencies relevant to reef management.  
The National Commission for Natural Protected Areas (La Comisión Nacional de Áreas 
Naturales Protegidas or CONANP), created in 2000 at the end of the Zedillo 
administration as a specialized and autonomous agency of SEMARNAP, shares 
responsibility with SEMARNAT for the creation and management of federal protected 
                                                 
248
 Prior to SEMARNAP’s creation, environmental management was scattered across 
various specialized agencies.  Interview, SEMARNAT official, not for attribution; 
SEMARNAT, 2008, Programa Regional de Educación para la Sustentabilidad en 
Áreas Naturales Protegidas (SEMARNAT), pg. 24.   
249
 NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and NOM-059-ECOL-2001 indicate that SEMARNAT has 
the authority to protect species recognized as integral to Mexico’s ecology, as well as 
species under threat, in the interest of maintaining national biodiversity.  These 
regulations available in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 6 March, 2002.  
SEMARNAT, 2009, ¿Qué hacemos?  Retrieved January 2009 from 
http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/queessemarnat/Pages/quehacemos.aspx.  SEMARNAT, 
2003, Reglamento de la Ley General de Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente 
(Mexico: Diario Oficial de la Federación).  CONABIO, 2000, Apéndice: Proceso de 
Formulación, pg. 77 – 78.   
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areas.250  CONANP may also conduct EIAs, and conduct monitoring of activities carried 
out in protected areas.251 
 
SAGARPA and CONAPESCA 
SAGARPA and the national fisheries commission (La Comisión Nacional de la 
Pesca, CONAPESCA), its executive agency, are responsible for designating appropriate 
areas for commercial and sustainable fishing and evaluating appropriate fishing 
techniques.252  CONAPESCA has a mandate to record catch sizes and set harvest quotas 
with assistance in determining officially sanctioned rates of capture from the National 
Fisheries Institute.253  CONAPESCA authorizes the creation of fishing cooperatives, or 
                                                 
250
 Taken from ICRI National Committee Progress Report – Mexico, available at 
www.icriforum.org/secretariat/word/CebuCPC_13.doc 
251
 Interviews with Alfredo Arellano, March 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
audiocassette recording.  José Juan Dominguez Calderón, author interviews conducted 
Jan 24, 2008.  Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording.  CONANP, 2006, Qué 
es la CONANP?  Retrieved January 2009 from http://www.conanp.gob.mx/qienes.html.  
The abbreviation CONANP comes from the Spanish name of the agency, which is la 
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas.  Unidad Coordinadora del 
Proyecto, 2003, Manual – Guía Común para la Evaluación de EIAs de Proyectos 
Turísticos (Belize City: SAM) pg. 32. 
252
 José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, autor interviews conducted between 12 and 15 May, 
2008.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording.  CONAPESCA, 2009, Acerca 
de.  Retrieved January 2009 from 
http://www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx/wb/cona/cona_mision_y_vision_acerca.  
CONAPESCA comes from the name of the agency in Spanish, la Comisión Nacional 
de Acuacultura y Pesca. 
253
 José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15 
May, 2008.  
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associations of fishermen that share investment capital, resources and profits, and 
requires permits for access in sensitive areas.254  
 
State Governmental Agencies 
SEDUMA, SEDETUR and the State Government 
Mexico’s governance efforts relevant to the Mesoamerican basin take place 
almost exclusively in the state of Quintana Roo.  As a result, certain state governmental 
agencies were identified as relevant by epistemic community members.  The state 
Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Medio Ambiente (SEDUMA) can create zoning 
ordinances through the Programa de Ordenamiento Ecológico Territorial (POET), a 
regulatory framework allowing SEDUMA to assess environmental loading capacities and 
determine appropriate land use policies for biologically sensitive sites.  Zoning can 
function to endorse or proscribe certain activities from being adopted in a geographically 
described area.255  In addition, the government of Quintana Roo can propose protected 
areas to be administered at the state level.  Similar to the federal government, the state 
can determine appropriate borders wherein restrictive policy applies and file areas as 
protected under law. 
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 José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15 
May, 2008; A. Hernández, F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. Castro y J. 
Medina-Flores. 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros de Banco 
Chinchorro. (CONANP/WWF-México), pg. 11; Comité Técnico Estatal de Evaluación, 
2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura y Pesca (Quintana 
Roo: SAGARPA), pg. 13 - 14 
255
 David Martínez, author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording. 
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In practice, the application of POETs is almost exclusively restricted to the 
northern third of the state, while in the southern two-thirds, only the Laguna Bacalar, a 
small site north of Chetumal, was assigned a POET zoning policy at the time of writing.  
At the time of writing, the extension of POETs was being considered for the Othón P. 
Blanco municipality, wherein sites incidental to the SAM Project, including Xcalak, 
Majahual and Banco Chinchorro are located.256  However, the use of POETs as a 
regulatory tool was challenged by civil society respondents, skeptical of the commitment 
of the state government to restricting development:   
[T]hese have not been sufficient to brake the lack of control of economic 
development.  Instead of allowing a fixed quantity of construction per unit 
area, whenever there is a certain interest, the quantity is changed and 
increased, which permits greater degradation than what was originally 
thought.257 
 
Finally, the tourist secretariat of the state government of Quintana Roo 
(Secretaría de Turismo del Estado de Quintana Roo or SEDETUR) is responsible for 
promoting the development of tourism in the state.  In practice, this means acting as a 
liaison for tourist interests to state and federal environmental agencies, clarifying 
regulatory policies applicable to prospective construction and hotel development, and 
developing recommendations for best practices, for example, in hygiene and 
hospitality.258 
                                                 
256
 Gustavo Olivares, author interviews conducted April 9 and 10, 2008. 
257
 Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008. Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.   
258
 SEDETUR, 2010, Conócenos.  Available online at 
http://www.caribemexicano.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
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Managers from the Civil Society and the Private Sector 
In this case, the epistemic community engaged actively with private sector 
managers with de facto regulatory power over environmental degradation and 
biodiversity loss.  These private actors consisted of the economically significant tourist 
industry, as well as marginalized fishing populations in coastal communities. 
 
Fishing Cooperatives 
Fishing communities along the coast of Quintana Roo are organized into profit- 
and equipment-sharing cooperatives.  They vary in the number of members, access to 
equipment and techniques employed, ranging from the 9 member SCPP Horizontes 
Marino, to the 90 member SCPP Laguna Macax.259  In addition to serving as a source of 
income to marginalized and low-income populations, fishing has some cultural 
importance, as the occupation is transferred intergenerationally among families of 
fishermen.  In the aggregate, the actions of cooperatives can have significant implications 
for fish populations and hence biodiversity governance in the reef ecosystem.  As an 
                                                                                                                                              
=306&Itemid=420; David Martínez.  Author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  
Taken from transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
259
 See chart of surveyed cooperatives for state research published in Comité Técnico 
Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura 
y Pesca (Quintana Roo: SAGARPA), pg. 47.  See also references to differences in size 
and practices of cooperatives in CONANP, 2007.  Programa de Conservación y 
Manejo, pg. 24 – 25.  A. Hernández, F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. 
Castro y J. Medina-Flores. 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros 
de Banco Chinchorro. (CONANP/WWF-México), pg. 11. 
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example, in 2001, Quintana Roo fishermen captured 45% of the total lobster catch in the 
Mexican Gulf and Caribbean Sea.260  
 
The Hotel Industry: An Oligopoly of Tourism 
Internal practices of the economically significant hotel sector are also important to 
ecosystem stability and governance.  Whereas the fishing community consists of 
decentralized actors, hotel capital and ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few 
actors, who in turn have formed statewide neocorporatist business associations for the 
protection of tourist interests.  The primary associations in Quintana Roo are: the 
Asociación de Propietarios e Inversionistas de la Riviera Maya (APIR), Grupo Quintana 
Roo, la Asociación de Clubs Vacacionales (ACLUVAC), and the Centro Coordinador 
Empresarial y del Caribe (CCEyC).261  Hoteliers have considerable leeway in 
determining the point of construction of hotels, as well as the size of hotel infrastructure, 
the number of rooms and the presence and extent of treatment facilities.  In addition, 
because hotel chains may provide reef access to tourists as part of vacation packages, 
hotel policy and regulations on recreational diving could influence the impact of human 
activity on reef health.  The list of relevant managers and policymakers is provided in the 
table below. 
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 Secretaría de Economía, 2009, Fideicomiso Fomento Económico Quintana Roo 
2025 Cluster Pesca y Acuacultura.  Retrieved online, August 2009 from 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p2757/Sector_Pesca_QROO.pdf.  Pg. 3. 
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Transnational Mobilization around the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
The Emergence of the SAM Epistemic Community 
Between 1995 and 2001, self-identified stakeholders in Mexico, the other 
countries implicated in the SAM Project, the United States, and international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations began a diffuse process of 
information-sharing and mobilization for improved reef governance in the Mesoamerican 
basin.  Over time, the network developed specific policy proposals, an intersubjective 
consensus on the relevant causal relationships, a shared understanding of processes, and 
shared policy preferences and tactics for engagement.  By 2001, a core group of actors 
had emerged, sharing the characteristics of an epistemic community, and holding a 
common management approach for the reef (see Table 3.2: List of Epistemic 
Community Members in the SAM Project).   
One of the earliest identified ENGOs involved in reef advocacy is the Mexican 
branch of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF-México), which had been conducting research 
in discrete sections of the Mesoamerican reef system since 1982.  By promoting local and 
transnational governance efforts for reef and coastal management in Quintana Roo, the 
agency acted as a catalyst in a process of network-building among other organizations 
and agencies.  In 1986, WWF-México lobbied the federal government for the application 
of federal protection to what is currently known as the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve.  
The Reserve had been established as a state protected area in 1982, subsequent to prior 
research on biodiversity conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones de Quintana Roo 
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(CIQRO), a state research organization.262  WWF-México’s 1986 successful petitioning 
for federal protection at Sian Ka’an also led to the creation of Los Amigos de Sian Ka’an, 
a civil society research organization, based in Cancún.  Los Amigos adopted a mandate to 
monitor human activity and environmental processes in the newly created federal 
protected area, to promote compliance with environmental regulations.   
The emergence of environmental reef and coastal activism in Mexico in the 1980s 
occurred as these and other ENGOs began advocating for improved environmental 
governance in other Mesoamerican countries.  WWF affiliate, WWF-Centroamérica 
similarly lobbied for the creation of what became the Hol Chan marine reserve in Belize 
in 1987.263  A quasi-state organization, the Coastal Zone Management Institute (CZMI) 
emerged from a local network of actors in 1989 to monitor environmental processes in 
the newly created protected area.264   
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The Germination of Transnational Links 
In the 1990s, concern about reef management in Mexico assumed a transnational 
dimension, as Mexican stakeholders created cost- and information-sharing links to a 
growing network of domestic, regional and international actors.  For example, in the 
Mexican town of Xcalak, local fishermen became concerned that tourist development 
would, by harming coral reefs, lead to losses in fish stocks important for subsistence and 
commercial production.265  In 1994, these fishermen and local activists formed the 
Xcalak Community Committee (XCC) to articulate and aggregate interests and lobby for 
the protection of Xcalak’s reefs.  In 1995, the XCC contacted Los Amigos and WWF-
México, requesting assistance in their plans to lobby the federal government to create an 
AMP in the reefs, granting local fishermen exclusive access to fish resources.266  In the 
process of assisting the XCC, Los Amigos and WWF-México partnered with the Coastal 
Resources Center of the University of Rhode Island (URI-CRC) to conduct studies on 
populations and migratory patterns of reef fish.267   
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From 1994 to 1995, Los Amigos and TNC conducted studies in the Sian Ka’an 
Reserve, and concluded that the preservation of ecosystem stability required the addition 
of a buffer zone in areas contiguous to the Reserve.268  In response to their lobbying 
efforts, the federal government established an additional 100,000 hectares in 1998 at what 
is now known as the Área de Protección de Flora y Fauna Uaymil in the south, and at the 
reefs off the coast of Sian Ka’an.  Currently, the Sian Ka’an Reserve constitutes the 
single largest contiguous national protected area in Quintana Roo, with a surface area of 
528,147ha.269  Between 1994 and 2000, over 700,000 additional hectares of federal and 
state areas were declared in Quintana Roo.270   
However, although the size and quantity of protected areas in the state grew in the 
1990s, it was not clear to the emerging network that management was environmentally 
effective, as the efficacy and commitment of policymakers to regulation varied 
significantly.  For example, although the Sian Ka’an Reef and the Área de Uaymil 
increased the total coverage at Sian Ka’an, the three sites had management plans that 
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were developed in isolation from each other.271  Other protected areas, such as AMPs at 
Puerto Morelos and Xcalak, completely lacked management plans when they were first 
created.272  In addition, fisheries management at the time focused primarily on identifying 
and regulating individually over-fished species.273   
These approaches were criticized as piecemeal forms of biodiversity 
management: for fisheries, monitoring and regulating individual species was costly, but 
failed to consider environmental problems in coral reefs in their function as fish 
habitats.274  As researchers became aware of the link between environmental processes in 
areas previously considered separate, they argued that a management approach treating 
AMPs as discrete entities would be thoroughly ineffective, by failing to understand the 
link between ecosystems.275  Finally, indicators of reef health, such as coral reef coverage 
and fish stocks indicated that management was failing to address negative environmental 
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change; coral reef coverage was being lost at a rate of 3% per annum, and fish stocks 
continued falling in the periods under investigation.276    
 
The Emergence of a Core Pool of Knowledge: ICZM as a Unifying Concept 
Throughout the late 1990s – 2001, advocacy groups and research institutions in 
the emerging network began developing a new management approach.  Now, the network 
sought to shift the focus of governance from its emphasis on piecemeal, site-specific 
management to incorporate a holistic view of ecosystem health.  In addition, whereas the 
SAM was considered a collection of separate reefs, it was now described in epistemic 
community documents as a unitary reef system, second in size only to the Great 
Australian Barrier Reef.277  In this timeframe, the network began expanding further and 
increasing the robustness of social ties among the members, as various researchers began 
conducting new studies and sharing information on environmental processes within the 
basin.   
Various transnational forums, including workshops provided by the International 
Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), an umbrella NGO consisting of marine ecologists and 
researchers, contributed to the development of shared ideas and knowledge.  In 1995, 
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ICRI held a series of workshops in Cancún to consider links between Caribbean reef 
management and processes in marine currents, benthic habitats and trophic webs in 
coastal and marine environments.278  Participants at these workshops included actors 
relevant to transnational mobilization in the Mesoamerican reef, such as WWF-México 
and TNC in Mexico, as well as NGOs from the other three Mesoamerican reef countries 
and the industrialized world.  
 
Creation of the SAM Project 
In 1996, regional political activity provided an additional networking forum.  That 
year, the Central American Commission for Development (CCAD) issued a general 
statement calling on the Central American countries to promote environmental 
management.279  To carry out this pronouncement, the governments of Mexico, Belize, 
Guatemala and Honduras drafted and signed the Tulúm Declaration, pledging to 
coordinate management efforts in the Mesoamerican reef.280  In 1997, CCAD and 
environmental ministry representatives of the four countries invited WWF-México and 
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the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to participate in project design for what was to 
become the GEF-funded Proyecto de la Conservación y Uso Sostenible del Sistema 
Arrecifal Mesoamericano, a project cited as relevant to the Tulúm Declaration and the 
CBD.281   
To the emerging transnational network, the Tulúm Declaration and the planned 
CCAD project offered “a framework for perhaps the most viable and transcendental 
opportunity on the planet for carrying out a multinational conservation effort” to integrate 
coastal and marine management with reef conservation.282  With an institutional role in 
project design, actors in the reef network began holding meetings and workshops aimed 
at constructing a management approach to reef governance that incorporated the 
emerging understanding of the reef ecosystem. 
In this timeframe, the concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) 
became one of the core organizing principles of the emerging epistemic community.  
ICZM, developed between 1998 and 2001, elaborated an ecological approach to 
management incorporating ecosystem wide characteristics.  In 1998, epistemic 
community member organizations and a transnational network of global reef stakeholders 
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participated at a symposium in Australia to evaluate ICZM application at existing and 
proposed Mexican AMPs at Xcalak, Yum Balám and Sian Ka’an.283  In 1998 and 1999, 
ICZM was used by the Atlantic and Gulf Reef Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) project, an 
international endeavor by the UN Institute of Water, Environment and Health (UNU-
INWEH), to evaluate methodologies for measuring reef health.284  In addition, in 1999 
Juan Bezaury of TNC, formerly of Los Amigos, and Bessy Aspra de Lupiac of Honduras 
conducted a Threat and Root Cause Analysis to evaluate the primary anthropogenic 
threats to biodiversity in the Mesoamerican basin.285  At this time, the network had 
expanded beyond the initial groups of stakeholders that had emerged in the early 1990s to 
include: Mexican academic institutions el Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios 
Avanzados (CINVESTAV), el Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR, formerly CIQRO); 
the Brazilian agency CZMA/I, staffers at the Hol Chan reserve; governmental staffers at 
the Cayos Cochinos Research station in Honduras; and federal employees from marine 
parks at Punta Cancún and Punta Nizuc in Mexico.286   
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At the same time as the development of the CCAD project, WWF-México began 
planning and carrying out research for an autonomously designed conservation efforts.  
The WWF-México efforts further contributed to what was becoming a pool of scientific 
knowledge and policy relevant information regarding environmental processes specific to 
the Mesoamerican reef system, through workshops with a participant list that overlapped 
significantly with the CCAD workshops.  These included workshops in Cancún and 
Belize in 1999 to construct an understanding of the basin by mapping relevant ecological 
features, including benthic habitats, marine and downriver current flows and physical 
characteristics.287  The WWF-México planning efforts were concluded in 2000, with the 
creation of the WWF Mesoamerican Reef Alliance Project (WWF MAR Project), which 
similarly applied an ecological focus to fisheries management.288   
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In 2001, the CCAD-planned SAM Project was finalized, and was declared active 
on the 30th of November.289  The regional goals of the project were coordinated by the 
Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP) which would, among other things, 
recommend areas of focus (such as developing monitoring techniques, modernizing and 
standardizing protected areas management programs, and identifying legislative gaps) by 
creating yearly Plans of Action (Planes Operativos Anuales or POAs) for the relevant 
management authorities.  These POAs were informed by formally established Technical 
Working Groups, or Grupos Técnicos de Trabajo (GTTs), groups of scientists, mobilized 
annually to gather data relevant to regional reef management.290    
In Mexico, as in the other three countries, responsibility for project 
implementation was accorded to a National Reef Committee.  The Mexican Committee 
was headed by CONANP, and staffed by civil society actors from Los Amigos and 
WWF-México.  Under CONANP regional director and marine biologist Alfredo Arellano 
Guillermo, the Committee was responsible for inter alia conducting an inventory of 
biodiversity in the area, evaluating the necessity of creating new federal AMPs in 
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ecologically sensitive areas, and recommending legislative and regulatory instruments for 
reef management.291   
After the adoption of the project in 2001, the network of information expanded 
further with the addition of academic agencies to the knowledge pool.  CONANP 
established Memoranda of Understanding with agencies such as ECOSUR and 
CINVESTAV for assistance in monitoring and analysis in specific aspects of the SAM 
Project, in matters such as chemical, physical and pollution analyses at selected sites.292  
Like the Forestry Department in Jamaica, CONANP functioned both as a policymaker 
organization and as an epistemic community organization, gathering data as part of the 
Reef Committee, contributing members to research gathering workshops, and recruiting 
from civil society agencies in the epistemic community network.  In 2002, Global  
Visions International (GVI), a British ENGO interested in coastal ecosystem integrity, 
created a formal relationship with CONANP and Los Amigos to conduct research and 
recreational expeditions in Sian Ka’an.293 
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By 2001, the core actors of the epistemic community had established a 
comprehensive series of network links, and a broad network comprising of various actors 
from a range of organizations in the public and private sector.  Although measurement is 
complicated by the amorphous nature of the coalition, it was apparent that this network 
was substantially larger than the epistemic community identified in Jamaica.  Table 3.2: 
Partial List of Epistemic Community Members identifies only 17 individuals within 
the network, but Los Amigos, which is entirely comprised of epistemic community actors, 
alone has 14 members.  ECOSUR, based in Chetumal, similarly counts another eight 
more members who are involved in studying marine and coastal environments in the 
Mesoamerican reef region, while URI-CRC counts an additional eleven.  These 31 
additional members suggest that a very conservative estimate of the size of this epistemic 
community would give a network of over 60 members, and perhaps as much as 100. 
 
Maintaining the Network 
This comparatively large network was maintained by more regularly established 
links than the network active in the Cockpit Country, although informal ties played a role 
as well.  Most informally, but perhaps quite significant in developing network links, 
several epistemic community organizations had exchanged members during the period of 
advocacy.  Specifically, both CONANP and TNC hired staffers away from Los Amigos 
between 1997 and 2000.   
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In addition, there have been a series of regular physical meetings between 
epistemic community organizations throughout the Yucatán peninsula.  For example, 
between 1998 and 2004, URI-CRC conducted six meetings in Chetumal with UQROO 
and local actors, five in Xcalak with Los Amigos and the XCC, and additional meetings in 
Belize and Cancún with ENGOs involved in Mesoamerican reef management.  As part of 
the conduct of the SAM Project, epistemic community members from the various 
organizations jointly participated in several meetings a year since 2001, not only as part 
of the annual GTT meetings held in rotating countries, but also in periodic Meetings of 
the Experts held by the UCP, one held between 2001 and 2002, three between 2002 and 
2003, and two from 2004 to 2005, as well as myriad other meetings referenced 
throughout the chapter.  Further, these network links were supplemented by other 
processes, including the drafting of widely cited jointly-authored reports, such as the 
Threat and Root Cause Analysis, the electronic circulation of information through a 
database on reef management operated by UQROO, and through financial support, 
particularly from TNC, which gave research grants to Los Amigos and GVI.   
In Figure 3.4: Diagram of Mesoamerican Reef Epistemic Community Links, 
there is a partial diagram of the above mentioned connections between some of the core 
agencies involved in the epistemic community network.  As the number of connections 
indicates, there were agencies that were identified as central to the maintenance of the 
network, namely Los Amigos, CONANP, WWF-México and TNC.  These organizations 
were similarly identified in interviews as key actors in constituting the network. 
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The Emergence of a Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) 
The emergence of this epistemic community was also paralleled by the emergence 
of coalitions of civil society actors concerned about ecological processes in the reef and 
coastal ecosystems.  As described above, one of these was a transnational advocacy 
network (TAN) of reef management stakeholders, who were committed to global and 
regional reef management.  This TAN emerged from organizations such as ICRI, which 
provided funds and created networking forums,294 and the UNU-INWEH AGRRA reef 
monitoring workshops, all of which were integral to the generation of scientific 
knowledge relevant to reef management.    
Although ICRI and other organizations within the coral reef TAN shared a 
scientific epistemology with the epistemic community, these were nevertheless separate 
networks.  An epistemic community is constituted by actors who share common policy 
goals,295 and several participants in the AGRRA and ICRI workshops were not directly 
involved in policy advocacy pertinent to reef management in Mesoamerica.  For example, 
participants in the AGRRA network include the Venezuelan academic institutions Simon 
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Bolivar Universidad and la Universidad Central de Venezuela, as well as the University 
of the West Indies and the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA/NEPA) in 
Jamaica, all of which are focused on managing local reefs. 
In addition to this TAN, a local network emerged in Mexico in the 1990s.  In 
contrast to the reef TAN and the epistemic community, this network had an exclusive 
interest in the management of mangrove zones.  At the same time, the objectives of the 
local network and the transnational networks overlapped substantially.  Like the 
epistemic community, the mangrove network argued that mangrove swamps were 
important as repositories of biodiversity and as buffer zones against coastal erosion and 
hurricanes.296  Similarly, the mangrove network was concerned about key coastal sites in 
Quintana Roo, including: the Cancún-Tulúm corridor; Sian Ka’an; Xcalak; Chetumal; 
Cozumel; and Banco Chinchorro.297   
This network consisted of stakeholders from research organizations such as the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and groups local to states such as 
Grupo Ecológico Mayab (GEMA) of Quintana Roo and Pronatura Noroeste of Baja 
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California.  As a national movement, this group also had visible political support from 
then environmental minister Lichtinger and party members in the Green Ecological Party 
of Mexico (PVEM) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), particularly from 
assumed PRI presidential successor Luis Donaldo Colosio.298  Although the local 
network did not coordinate advocacy efforts with the epistemic community, the efforts of 
this network later played an important role in the federal management of coastal hotel 
development. 
 
The SAM Epistemic Community Develops an Ecological Managerial Approach 
This epistemic community mobilized and recruited new members around the 
principle that improved environmental management in the reef was necessary as a matter 
of ecosystem stability, linking biodiversity conservation and protected areas management 
to ecological health and functioning ecosystems.  As occurred in the Jamaican Cockpit 
Country, epistemic community members were also concerned about the impact of 
management on the employment and subsistence potential of marginalized communities 
who depended on access to, and the exploitation of natural resources.299  Granted, the 
Jamaican case focused on agricultural, rural communities in the limestone forest, while 
the SAM case study concerned coastal fishing communities.  Nevertheless, the ecosystem 
management goals of the epistemic community had to confront not only the interests of 
                                                 
298
 Exequiel Ezcurra, author interviews conducted May 2009.  Taken from handwritten 
notes of phone interview. 
299
 The World Bank, 2000, Regional: Conservation and Sustainable Use of the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System, passim. 
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nationally significant economic actors, but also the interests of disenfranchised 
populations.  The following section indicates the internally held ecological perspective of 
the epistemic community by discussing interviews and documents held by its members. 
 
The Impact of Biodiversity Loss 
By focusing on ecosystem-level processes, the epistemic community portrayed 
biodiversity loss as a threat to overall ecosystem integrity, where a loss in the 
functionality of any area of the ecosystem could lead to irreversible harm in the entire 
ecological network.  The Normas Practicás studies, among others, framed mangrove loss 
as a problem of a loss in nursery habitats of fish, and eventually depleted fish 
populations.300  Moreover, mangroves were cited as important to ecosystem stability, as 
mangrove trees buffer against marine surges during storms and hurricanes.301  
Biodiversity in fish populations was also considered important in itself, and also because 
a healthy genetic variation in fish populations would have positive impacts on coral reef 
health by:  
…[providing] the corals the capacity to maintain their vital functions in 
healthy conditions for their growth, reproduction and development, while 
the presence of numerous coral structures gives the fish places where they 
                                                 
300
 Amigos de Sian Ka’an.  1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la 
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México.  (Coastal Resources Center: University of 
Rhode Island, Narragansett) pg. 15 
301
 Amigos de Sian Ka’an.  1998, Normas Prácticas para el Desarrollo Turístico de la 
Zona Costera de Quintana Roo, México.  (Coastal Resources Center: University of 
Rhode Island, Narragansett) pg. 11 
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can be protected, where they can find food, reproduce and maintain other 
vital functions.302  
 
The link between mangrove health and overall reef health, and between fish and 
coral reef biodiversity was emblematic of the interconnectivity described as important by 
epistemic community members:  
There is a very close relationship between the mangrove and the health of 
the reef.  Because for many species of fish and other species that keep the 
reef healthy, part of their life cycle is developed in the mangrove zone.  
Then, when someone destroys this part of the ecosystem, the mangrove, 
people generally think, “The reef is over there, and what I’m destroying 
are these trees here.”  But all these species have a very important 
interaction.303 
 
If you remove coastal material, in the mangrove and the forest, it’s a chain 
that affects everything.  In other words, the forest that is over here, 
contributes energy to the mangrove, and the mangrove contributes energy 
to the lagoon, to the reef lagoon, and the reef lagoon – but then people 
don’t understand this trophic or ecological chain.304 
 
The epistemic community was also concerned with the impact of natural resource 
and “biodiversity and ecosystem equilibrium” for economic resource generation and 
sustained consumption among low income populations.305  From this perspective, certain 
processes were seen as the primary threats to successful ecosystem management.   
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 WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in Coral Reefs, pg. 11 
303
 Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008.  Transcript of digital 
voice recording.  Translated from Spanish.   
304
 Interview 2.  Author interviews conducted January 2008.   Taken from transcript of 
audiocassette recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
305
 UCP, 2004, Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable de los Recursos Pesqueros, Turismo 
y Áreas Marinas Protegidas Transfronterizas, pg. 13 – 14. 
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Identifying the Primary Ecological Threats 
The primary threat was seen as hotel development, which not only degraded the 
reef ecosystem, but also competed with the land ownership claims of indigenous and 
lower income populations,306 threatening the economic sustainability of these 
communities by preventing sustainable use of natural resources.307  Although hotel 
development at present is largely restricted to the Riviera Maya in the northern third of 
the state, officials in SEMARNAT, the state agency SEDETUR and the research 
community have indicated that the southern third of the state, including in rural and 
undeveloped areas such as Majahual, is a target for future development and hotel 
expansion.308  
As indicated above, coastal hotel development contributes a range of direct and 
indirect threats to reef ecology.  Further, hotel development and the attendant tourism 
exacerbate the stress caused by other activities, such as increasing the demand on fishing:  
The principal threat is tourism… not just because of the people who are 
maybe directly diving, or fishing, or stepping on the reef…  [If] you have 
10 million tourists a year in one place, these tourists generate solid 
residues… waste water from human activity, from bathrooms, from 
whatever…  When there’s fishing in certain places, the fish will probably 
                                                 
306
 UCP, 2005, Manual de Métodos para la Elaboración de Programas de Uso Público 
en Áreas Protegidas de la Región del Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM: Belize 
City) pg. 35. 
307
 Secretaría de Economía, 2009, Fideicomiso Fomento Económico Quintana Roo 
2025 Cluster Pesca y Acuacultura.  Retrieved online, August 2009 from 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p2757/Sector_Pesca_QROO.pdf 
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 Enrique Galvez Herrera, author interviews conducted February 2008.  David 
Martinez, author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  Bezaury, J.C., et al, 1998, 
Participatory Coastal and Marine Management in Quintana Roo, Mexico, pg. 1. 
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be overexploited… If there weren’t tourism, fishermen wouldn’t need to 
fish these enormous quantities to support the demand.309 
 
Nevertheless, there was no call within the community for a ban on hotel 
construction.  Given the prominence of hotel tourism to state and federal GDP, such an 
approach would probably not have been politically tenable.  Rather, epistemic 
community members proposed reform in practices and policies governing the physical 
location, size, and environmental management practices of newly constructed hotels: 
And currently, at the international level, and also here in Mexico, we are 
promoting the sustainable use of resources…  In Cancun, where anyone 
can come and fish, and they don’t need a permit, we don’t imagine that 
this is sustainable…  At the same time, if we want sustainability in fishing, 
we want tourism to become sustainable as well.310 
 
Overfishing is similarly recognized as a major threat in ecosystem management in 
the SAM.  Scaled fish, particularly red snapper (Epinephelus morio), and shellfish such 
as lobster and conch, are targeted for commercial and subsistence fishing throughout 
Quintana Roo.311  Unchecked, the stress of commercial fishing is likely to increase, as 
fishing rich sites along the coast at Majahual, Banco Chinchorro and Xcalak are 
recognized as potentially lucrative, and attract a growing number of inland migrants.312   
                                                 
309
 Albert Franquesa, autor interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
310
 Álvaro Hernández author interviews conducted May 15, 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
311
 Hernández, A., F.A. Rodríguez-Zaragoza, M.C. García, J.M. Castro y J. Medina-
Flores. 2008, Hacia el manejo sostenible de los recursos pesqueros de Banco 
Chinchorro (Cancún: WWF-México) pg. 4 – 5; Patricia Santos, autor interviews 
conducted May 15, 2008.   
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 For example, WWF, 2007, How to Profit by Practicing Sustainable Fishing: Lobster 
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Creating a Managerial Framework 
Concerned about ecological integrity, the epistemic community developed a 
management approach focusing on the interconnectivity of biodiversity in the reef.   
…[At] a scientific or practical level, biodiversity is a necessary component 
for ecosystems to last…  [It’s] like the different organisms that we have in 
our bodies.  Everything has a function, and we can live without a piece, or 
without one organ…  The same thing happens with an ecosystem… If you 
remove one of the species, you would probably think that the ecosystem is 
not going to collapse.  But each time you remove one, and another, and 
another, you’re closer to the point where the ecosystem stops 
functioning.313 
 
In particular, epistemic community members were dismissive of the idea that 
additional AMPs would lead to improved biodiversity conservation, if the management 
practices were not improved:  
When we get into this topic, when we get into biodiversity, the 
government acts like everything is OK.  Because they argue: “In Quintana 
Roo, we have a high percentage of coastal areas as protected areas.   We 
are carrying out management.”  …For me, the concern is where there 
aren’t any protected areas, right?  There, there has been a very strong 
impact.314 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Fishing Practice Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef (WWF), pg. 32 notes that in 
one year (2004), the population of resort areas in Quintana Roo increased by 10.4%, a 
figure confirmed in interviews with CONANP staff working at the Puerto Morelos 
National Park and AMP, SEMARNAT staff in Chetumal and with Los Amigos staff in 
Cancún as a consistent rate of increase since the 2000s.  At that rate, the population 
would double every 7 years.   
313
 Albert Franquesa, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Transcript of digital 
voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
314
 Eloy Sosa, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Transcript of digital voice 
recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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The ICZM approach, developed in the UNU-INWEH and the ICRI workshops, 
posited that protected areas management should be fundamentally reformed to reflect the 
range of environmental processes in the region.  Similarly, effective management in 
fisheries would incorporate concern about ecosystem stability, while maintaining the 
ability of marginalized communities to earn a livelihood. 
 
Framing Alignment 
The adoption of a management approach organized around ICZM changed the 
focus of some of the core organizations of the epistemic community.  Prior to the 
emergence of the network, organizations such as Los Amigos were focused on improving 
management in specific locations, rather than on the reef as an integrated ecosystem.  As 
described by Gonzalo Merediz Alonso of Los Amigos, ideas about managing the reef as a 
unitary ecosystem evolved over time, as the various organizations participated in the 
constitution of the network: 
… [Over] the years we understood that it wasn’t making sense to have a 
Reserve being conserved like an island, right?  Sian Ka’an exchanges 
water with the area, the reefs are linked, the forests are connected.315 
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 Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of audiocassette  recording.  Translated from Spanish.  This sentiment would 
be repeated in a study produced by Gonzalo Merediz Alonso, director of Los Amigos, in 
his chapter in Holliday, Laura, Luis Marin and Henry Vaux, eds.  2007.  Sustainable 
Management of Groundwater in Mexico: Proceedings from a Workshop (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press) pg. 97 – 102. 
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Measuring the Epistemic Community’s Knowledge Consensus 
In addition to sharing a rationale for action based on an ecological understanding 
of the reef, this network shared a causal consensus on the relationship between human 
activity and environmental degradation.  As occurred in Jamaica, not only did the various 
researchers agree on the scientific causal explanations, but they also were aware that a 
general agreement existed within the network.  As explained by Patricia Santos of 
CONANP, this agreement emerged for specific reasons: 
First, because the data is generated by experts.  Experts whom almost all 
of us know, because we are friends, or colleagues, or teachers, or students.  
Or, we know they’re experts because we read each other’s publications.  
Second, because the methodology that is used is standardized, which 
makes it trustworthy.  Third, there is no reason for anyone to dress up the 
information being collected. 
 
This consensus did not apply to all the potential threats addressed by the SAM 
project, however.  While the consensus was strongest in relation to hotel development 
and fishing practices, there was an admitted lack of clear scientific knowledge linking 
inland industrial and agricultural development to offshore marine degradation.  At the 
same time, these processes were not an overt part of the policy advocacy campaigns.  The 
following section assesses the level of consensus on the identified threats.   
 
Knowledge Consensus on Tourism Development 
Tourism Development: Agreement on the Causes 
There was a universal recognition within the community about the causal 
significance of coastal tourist and hotel development on environmental degradation in the 
reef.  Project reports such as the Threat and Root Cause Analysis produced for the SAM 
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Project, as well as interviews indicate a shared awareness of the association between 
tourism-based development and its various impacts on reef environmental health.316   
Similar to bauxite production in Jamaica, coastal tourism in Quintana Roo is seen 
as a prominent threat due to its privileged position in federal and state economic 
development.  Since the 1970s, the PRI government had promoted coastal tourism as a 
key driver of the economy.  Cancún and the Riviera Maya were specifically established 
through a federal program as major sites for tourist development, with the government 
providing credit and investing in infrastructure for the development of large-scale 
tourism.317   
Economically, this proved a windfall for Quintana Roo and Mexico.  Between 
1997 and 2003, the number of hotel rooms in the Riviera Maya increased from 4,000 to 
28,000, and by 2007, Cancún and the Riviera Maya combined had 59,000 rooms.318  
From 1999 to 2006, between 28% and 38% of the total tourism revenue in Mexico and 
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 See project proposals and reports in, inter alia, Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, 
Threat and Root Cause Analysis. 
317
 Graciela Pérez Villegas and Eurosia Carrascal, 1999, El Desarrollo Turístico en 
Cancún, Quintana Roo y sus Consecuencias sobre la Cubierta Vegetal.  Investigaciones 
Geográficas, Boletín del Instituto de Geografía, UNAM(43: 145- 166) pg. 149.  David 
Martínez, author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  María del Consuelo Méndez 
Sosa, “Desarrollo Económico en Cancún a Partir del Sector Hotelero.”  Produced for La 
Confederación Nacional Turística.  Retrieved online August 2009 from 
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between 75% and 80% of the total state revenue of Quintana Roo came solely from 
earnings based on Cancún and the Riviera Maya.319  As a result, hotel development has, 
over the past four decades, been a significant part of the politics of development in the 
reef region. 
 
Tourism Development: Agreement on the Consequences 
In interviews and project documents, respondents indicated a high level of 
awareness of the consequences of tourism-based development for the ecological health in 
the reef.  Members universally acknowledged that tourism-based development led to 
depleted mangroves, which in turn caused a chain reaction of coastal erosion, loss in reef 
cover, and exposure to tidal energy.320  Because of this contribution to various processes, 
epistemic community members ranked tourism-based development as the main 
environmental threat to coastal management in interviews, and in threat assessments 
conducted since the 1999 AGRRA studies.321 
                                                 
319
  David Martínez, autor interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording; The revenue stream for this period is estimated to fall 
between US$2,771 million and US$3, 319 million per year.  SEDTUR, 2009, 
Indicadores Turísticos, available online at 
http://sedetur.qroo.gob.mx/estadisticas/estadisticas.php.  By another measure, tourism 
in Cancún brings approximately 25% of the GDP of Mexico.  See Sale, Peter F., 
Ernesto A. Chávez, Bruce G. Hatcher, Colin Mayfield and Jan J. H. Ciborowski, c. 
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The primary threat is tourism.  Right now, in the Maya coast, the reef 
system is directly at risk, because of the explosive boom of tourism.  Not 
just the tourists that come to enjoy the beach, but those that come to 
construct, let’s say, a support infrastructure for tourism… [starting] a 
process of urbanization that deforests, that impacts…more than just the 
wetlands, but also the forest, the coastal landscape.322 
 
We believe that coastal development, particularly in the case of Mexico, is 
the principal threat to the integrity of the ecosystem.  Coastal 
development, which, in the majority of the cases, is associated with tourist 
development.323 
 
Knowledge Consensus on Fishing 
Fishing: Agreement on the Causes 
Fishing, though less economically significant than tourism, is still a significant 
source of income for coastal communities, and the political economy of this practice 
similarly contributes to the impact of this activity on the reef ecosystem.  Although 
fishing contributes an average of only 0.8% toward internal state revenue per annum, 
over 3,000 fishermen in the state earned an average of MX$60,939 per year, or 
approximately US $6,000, an attractive income to marginalized populations.324  While 
recognized as a causal threat by the epistemic community, there is some equivocation 
about the causal weight of fishing in the Mesoamerican basin.  As occurred with the 
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from transcript of audiocassette recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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 Álvaro Hernández, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish.  
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peasant agricultural practices in the Cockpit Country, Jamaica, clandestine activity 
prevents precise models of the impact of fishermen on reef biodiversity.   
 
Fishing: Agreement on the Consequences 
Overfishing is universally cited as a source of pressure on the marine ecosystem, 
both in interviews and confirmed in reports conducted by TNC on fish populations and 
spawning sites, or areas in which gathered to fish reproduce.325  Overfishing as described 
by the epistemic community could result in population collapses, leading to disruption of 
the benthic cycle and trophic network of the marine ecosystem.  Again, there was some 
uncertainty insofar as the impact of clandestine activity is unclear. 
 
Measuring Consensus on Inland Industry and Agriculture 
Inland Industry and Agriculture: A Lack of Agreement on the Causes 
The epistemic community lacks a scientific consensus for other threats cited in 
SAM Project documents, such as inland agricultural and industrial development.  
Although information is available indicating the presence of pesticides commonly 
associated with agricultural runoff in coastal and marine areas, specific information about 
the contribution of various point sources to marine pollution is nonexistent, due to a lack 
of information about the direction of subterranean river flows in the Yucatán.326   
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A Consensus on the Aggregated Extent of Environmental Degradation 
Studies on the reef ecosystem have created an aggregate measure of the projected 
and current extent of environmental degradation in the Mesoamerican reef.  In 2005, the 
epistemic community concluded a baseline study of reef conditions in the four countries 
in the basin.  In Mexico, the sites studied were Cozumel in the north and Banco 
Chinchorro and Xcalak in the south.  In this study, researchers gathered information on 
indicators of reef and ecosystem health including: the size, density, species and average 
cover of coral species; the diet, nesting patterns and biomass of 23 indicator species of 
fish; the quantity of seagrass; and the density of mangrove cover as measured by number 
of trees per hectare.327  In addition, studies of pollution in the Bay of Chetumal generated 
figures on the presence of chemical and organic compounds from agricultural pesticides 
and plaguicides, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and DDT, as well as 
generating information on the chemical and physical composition of water.328   
Some studies were more narrowly tailored towards specific threats.  For example, 
CONAPESCA and the FAO had conducted longitudinal studies on declines in catch size 
and populations of important commercial species, such as spiny lobster, snapper and 
                                                                                                                                              
inland pollution via underground rivers.  
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 M. García-Salgado, et al, 2006, Línea Base del Estado del Sistema Arrecifal 
Mesoamericano, pg. 120 – 153, especially pg. 151 - 153. 
  
 
 
 
 
166 
 
conch, dating back to the 1970s.329  The CONAPESCA and the baseline studies were 
shared among epistemic community members through member participation in the 
various threat assessment workshops and research methodologies workshops conducted 
among network participants for the SAM Project.   
With high agreement on the extent of environmental degradation, as well as a 
stated awareness within the community about the existence of this agreement, the data 
indicate that consensus is high for two of the identified threats relevant to management 
under Mexican jurisdiction: tourism-based development and overfishing, but absent for 
inland agriculture and industry.   
 
Measuring Network Socialization with Managers 
High Levels of Socialization with SEMARNAT and CONANP 
In this case, the epistemic community established strong socialization ties to 
federal agencies, particularly in the environmental secretariat, SEMARNAT and its 
executive agency in protected areas management, CONANP.  As described above, the 
SAM Project was administered by a National Reef Committee staffed by CONANP and 
by epistemic community organizations Los Amigos and WWF-México; the GTTs that 
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 The Quintana Roo delegation of CONAPESCA provided figures of population 
changes over time, noting a general tendency to decrease over time in Comité Técnico 
Estatal de Evaluación, 2006, Informe de Evaluación Estatal: Programa de Acuacultura 
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increasingly visible decline in catch sizes and biomass among commercially harvested 
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provided recommendations to the coordinating UCP were also comprised of CONANP 
and ENGO organizations from the epistemic community.  Beyond these formalized links 
under the SAM Project, CONANP held occasional additional information-gathering 
meetings with researchers from epistemic community organizations, such as ECOSUR 
and CINVESTAV in the course of its duties as manager of protected areas.330   
These ties were strengthened by the exchange of personnel and training between 
CONANP and the civil society.  Former staffers of Los Amigos were employed by 
CONANP in reef monitoring during the period of field research, and the agency 
participated in regionally coordinated training workshops with civil society actors, such 
as a 2003 workshop held in Belize to evaluate protected areas management.331   
 
Low Socialization with State Managers in Quintana Roo 
CONANP was the most integrated of the policymaker agencies relevant to SAM 
governance.  The epistemic community did create additional ties to agencies in the state 
government of Quintana Roo, but these were only weakly established.  There, epistemic 
community members invited state officials to participate in the 1990s Xcalak reef 
management workshops, to design appropriate management strategies with civil society 
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 Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008.   
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 UCP, 2003, Principios de Manejo para las Áreas Marinas Protegidas: Manual 
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managers.332  However, this process of socialization did not mirror the regularized 
meetings with CONANP.  It was limited to discussions on the Xcalak management 
workshops, but did not extend to discussions on hotel management, either with 
SEDETUR, or the state government itself. 
 
Socialization with SAGARPA and CONAPESCA 
For the governance of fisheries, the epistemic community reinforced its links with 
CONANP, as well as creating ties to federal agencies in SAGARPA and CONAPESCA.  
For the WWF MAR Project, the epistemic community organizations WWF-México, 
CINVESTAV and ECOSUR held a series of information-building and exchange 
workshops on fisheries management and conservation with federal agents in CONANP 
and CONAPESCA throughout the 2000s.333   
 
Socialization with Fishing Cooperatives 
In addition, the epistemic community fostered ties to private sector actors in 
fishing cooperatives.  This gave the fisheries governance efforts a multilevel dimension, 
as it involved the civil society as well as public policymakers.  As fishermen had regular 
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 Beth R. Chung, 1999, “A Community Strategy for Coastal Zone Management of 
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access to the reef and a store of knowledge about fish populations and migratory patterns, 
cooperatives were identified by policymakers and researchers as crucial sources of 
information in areas relevant to management, including: identifying common sites of 
capture, measuring diversity within and among fish species, and identifying capture 
techniques.334  Consequently, they were included in the WWF MAR Workshops with 
SAGARPA and CONAPESCA.  For the fishermen, these workshops resulted in the 
publication of manuals and recommendations for safety precautions, appropriate fishing 
techniques and population monitoring.335   
 
Socialization with Private Sector Actors in Hotel Management 
Epistemic community members also created formal and ad hoc channels of 
communication with private sector managers in the tourism sector.  Los Amigos and URI-
CRC conducted periodic studies on the relationship between coastal hotel construction 
and environmental degradation, and issued a series of voluntary recommendations titled 
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 Referenced in interviews with José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, Álvaro Hernández 
and Gonzalo Merediz Alonso.  See also WWF-México, 2008, Best Fishing Practices in 
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Normas Prácticas to hotel managers in the Riviera Maya.336  In addition, transnational 
epistemic community organizations such as Conservation International and Los Amigos 
established the Mesoamerican Reef Tourism Initiative (MARTI), an informal association 
of hoteliers and civil society researchers.  Like the Normas Prácticas studies, the MARTI 
initiative was created to promote voluntary good environmental practices in the tourism 
sector, including in the operation of cruise ships, reef visitation practices, and hotel 
operation and construction.337 
 
Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community 
As described above, the epistemic community had variable levels of socialization 
with environmental managers in the public and private sector in Mexico.  Similarly, the 
epistemic community used economic framing, or the linkage of environmental 
management to the wellbeing of nationally important productive economic sectors, in 
different campaigns to promote environmental management in the Mesoamerican reef.  
This formed a strategic choice, as interview respondents indicated that the network, 
continued to be internally motivated by broader concerns about biodiversity and 
ecosystem integrity: 
But I believe that what should be recognized is that the [natural] resources 
have a value per se…  They’re valued not just because they might be 
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valuable to mankind.  Or, they’re not just valuable because we can get 
some money from them.  They’re valuable per se, by the fact of their 
existence, from all that they represent for evolution, all the complexity and 
their place in the biosphere.338 
 
Using Economic Frames with Hotel Managers 
The primary framing tactic of the epistemic community was to link biodiversity 
loss to economic harm in the hotel sector, identified as the primary economic productive 
sector in the state.  This link allowed epistemic community members and knowledge 
brokers to argue to hotel managers that proper environmental management would avoid 
the erosion, attendant pollution and reef sedimentation that could damage hotel 
infrastructure and the market appeal of coastal landscapes.  For example, the Normas 
Prácticas studies conducted by Los Amigos projected that coastal erosion would 
necessitate the construction of buffering walls to maintain the long-term structural 
integrity of the coastal buildings (see Figure 3.3: Effect of Erosion on Hotel 
Construction), theoretically creating a picture whereby environmental loss would 
negatively affect long-term profit margins:  
Those gentlemen that want to do away with the mangrove should 
understand that if they do away with the mangrove, they’re doing away 
with the coral reef, which is what they want to sell.  Or that if they tear out 
the seagrass near the coast, their fine sand beach is going to be lost.339 
 
Well, each one of [the hoteliers] wants to get the maximum utility from 
their hospitality, from their investment in the land.  And to get the 
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 Patricia Santos, autor interviews conducted May 15, 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
audiocassette recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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maximum utility, they have to build a lot of rooms, a lot of concrete, they 
have to alter the landscape a lot.  When you speak to them about 
environmentally friendly development, something less destructive… they 
look at it from an accounting perspective.340 
 
 
Using Economic Frames with Fishing Managers 
Similarly, environmental management was linked to the economic interests of 
cooperatives in their capacity as managers of coastal fishing practices.  The multilevel 
workshops coordinated by WWF-México and the epistemic community were designed to 
persuade fishermen that overexploitation would result in a decreased future ability to 
utilize coastal resources.341  While not a prominent economic sector, this nevertheless 
counts as economic framing, as the cooperation of civil society fishing managers 
(cooperatives) was sought by convincing them of the economic benefit of environmental 
action.  Moreover, the sustainability of commercially harvested fish populations was 
linked not only to overharvesting per se, but also to the maintenance of health of other 
populations and the degradation of terrestrial and marine ecosystems external to the 
reef.342   Reports produced for the SAM by epistemic community members also 
emphasized the economic merit of conserving and sustainably managing fish harvesting: 
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 Eloy Sosa, autor interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
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 ICRAN, c. 2005, Lobster Fishing Practices Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef 
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…Overfishing and a lack of regulations in reproductive and nursery sites 
can bring the size of commercial captures to a decline, possibly close to 
collapse.343  
 
One can consider that the protection of reproductive aggregation sites is 
similar to the protection of a savings account in a bank.  If possible, we 
should capture the interest, not the savings capital…  This analogy is 
particularly appropriate when one considers the management of 
reproductive aggregations – source sites for the reproduction of the 
majority of the commercially important reef fish in the regions of the 
SAM.344 
 
In interviews, epistemic community respondents indicated that the choice of 
economic language to describe the impacts of biodiversity loss and environmental 
degradation was necessary to persuade these local stakeholders about the rationality of 
environmental management and good practices.  Again, respondents indicated that the 
use of economic language was a strategic choice, as it differed with internally held 
reasons for biodiversity management, which emphasized the holistic rather than the 
consumptive value of reef ecosystems:  
[U]nfortunately, our society is based largely on the issue of costs and 
compensation for environmental impacts…  [If] we don’t carry out that 
kind of valuation, the people will not, they might not pay it any mind. 345 
 
If we look at it from the perspective that the people do, that is, only 
economic, well [biodiversity] does have its value, right?... [B]ecause it’s 
                                                 
343
 UCP, 2002, Reporte de Avance Técnico y Financiero.  Reporte No. 3.  Período: 
Julio 2002 – Diciembre 2002 (Belize City: SAM) pg. 17.  Translated from Spanish.   
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generating economic revenue for them.  As a naturalist or biologist, the 
value that it has is for human health.346 
 
This case gives variation on two of the independent variables, framing and 
socialization, but again has no variation on consensus in regards to the policy campaigns 
studied.  As described above, the community generated a robust intersubjective 
consensus on two of the primary anthropogenic threats assessed here: fishing and coastal 
hotel development.  The other threats, inland agriculture and industry, were not addressed 
by the advocacy efforts.  Second, the community created strong social links to 
policymakers in the environmental and fishing governmental agencies, particularly in the 
federal level, as well as with private sector managers in the hotel and fishing sectors.  
Third, in the interest of persuading actors and policymakers interested in the economic 
exploitation of natural resources, the epistemic community adopted strategic frames 
attempting to demonstrate the economic importance of biodiversity conservation to 
hoteliers and fishing cooperatives.  The following section assesses the success of the 
community in influencing biodiversity policies and practices in the Mesoamerican basin. 
 
Environmental Policy Advocacy 
Bounding the Cartographic Limits of the Ecoregion 
In contrast to the Jamaican Cockpit Country project, where the Cockpit Country 
remained amorphously described, the epistemic community in this case was more 
involved in establishing specific geographic limits in the GEF-funded project.  The 
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outcome of this process was that the community exercised additional influence on the 
eventual management approach taken by federal environmental policymakers in Mexico.   
The area studies in the 1999 Threat and Root Cause Analysis, which was intended to 
understand the environmental threats in the Mesoamerican basin, was chosen to 
“approximate the limits defined by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) for the Meso-American 
Caribbean Reef Ecoregion” (see Figure 3.1: Map of WWF Defined Ecoregion).347  
This control also allowed the epistemic community to include references to ecological 
management in the project, including coastal with marine management.  As adopted by 
the coordinating body, the Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP) of the SAM 
Project, the areas relevant to biodiversity management in the reef included coastal and 
marine environments, such as mangroves and seagrasses,348 some of the core principles 
of ICZM developed by the emerging scientific network during the late 1990s.   
Second, in relation to project design, the epistemic community promoted the 
adoption of a standardized investigative methodology to evaluate reef health, also based 
on the principles of ICZM and an ecological understanding of the environmental 
processes in the reef.  Prior to the launch of the SAM Project, Mexican natural resource 
policymakers had not established a standard methodology for monitoring federal and 
                                                 
347
 Bessy Aspra de Lupiac et al, 1999, Threat and Root Cause Analysis, pg. 2 
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state AMPs.349  In 2002, the CCAD and the UCP requested the development of a 
standardized, scientifically valid monitoring program to investigate regional reef health 
for the SAM.  In May of 2002, a transnational consortium of researchers headed by Peter 
Sale of UNU-INWEH held a workshop in Cancún to this end.  Over 35 scientists from 
the four countries and the international community participated in this workshop, 
including members of Mexican epistemic community organizations, Los Amigos, WWF-
México, and CINVESTAV ,and organizations such as CZMA/I from the broader regional 
reef TAN.350  The methodology developed by the consortium was called the Programa de 
Monitoreo Sinóptico (PMS), and was synthesized from earlier studies, including the 1999 
AGRRA workshops, and the ICZM symposia.351  The PMS specified monitoring 
methods, environmental modeling, biodiversity indicators and relevant sites of 
investigation in the region, and by using the ecosystem framework developed in ICZM, 
incorporated coastal mangrove zones and seagrasses in the monitoring approach.  Much 
as occurred with the geographic area defined in the 1999 Threat and Root Cause 
Analysis, the PMS was incorporated as part of the regional management approach in the 
SAM Project. 
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SEMARNAT and the Federal Branch: Expand the ZFMT 
A minor campaign in the epistemic community advocacy attempt was the goal of 
reforming a coastal zone referred to as the Zona Federal Marítimo-Terrestre (ZFMT).  
The ZFMT consists of the coastal area measured 20 meters from the average tide level, in 
which large development projects such as hotel construction are subject to an 
environmental impact assessment, and have to be approved by SEMARNAT and 
PROFEPA.352   
However, at present the epistemic community considers the ZFMT as an 
inadequate management tool.  Studies of beach erosion cited in the Normas Prácticas 
studies have demonstrated that large structures between the first sand dune and the 
coastline are severely disruptive of sand replenishment and contribute to beach erosion.  
As the location of the first sand dune on a beach may be substantially more than 20 
meters away, hotels constructed out of the ZFMT and hence free from this federal 
oversight may contribute strongly to coastal erosion and reef sedimentation.353  However, 
this became a site of policy advocacy for a small subsection of the epistemic community, 
only in the Normas Prácticas studies of Los Amigos and URI-CRC recommended that the 
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federal government expand the ZFMT from 20 meters to a construction-free zone 
extending up to 5 meters behind the first sand dune.   
 
SEMARNAT and CONANP: Reforming AMPs  
In addition, the epistemic community sought the reform of SEMARNAT’s and 
CONANP’s practices in managing federal AMPs in sites relevant to the SAM.  Los 
Amigos recommended the addition of federal AMP status in currently non-protected 
areas, primarily at Majahual and Xaban Ha, an area near Cozumel.354  Los Amigos and 
other epistemic community organizations, including ECOSUR and WWF-México sought 
the incorporation of ecological principles established under ICZM in existing protected 
areas, both in those without plans, and in those with insufficiently designed plans.  This 
was explicitly advanced to CONANP and SEMARNAT: in 2003 civil society 
organizations and CONANP participated in a series of workshops in Belize to discuss 
incorporating the principle of ecosystem loading capacity in general AMP 
management.355  Throughout the conduct of the SAM Project, epistemic community 
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 As stated by Felipe Serrano of ECOSUR in interviews conducted March 2008.  
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members in WWF-México and ECOSUR sought to persuade CONANP to redraft 
existing plans at Xcalak and at the “buffer zones” at Sian Ka’an, Área de Uaymil and the 
Reefs of Sian Ka’an, such that they conform to a “scientific or ecological point of view of 
biodiversity.”356   
 
Fishing Cooperatives: Reform Existing Practices 
For fishing management, the epistemic community took a multilevel approach to 
governance.  In the WWF MAR Project, epistemic community participants in CONANP 
and WWF-México directly engaged with participating fishing cooperatives, promoting 
the adoption of sustainable fishing practices, such as the voluntary adoption of size 
restrictions on lobster, compliance with fishing regulations, and protecting spawning 
sites.357  Epistemic community members combined this approach with encouragement 
that fishermen curtail the quantity of fish extracted for commerce or subsistence, by 
shifting toward other forms of income generation such as catch-and-release or sport 
fishing. Promoting internal compliance and the voluntary adoption of sustainable 
practices was necessary to effective governance, as the cost to the government of 
monitoring and enforcing marine practices is extremely prohibitive.  The epistemic 
                                                                                                                                              
26; CONANP, 2003, Informes de Logros 2003.  Retrieved August 2009 from 
http://www.conanp.gob.mx/pdf_informes/logros_2003.pdf, pg. 32; UCP 2003, Diseño e 
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community sought to persuade cooperatives to take this action by arguing that these 
restrictions would improve the long-term durability of fish resources necessary to 
continued economic exploitation.358   
For the SAM, fisheries management only has two activities...  The search 
for new, alternative livelihoods for fishermen, so that they change their 
practices.  So, training for sport fishing, so that they move toward tourism, 
ecotourism, whatever...  And the other is monitoring the reproductive 
aggregations.359   
 
 
SAGARPA and CONAPESCA: Reform Fishing Regulations 
At the policy level, epistemic community members recommended that 
CONAPESCA establish regulations identifying and protecting fish spawning sites.  In 
2002, TNC and other organizations conducted a study identifying spawning sites 
throughout the Mesoamerican basin.360  As sensitive areas and crucial to fish biodiversity, 
the epistemic community argued that CONAPESCA ban or restrict fishing in these 
zones.361  Moreover, the epistemic community recommended that CONAPESCA, 
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Practice Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef (WWF).  WWF, 2008, Best Fishing 
Practices. 
359
 Eloy Sosa, author interviews conducted February 2008. Taken from transcript of 
digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish.   
360
 Key to this effort was a 2002 workshop in Belize, attended by scientists of the four 
countries, and transnational organizations such as TNC.  See Will Heyman and Nicanor 
Requena, 2003, Informe Final de la Consultoría: Sitios de las agregaciones 
reproductivas de peces en la zona del SAM: Recomendaciones para su monitoreo y 
manejo (Belize City: SAM), pg. 4. 
361
 Will Heyman and Nicanor Requena, 2003, Informe Final de la Consultoría: Sitios 
de las agregaciones reproductivas de peces en la zona del SAM: Recomendaciones 
  
 
 
 
 
181 
 
CONANP and SEMARNAT coordinate the protection of spawning sites with AMP 
management.  AMPs created by CONANP and SEMARNAT in fishing spawning sites 
would be governed as exclusive access zones for registered cooperatives who would in 
turn could contribute to reef governance through monitoring and the adoption of 
sustainable practices.362 
 
Hoteliers: Change Hotel Management and Land Use Practices 
As described above, the MAGTI partnership and Normas Prácticas studies 
attempted to convince hoteliers to change practices by using economic framing 
arguments.  These focused on practices such as aggressively implementing 
recommendations for recreational reef access, voluntarily restricting the height and 
coastal proximity of hotels, and generally incorporating environmental best practices:  
For the hotels that are currently in operation, what we do is carry out a 
diagnosis with them, on how to manage energy, water, toxic residues…  
Things that are practical and that help them to save energy, water, money, 
and that is an element, to answer your question, as to how we approach 
them.  So that they see that [the environment] has an economic value as 
well.363  
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Evaluating Epistemic Community Influence 
In this case as well, the epistemic community had mixed success in promoting 
their preferred management approach in the governance of the region of concern.  
Epistemic community members had considerable success in persuading environmental 
policymakers in CONANP, SEMARNAT, and CONAPESCA to adopt new policies. 
Similarly, the epistemic community attained some success in persuading fishing 
cooperatives to change practices.  However, the community had little success in engaging 
with the governance of coastal hotel construction, either as taken by hoteliers, or by the 
state government of Quintana Roo.   
 
Managing AMPs under CONANP and SEMARNAT 
In AMP management, epistemic community influence filtered from the top-down, 
as the regional SAM institutions in the UCP and CCAD adopted the recommendations 
issued by the civil society network.  The PMS methodology designed by the UNU-
INWEH consortium, and which was based on ICZM studies carried out by epistemic 
community members during the late 1990s, was adopted by CONANP and SEMARNAT 
as the monitoring strategy for AMPs in the Mesoamerican basin.364  After the SAM 
Project concluded in 2007, the federal agencies continued to employ PMS, indicating that 
its adoption was not contingent on GEF support.365   
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The domestic management of AMPs was also directly influenced by epistemic 
community advocacy.  In the Sian Ka’an area, CONANP and SEMARNAT replaced the 
1993 management plan with a plan designed with assistance from civil society 
organizations such as Los Amigos and TNC.  Under the new plan, monitoring and 
protection of the Biosphere Reserve was integrated with management of the Reefs of 
Sian Ka’an and the Área de Uaymil, and incorporated into what is currently referred to as 
the “Sian Ka’an Complex,” with over 652,000 hectares, or approximately half of the total 
protected area coverage in Quintana Roo.366  In addition, the agencies entered into 
sponsorship agreements with UNESCO and international MNCs, such as Gillette, to 
purchase sections of coastal wetlands in Sian Ka’an for conservation, monitoring these 
areas through joint efforts with actors in the epistemic community, namely TNC and Los 
Amigos.367   
Similarly at Xcalak, epistemic community members WWF-México, TNC and 
URI-CRC successfully drafted a federally accepted management plan, with the approval 
of CONANP and SEMARNAT for the newly created AMP; this plan included limitations 
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on the quantity of divers (recreational or otherwise) based on ecosystem loading capacity, 
prohibitions on the use of SCUBA and other types of augmenting fishing equipment, and 
the creation of zones of no-capture and restricted access for registered cooperatives.368   
Not all recommendations were incorporated into the policies of the environmental 
agencies, however.  At the time of writing, the adoption of additional federal protected 
areas status at sites recommended by the epistemic community, such as Majahual, were 
not carried out.  CONANP members were concerned that the adoption of AMP status in 
these areas, though preferred by Los Amigos, was not justified, due the environmental 
health of the area.   
This suggests a further split in the overall consensus within the epistemic 
community, as both agencies are prominent members of the network.  Nevertheless, this 
difference was not an observed source of tension within the network, as it was not 
mentioned outside of one interview with CONANP staff, and the reason given for 
refusing protected areas status was based on a pragmatic consideration of the costs of 
managing marginally important zones. 
There are zones where, even if there are corals, the population density is 
very low.  There’s just pure rock, sand, seagrass, and one little coral here, 
another over there, one here, and we can’t call that the reef, nor can we 
call it a coral community…  And then, when a place is already very 
altered… it doesn’t merit having a category of protection that requires 
money, personnel, equipment…  In other words, it’s so deteriorated that 
it’s not worth the trouble to give it a special category of protection.369 
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Multisectoral Governance of Fisheries 
The practices and policy of fisheries management was also directly influenced by 
the epistemic community.  After the project to monitor spawning sites concluded in 2003, 
the epistemic community identified additional sites in Mexico, increasing the recognized 
number from 27 to 39.370  In these sites, SAGARPA and CONAPESCA adopted policies 
requiring permits for fishing cooperatives, establishing seasonal allowances, and limiting 
the use of fishing boats to those with small outboard motors.371  CONANP also 
coordinated with CONAPESCA to manage spawning sites, classifying them as protected 
areas under environmental law, and banning commercial fishing in them in the interest of 
maintaining ecosystem health.372   
Fishing cooperative practices demonstrated some epistemic community influence 
as well.  Throughout the coast, there were some exemplary cases of the reform of fishing 
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practices, such as at Xcalak.  After the involvement of epistemic community 
organizations in the constitution of the XCC, the fishing community established no-take 
zones, limited appropriate extractive techniques to low-impact methods, and agreed to 
protect overall health in the region, all without additional government regulation.373  At 
Punta Allen, the cooperatives adopted a voluntary ban on the use of SCUBA equipment 
for lobster harvesting.374   
At a broader level, in a 2006 CONAPESCA survey of fishing cooperatives, 
26.7% were identified as carrying out a high level of sustainable management and 
extraction, including using low-impact fishing techniques and regulated harvesting; 40% 
carried out moderate action, but stopped short of specifically targeted conservation of 
stocks whereas 33% carried out no discernible management effort.375   
 
Multisectoral Resistance to Hotel Management and Coastal Land Use Reform in 
Quintana Roo  
While the community had some success in informing protected areas and fisheries 
management, specific reforms aimed at restricting coastal tourism and development, 
through either regulatory policy or practice, failed to take place.  Although federal policy 
eventually led to significant restriction on coastal construction, this was due to advocacy 
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efforts outside the reef epistemic community.  Despite the efforts of the epistemic 
community, beachfront construction remained the preferred model of coastal construction 
by hoteliers, who remained unconvinced by economic arguments for ecological 
conservation.  In fact, epistemic community respondents noted that economic arguments 
for limited coastal development would be unlikely to convince hotel managers, whose 
economic calculations fundamentally diverged from the sustainable management 
preferences of the epistemic community: 
Traditionally, in the case of tourism in coastal development in Mexico, the 
expectation of a return on investment among the major hotel developers, is 
a return in six, seven, eight years.  In sustainable development, the plan for 
a return on investment of resources and benefits, we’re talking about the 
long-term, possibly 15 years.  To the way of thinking of the investor, it’s a 
notable difference.376 
 
In addition, attempts to encourage hoteliers to adopt measures to provide 
municipal services for the spontaneously emerging “support communities,” and to place a 
higher value on maintaining ecological integrity failed to take hold:  
The mangrove bothers them, because it disturbs the hotel surroundings, or 
it bothers them because of the mosquitoes.  The hotels want to be on the 
beach.  They don’t want to be inland.  And so – and they want to invest as 
little as possible – and so, the easiest thing to do, is fill the mangrove.377   
 
[Hoteliers] are supposed to come with a treatment plan and location for 
services, for the hotel as well as for communities that form, the support 
communities.  But right now, the tourist developers are only thinking 
about investing in their own hotel.378 
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transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
377
 Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
378
 José Juan Domínguez Calderón, author interviews conducted Jan 24, 2008.  Taken 
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State agencies did maintain that this development in Majahual and other 
underdeveloped rural areas was compatible with environmentally friendly behavior.  
Asserting that Majahual and southern coastal zones would be developed through a 
different model of development, encouraging higher end customers for less intensive 
development, officials at SEDETUR were assuring that development plans would be 
minimally environmentally destructive: 
Majahual has the concept of low impact development…  Sure, there are 
pressures on the part of hotel chains, as far as I know in this case from 
Spain, that want to get permits to construct hotels of 1,000 or 2,000 rooms 
in a place where the ecosystem cannot support this stress.  But then, it 
hasn’t had that explosive development [as in Cancún], precisely because 
the POETs haven’t allowed it, and the government of the state and the 
federation have maintained that the environment be protected.379 
 
However, this perspective contrasted with the view of the epistemic communities 
that, although sustainable coastal development was possible, current and planned 
development systematically failed to incorporate ecological concerns into design.  As a 
result, scientists within the network continued to express their disapproval of 
development in the southern third of the state. 
But that area of Majahual, as I’m saying, is an area of pure mangrove.  
Well, where there would be mangroves, that are now filled and cut, filled 
with stone.  And who cared?  Who said anything?  Sure, the scientists, but 
so what?  They had said that the zone was very fragile, that there should 
be a zoning plan for minimal growth, low-impact ecotourism... In front of 
Majahual is the biggest reef in Mexico, the Mesoamerican reef.  Part of 
                                                                                                                                              
from transcript of audiocassette recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
379
 David Martínez.  Author interviews conducted April 29, 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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the Mesoamerican reef.  But it’s not that [the hoteliers] don’t know, it’s 
that they don’t care.380 
 
As of the time of writing, there was no systematic data on compliance within 
hotels on restrictions on loading capacity of reefs.  CONANP managers did produce 
regulations, including establishing sanctions, limiting the amount of recreational divers in 
reef environments within AMPs, and also established monitoring patrols.381  However, 
the cost of comprehensive marine monitoring is extremely costly, in time and resources, 
and so the federal government has been unable to establish independent verification of 
compliance with these guidelines.  Finally, the recommendations to establish a wider 
zone of restriction to replace the ZFMT have to date, not been enacted.  Overall, 
epistemic community influence has been mixed. 
 
A Brief Look at Local Activism in Coastal Regulation 
What success occurred in reforming coastal hotel development emerged not from 
the epistemic community, but from the efforts of the national network in Mexico, which 
lobbied the federal government to restrict future construction in the interest of protecting 
the environment.  In 2003, SEMARNAT adopted a federal norm titled NOM-022-
SEMARNAT-2003, following the publication of studies conducted by researchers in the 
mangrove advocacy network on the importance of mangrove swamps to coastal 
                                                 
380
 Adriana Yoloxóchitl Olivera Gómez, author interviews conducted March 2008.  
Taken from transcript of audiocassette recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
381
 CONANP, 2007, Programa de Conservación y Manejo: Reserva de la Biósfera Sian 
Ka’an 
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ecosystems.  NOM-022 established federal regulations such as barring construction 
within 100m of mangrove zones, except where necessary to restore the function of 
degraded mangrove zones and maintain the flow of fresh water to the open ocean from 
inland sources.382  This policy had clear, positive implications for the management goals 
of the epistemic community, by restricting legitimate coastal construction. 
Over the next four years, this policy became the site of political contestation.  In 
2003, Minister Lichtinger was replaced by Minister Luege under Fox’s PAN 
administration.  After a spirited national campaign by neocorporatist hotelier associations 
and state governors, including (from Quintana Roo) ACLUVAC, APIR, Grupo Quintana 
Roo, and then governor Hendricks Díaz, Minister Luege added Section 4.43 to NOM-
022, stating that coastal construction and mangrove removal would be permitted, 
provided developers paid certain “compensation measures,” generally measured as a one-
time fine of $1,000 per hectare cleared, and received permission from the state 
government.383   
As the $1,000 fine was substantially less than the potential revenue stream per 
hectare of hotels, and since littoral states such as Quintana Roo received a substantial part 
of income from tourism, Section 4.43 functioned to remove effective sanctions from 
                                                 
382
 See NOM-022-SEMARNAT-2003, particularly section 4. 
383
 NOM-022-SEMARNAT-2003, Section 4.43, allowing construction “as long as, in 
the preliminary report or in the event of an environmental impact, compensation 
measures are established to benefit the wetlands, and the corresponding authorization to 
change the land use designation is obtained.” Translated from Spanish. 
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coastal construction and mangrove clearing.384  Federal protection was later restored in 
2007 after a national campaign from the mangrove TAN led to congressional approval of 
federal Article 60 TER of the LGVS, prohibiting:  
The removal, filling, transplant, cutting, or any work or activity that 
affects the integrity of the hydrological flow of the mangrove; of the 
ecosystem and its zone of influence; of its natural productivity; of the 
natural loading capacity of the ecosystem for touristic projects; of the 
zones of shelter, reproduction, refuge, feeding and fish fry.385   
 
In Quintana Roo, this resulted in a halt of planned and current development and 
construction throughout the state.386  Unsurprisingly, hotelier associations and governors 
once again began a national campaign to repeal federal protection of mangrove zones.  In 
2007, Quintana Roo’s governor Felix González Canto led an association of 16 governors 
from Baja California and other littoral states, requesting that Calderón’s administration 
overturn Article 60 TER.  The hoteliers supported this effort, arguing that “the people in 
                                                 
384
 Exequiel Ezcurra, author interview conducted May 2009.  Taken from handwritten 
notes of phone interview.  Figure also confirmed in a press release by PRONATURA, a 
civil society organization in Baja California.  Figures available online at: 
http://www.pronatura-noroeste.org/manglaresdelgolfodecalifornia.php 
385
 Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2008, Ley General de la Vida Silvestre (DOF 
October 14, 2008), Article 60 TER.  See also “Manglares, refugio de especies 
comerciales importantes” in La Jornada, Monday 25 February, 2008; “Increpan 
regidores del Verde Ecologista a García Pliego” in Novedades, Friday 2 February, 
2007.   
386
 Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Eloy Sosa, author 
interviews conducted February 2008.  El “Respaldo de SCJN a humedales será 
fundamental para Q. Roo,” Periódico de Quintana Roo, Wednesday, 19 August 2009. 
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the state aren’t going to live by eating mangrove,”387and that Article 60 placed an 
excessive financial burden on the development potential of coastal states.388   
[One] of the political processes that is trying deliberately to counter 
[LGVS Article 60 TER] is the state government…  It’s not just me saying 
that, the press is saying that.  The press has realized that there is a group of 
governors that is intending, let’s say, to bend this law, or change this law, 
and among them is the very same governor [of Quintana Roo].389 
 
…[Now] there is the law of flora and wildlife, the [LGVS].  This law 
impedes the destruction of mangroves by the hotels.  And the powerful 
businessmen are exerting pressure on the local government to give them 
permits to destroy the mangrove.  So, there is a very direct conflict that 
SEMARNAT, and also PROFEPA, are confronting in this case.390 
 
Yet, even though to date this policy advocacy has not resulted in a change of 
Article 60 TER, media reports, research and interviews indicate that hoteliers often find 
other ways to avoid the application of the law.  For example, after hurricane Dean struck 
the Yucatán peninsula in 2007, large areas of coastal mangrove were destroyed along the 
                                                 
387
 Quote taken from APIR president Miguel Ángel Lemus.  Cited in “Promueven 
industriales veto a reformas en ley de vida silvestre, denuncian ONG,” La Jornada, 
Wednesday, 24 February, 2007.  Translated from Spanish.  In addition, various 
accounts of hotelier mobilization and state support presented in interviews with 
epistemic community members, and in the following: “Defienden por internet el 
recurso natural,” Novedades Quintana Roo, Wednesday, 6 February 2008; Centro de 
Estudios Jurídicos y Ambientales [CEJA], 2007, “Van empresarios contra manglares de 
QR,” Noticias Ambientales.  Retrieved online August 2009 from 
http://www.ceja.org.mx/noticia.php?id_article=929. 
388
 “Increpan regidores del Verde Ecologista a García Pliego” in Novedades, Friday 2 
February, 2007.  Also taken from interviews with epistemic community members  
389
 Eloy Sosa, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from digital voice 
recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
390
 Enrique Galvéz, autor interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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coast of Quintana Roo, including at Majahual.  By effectively clearing the mangrove, 
hurricane Dean opened the way for coastal construction, and by April of 2008, 
infrastructure including road paving and hotels were taking place, disrupting the 
hydrological flow of fresh water from mangrove zones.391  Hoteliers would also simply 
resort to corruption where necessary.   
 
Conclusion 
Again, the results support one hypothesis, undermine another, and are 
inconclusive in the third.  Table 3.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes 
summarizes the predicted and observed relationships between the independent variables: 
economic framing, consensus and socialization, and the dependent variable: influence. 
As the data indicate, socialization is present in every campaign in which the 
epistemic community exercised influence.  This supports the hypothesis H3: 
Socialization improves the influence of epistemic communities.  Notably, there was one 
instance in which the presence of socialization did not result in network influence, 
notably in the campaign to persuade hoteliers.  This issue is addressed in more detail 
below. 
As described above, CONANP had staffers participating as epistemic community 
members, gathering information and reports as part of a research network and sharing 
                                                 
391
 Observed through firsthand observation of Majahual during April 2008, in 
conjunction with interviews with members of SCPP Andrés Quintana Roo, and Abril 
Navarro. 
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findings with civil society researchers including Los Amigos, WWF-México, TNC and 
others.  Similarly, CONAPESCA members and fishing cooperative members were also 
comprehensively socialized with the epistemic community.  The fishing management 
workshops, for example, incorporated knowledge and capacity building exercises 
between epistemic community members, fishing policymakers in the federal government, 
and managers from various cooperatives.  Like CONANP, CONAPESCA members 
conducted joint studies of reef environmental processes, although targeted more 
specifically at fish conservation rather than ecological management per se.  Although the 
justifications of management were driven by economic reasons, socialization 
corresponded with the willingness of managers to adopt sustainable practices and policy.  
This supports arguments that socialization leads to a willingness of policymakers to 
accept the claims of the scientists and act accordingly.   
The importance of socialization in promoting learning and norm sharing among 
actors is challenged by the fact that hoteliers did not adopt the arguments of the epistemic 
community.  Socialization developed in the MARTI workshops and the jointly designed 
Normas Prácticas diagnostics produced with Los Amigos did not result in changes in 
behavior and understandings in private stakeholders that satisfied the ecological 
management preferences of the epistemic community.  The models constructed by the 
epistemic community simply could not compete with the interests of resource and benefit 
extraction adopted by hoteliers.   
This suggests two characteristics of the impact of socialization on network 
advocacy.  First, an argument that socialization leads to epistemic community influence 
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has to be a probabilistic argument, not a deterministic one.  Second, socialization, while 
necessary, is not a sufficient causal variable.   
Again, in evaluating hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the influence 
of transnational advocacy networks, the data suggest that scientific consensus, even if 
shared by a publicly recognized network of experts, is insufficient to lead to a change in 
behavior.  While present in the campaigns in which the epistemic community exercised 
influence, it was not enough to lead to policy support among the state government of 
Quintana Roo, SEDETUR, or the hotelier associations.  At the same time, since every 
campaign evinced knowledge consensus (no variation on the independent variable), it is 
not clear if consensus is necessary from this case, or from the previous chapter. 
Finally, there is a lack of support for the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy 
networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development 
in order to influence LDC governments.  While economic framing was present in 
successful campaigns, namely the campaigns to reform fishing management from 
governmental agencies in SAGARPA and CONAPESCA, it was also present in the failed 
campaigns to influence hoteliers and the state government of Quintana Roo.   
On one hand, economic arguments were cited by epistemic community 
respondents as crucial in influencing fishermen in cooperatives to adopt changes to their 
fishing practices.   
And here, fortunately, in some areas that we have been able to 
demonstrate, what the fishermen have been able to see is that protected 
areas have served to protect their interests.  There haven’t been any more 
permits given out, for people to fish.  And so, AMPs have become like 
exclusive areas, and they see this as an advantage…  “I recognize what 
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you’re telling me, that we’re on a good path, and that now we have some 
kind of sustainability with lobster fishing, and other species besides.”392 
 
Economic arguments similarly were cited by CONAPESCA as relevant to 
biodiversity management, as environmental protection was necessary to continue the 
sustainable extraction of economic benefits from the natural resources.   
The committee for inspection and state monitoring, which comes from the 
fishing delegation of SAGARPA was created to coordinate with other 
authorities, like the Army, PROFEPA, SEMARNAT, the Navy, for 
improvement of our inspection and monitoring methods.  Because 
otherwise, by tomorrow, bit by bit, we won’t have anything left to sell.393 
 
Similarly, CONAPESCA respondents registered support for increased protection 
of mangrove and coastal zones under Article 60 TER, based on its contribution to 
commercial fish reproduction, and by implication, economic sustainability among coastal 
communities: 
It’s a very good law.  It’s a very good form of conservation because the 
mangrove, besides helping us by forming dunes and impeding the direct 
impact of the tide on the coast, well, it’s a very important area of fish 
reproduction, for lobster larvae, right?394 
 
                                                 
392
 Alfredo Arellano Guillermo, author interviews conducted March 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
393
 José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15 
May, 2008.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish.   
394
 José Manuel Cárdenas Magaña, author interviews conducted between 12 and 15 
May, 2008.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish.  
See also SAM/FMAM/CCAD, 2004, Informe de Revisión de Medio Término 9 al 21 de 
marzo, pg. 6. 
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However, economic arguments were ineffectual in persuading hoteliers to adopt 
internal regulations, or comply with existing policy, on coastal development, and 
unnecessary in influencing reform in CONANP or SEMARNAT.   
CONANP adopted the PMS monitoring strategy and incorporated findings and 
parameters of the environmental problem as espoused by the network of scientists.  In 
addition, CONANP staff members shared the ecological perspective of the civil society 
actors within the epistemic community.  In interviews, staffers of CONAP argued, like 
the epistemic community, that the Mesoamerican reef region functioned as an integrated 
ecosystem, rather than as a collection of discrete reef environments: 
These aren’t the tiny little isolated communities like in other parts of the 
world, right?  And the SAM project, to me, it seems like it fulfilled a 
primary attempt to understand the area, recognize how valuable this 
barrier reef is at the environmental level and to classify it...  There are 
marine currents that come like so, from south to north, that implicate all 
the richness and biodiversity in this zone.395 
 
However, as the following chapter will make clear, knowledge consensus based 
on scientific research principles, which is the distinguishing characteristic of epistemic 
communities, remains an integral variable in the advocacy efforts of scientific networks.   
Consequently, the following chapter illustrates a case of scientific advocacy by a 
network that lacked a shared knowledge consensus.  This network attempted to influence 
terrestrial biodiversity management in the Yucatán peninsula relevant to the CBD did so 
in part through a process of socialization and network-building with federal 
policymakers.  While epistemic community members themselves in this chapter and 
                                                 
395
 Patricia Santos, author interviews conducted May 15, 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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Chapter 2 suggested that economic arguments may be necessary to communicate with 
policymakers, the data suggest that strategic framing has no independent impact on 
changing patterns of behavior by state or civil society environmental managers.  
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Table 3.1: List of Reef Policy Makers  
AGENCY/MANAGER 
JURISDICTION 
EST. THROUGH REGULATES 
SEMARNAT 
Federal supremacy 
over biodiversity; 
Constitution; various 
laws on natural 
resources 
Environmental monitoring. Defines 
and regulates marine protected area 
(AMPs). 
CONANP 
SEMARNAT 
agency 
Manages AMPs. Environmental 
monitoring. 
SAGARPA 
1958 Law of 
Ministries 
and Departments 
Regulates fisheries activities. 
Certifies 
permits granted to fishing 
cooperatives 
in Quintana Roo 
CONAPESCA SAGARPA agency 
Regulates and monitors fishing 
activity 
in Quintana Roo. 
SEDUMA/ State Government 
of Quintana Roo 
State control over 
natural resources 
Administration of POETs / land 
zoning management 
SEDETUR 
 Agency of the state 
government Promotion of tourist development 
Quintanarroense Cooperatives 
De facto control over 
fishing practices and 
excursions 
Internal control over fishing 
practices, use of technology, possible 
contribution to monitoring 
Hotelier Associations 
De facto control over 
tourist activity 
Internal control over tourist 
excursions, recreational practices, and 
hotel/infrastrcture construction 
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Table 3.2: Partial List of Epistemic Community Members  
ORGANIZATION INDIVIDUALS FUNCTIONS 
SCIENCE 
TRAINING 
Los Amigos de Sian 
Ka’an 
Gonzalo 
Merediz 
Alonso 
Protected areas monitoring.  
Habitat health evaluation. 
Marine 
Biology 
  
Albert 
Franquesa 
Protected areas monitoring.  
Habitat health evaluation. 
Marine 
Biology 
UNU-INWEH Peter Sale 
Designing monitoring 
methodology Ecology 
The Nature Conservancy 
Juan Bezaury 
Creel 
(formerly of 
Los Amigos) Protected areas monitoring 
Land use 
planning 
  
Will Heyman AMP monitoring 
Marine 
Sciences 
CONANP 
Alfredo 
Arellano 
Guillermo 
Population monitoring.  Habitat 
health evaluation.  National Reef 
Committee coordinator 
Marine 
biology 
  
  
Rosa Loreto 
Viruel 
(formerly of 
Los Amigos) 
Protected areas monitoring, 
Puerto Morelos AMP 
management 
Marine 
ecology 
Juan 
Domínguez 
Calderón Protected areas monitoring 
Marine 
biology 
Patricia Santos 
Population monitoring (fauna).  
Flora taxonomy.  Habitat health 
evaluation.  
URI-CRC 
Pamela 
Rubinoff Monitoring methodology 
Coastal 
manageme
nt 
ECOSUR 
Eloy Sosa Reef ecology monitoring 
Marine 
ecology 
Felipe Serrano Reef ecology monitoring 
Marine 
ecology 
Laura Carrillo Reef ecology monitoring 
Marine 
ecology 
WWF-México 
Melanie 
McField 
Threat analysis, monitoring 
methdology 
Conservati
on ecology 
  
Álvaro 
Hernández Gil 
Habitat and marine fauna 
monitoring Ecology 
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Table 3.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in Mesoamerican Reef 
Advocacy 
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Figure 3.1: Map of WWF Defined Ecoregion 
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Figure 3.2: Graph of Declining Populations 
Volume of Fisheries Production in Lobster (Langosta), Shrimp (Camarón) and 
Conch (Caracol): 1978-2006. 
 
 
Volume of Production of Scaled Fish (Escama Total), Lobster (Langosta) and Shark 
(Tiburón): 1978-2006. 
 
 
 
 
  
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05
V
olu
m
é
n
 de
 captu
ra
 (Kg)
 /
 La
ng
osta
 y
 
C
a
racol
Vo
lu
m
én
 
de
 
ca
pt
u
ra
 
(K
g) 
/ C
am
ar
ón
Año
Camarón Caracol Langosta
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
78 79
19
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
20
00 01 02 03 04 05 06
V
olu
m
e
n
 d
e
 captu
ra
 (kg)
 /L
a
ng
o
stay
 Tib
u
ró
nV
o
lu
m
e
n
 
de
 
ca
pt
u
ra
 
(K
g) 
/ E
sc
a
m
a
 
To
ta
l
Año
Escama Total Langosta Tiburón
  
 
 
 
 
204 
 
Figure 3.3: Effect of Erosion on Hotel Construction 
 
 
 
The title of the boxes are, clockwise from top left: 
1. Before the wall (buffering wall to protect building from tides and storms) 
2. Establishment of a wall 
3. After 10 or more years (note depiction of building, formerly on hill, now at the 
bottom of the ocean 
4. After 2 or more years (note depiction of failing structural integrity) 
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Figure 3.4: Diagram of Mesoamerican Reef Epistemic Community Links 
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CHAPTER 4  
MEXICO AND BIODIVERSITY MANGEMENT IN THE MESOAMERICAN 
BIOLOGICAL CORRIDOR 
 
Introduction 
The previous two cases demonstrated that transnational epistemic communities 
can successfully contribute to biodiversity governance in developing countries.  In 
Jamaica and Mexico, national governments adopted biodiversity management projects 
after epistemic communities exposed an emerging crisis to internationally and regionally 
important biodiversity.  Later, these communities contributed to the creation of policy 
and behavior by key managers, influencing including land use designations, monitoring 
and project compliance efforts.  Subsequently, natural resource policymakers and 
managers learned from epistemic community claims, adopting the information, theories, 
and policy conclusions drawn by scientists.   
The previous two chapters strongly support the hypothesis H3: socialization 
increases the influence of transnational advocacy networks. Socialization, or the 
participation of epistemic communities and target audiences in knowledge exchange 
processes, enabled epistemic communities to convince managers to take environmentally 
friendly action for biodiversity management.  These processes included processes 
transnational information-generation forums, project development workshops and joint 
training exercises relevant to the projects studied.  When socialization was absent, 
  
 
 
 
 
207 
 
epistemic communities were unable to advance environmental learning among managers, 
even if network members shared an internal consensus.   
However, while the previous two chapters indicate that knowledge consensus is 
not sufficient to lead to network influence, it is not clear if consensus is necessary, due to 
the fact that there has been no variation on this independent variable.  In order to have a 
clearer test of hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks must frame environmental 
policy as relevant to national economic development in order to influence LDC 
governments, this chapter process traces the advocacy campaigns of a transnational 
network concerned about biodiversity governance in the southeastern states of Mexico.  
This case is distinguished from the previous two, as this network did not generate an 
intersubjective knowledge consensus on the causal dimensions of the problem. 
What this chapter found is that consensus is, in fact, necessary (but insufficient) 
for network influence.  The network here generated measurable socialization with 
targeted policymaker agencies in the Mexican federal government, but failed to generate 
influence on some of the primary goals of policy advocacy.  This suggests that 
knowledge networks who do not have an unquestioned scientific authority on their side 
are operating at a cognitive disadvantage in influencing policymaking; socialization is 
necessary, but as this chapter indicates, insufficient.   
This chapter also returns to testing the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy 
networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development 
in order to influence LDC governments.  As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, economic 
arguments have been ineffectual in independently persuading target audiences to change 
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behavior.  In this case as well, the transnational advocacy network active in this case was 
unable to convert economic arguments into policy, as framing did not lead to network 
influence.  This supports the argument that the use of economic language cannot persuade 
managers that long-term conservation efforts are a reasonable alternative to the short-
term developmental gains from continuing contemporary patterns of natural resource 
exploitation.   The remainder of the chapter explains how issue-framing, socialization and 
knowledge consensus affected the ability of epistemic communities to influence 
policymaking and terrestrial biodiversity management in Mexico.  Where documents and 
interviews were originally in Spanish, I have provided my own translation of the material 
throughout. 
 
Overview of Threats to the Mesoamerican Corridor 
As in the previous two cases, this chapter involves TAN advocacy for biodiversity 
management through a project funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) as 
relevant to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  This project, titled the 
Proyecto para la Consalidación del Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México 
(Project for the Consolidation of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor – Mexico, or 
CBMMx Project), was carried out in the peninsular states of Campeche, Yucatán and 
Quintana Roo, as well as in Chiapas (see Figure 1.3).   
This Mesoamerican region, part of a transboundary zone connecting seven 
Central American countries and the southern states of Mexico, is considered to be an 
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internationally important site of endemism and biodiversity.396  The Mexican section is 
comprised largely of a karst limestone base, with low lying wetlands in Quintana Roo, 
dry forests in Campeche, rainforests in Yucatán and temperate mesophile forests in 
Chiapas.397  Unique climatological and geomorphological features of this region, 
including frequent hurricanes, thin subsoil, an absence of aboveground rivers, and 
millennia of evolution under these circumstances have contributed to the exceptional 
biodiversity characterizing the area.398   
Studies of the peninsula have found thousands of different species of plants and 
hundreds of mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians in the region, with as many as 900 
different plant species and 200 animal species per hectare, many of them endemic.399  
This biodiversity is subject to human pressure from various sources, as local 
                                                 
396
 World Bank, 2000, Mexico: Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (World Bank 
project document), Annex 3, pp. 1; Comisión Nacional de la Biodiversidad 
[CONABIO], 2003, “El Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano,” (Biodiversitas 7(47)), 
pp. 2; CCAD, 2002, El Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano: Un plataforma para el 
desarrollo regional (CCAD: Serie Técnica 01) p. 7.  .   
397
 Jorge L. Tamayo, 2005, Primera fase del Sistema de Evaluación y Monitoreo para 
el Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano - México (Componente de Geomática): Informe 
Final (Centro de Investigación en Geografía y Geomática), p. 10. 
398
 World Bank, 2000, Mexico: Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, p. 3 
399
 Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano [CBM], 2000, Biodiversidad Total y Endémica 
de Mesoamerica.  Comisión Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo [CCAD], 
2000, Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano: Del Paseo Pantera a un modelo de 
desarrollo sustentable (CCAD: Costa Rica); World Bank, 2000, Mexico: 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, p. 2; Jorge L. Tamayo, 2005, Primera Fase del 
Sistema de Evaluación, pp. 10. 
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communities, oil exploration and agro-industry extract benefits from the exploitation of 
natural resources in the region.   
 
Agriculture and Land Conversion 
Agricultural activity, whether slash-and-burn agricultural cultivation among 
peasant and indigenous populations, mechanized and commercial agro-industry, or cattle-
farming, typically requires broad land conversion of pristine forest to monoculture crops, 
such as the popularly consumed chili peppers.  Land clearance also further allows easier 
access for invasive species, including fast-growth plants such as guarumbo.400  Cattle-
farming is particularly harmful, as the thin topsoil and poor vegetative conditions in the 
Yucatán peninsula require an intensive use of resources, such as fertilizer, to create 
conditions propitious to cattle.401  Moreover, cattle-farming has had a high level of 
support from the federal government, which has, through the 1990s, provided subsidies to 
cattle ranchers for the expansion of farms throughout the Yucatán.  Agro-industry and 
subsistence agriculture exacerbate problems associated with land clearance when 
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Barbosa, Juan José, 1995, La Gran Selva Maya, (from the series Sian Ka’an: 
Introducción a los Ecosistemas de la Península de Yucatán, Cancún, Q. Roo: Amigos 
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practitioners introduce chemical pesticides and biocides, which accumulate as toxins in 
terrestrial and subterraneous aquatic ecosystems.402   
Land conversion and loss of forests for agriculture and logging also contribute to 
regional forest fires.  Degraded and poorly managed forests tend to accumulate 
flammable debris, including discarded twigs and shrubbery, which exacerbates the 
propensity of the spread of fires, in turn worsened by the prevalence of slash-and-burn 
production among rural populations.403  Since 2005, the Mesoamerican states of Quintana 
Roo, Chiapas and Oaxaca have been three of the top 19 states in the country affected by 
forest fires.404   
 
Logging 
Unsustainable logging for firewood and timber production also contributes to 
biodiversity loss.  Timber production tends to be concentrated on a few commercially 
viable species, such as mahogany and cedar, which are produced for the tourist market 
and subsequently overharvested.  By depleting these species, rural populations can 
                                                 
402
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degrade the regenerative capacity of the limestone jungle.405  Moreover, the demand for 
these timber products creates incentives for rural populations to develop tree plantations 
in jungle areas, which has caused problems due to the introduction of invasives in 
sensitive ecosystems.406  Hunting for subsistence consumption or for sport among 
different sectors of the peninsular population may also become problematic if 
unregulated, particularly when endangered species are targeted.   
 
Industrial Development 
However, there are also significant industrial sources of environmental 
degradation as well.  The construction of roads and high-speed throughways in jungle 
areas causes environmental stress by fragmenting ecosystems and interrupting migratory 
patterns of land-based fauna.407  Incidental pollution from vehicle emissions negatively 
affects the immediate environment of sensitive flora by contributing to the accumulation 
of toxins in plants.  Oil spills and other resultant pollution from petroleum extraction are 
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plantaciones forestales en el área Sian Ka’an-Calakmul, Corredor Biológico 
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significant threats to environmental integrity.  Oil exploration takes place throughout the 
states in Mesoamerica, namely Tabasco, Campeche, Veracruz, creating problems when 
the toxic material is spilled, or when heavy machinery emits incidental air pollution.408   
 
Tensions in National Economic Development 
Again, there are tensions in conceptualizing national economic development 
insofar as some of the goals of ‘national development’ conflict with the economic 
wellbeing and natural resource management goals of marginalized populations.  Oil 
exploration, one of the most important national productive sectors, may contribute to 
additional environmental and social problems.  The disruption caused by mining and 
drilling can impel the displacement of rural communities, who then migrate and 
contribute to more extensive patterns of resource use and environmental degradation.409  
In addition, subsidized cattle-farming, while ostensibly aimed at improving the 
livelihoods of agrarian populations in the Yucatán, fractures ecosystems by converting 
large areas to monocultural pasturelands, and economically displaces traditional and 
subsistence agricultural practices.410 
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Yet, environmental management problems are generally blamed on the activities 
of low-income and rural communities in the Yucatán peninsula and in Chiapas.  
Population growth is one of the drivers of environmental degradation, and in the 
peninsula, the tourist center of Cancún and the Riviera Maya is a significant attraction for 
in-land migrants.  In the municipality of Felipe Carrillo Puerto alone, in-land migration of 
low skilled workers seeking employment in the tourism center of Cancún and the Riviera 
Maya has contributed to a tenfold population increase between 1970 and 2000.411  
However, assigning responsibility for environmental degradation to the activities of 
marginalized populations obscures the contribution of state-sponsored activities and 
institutions to those same activities. 
 
Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management 
Federal Policymakers 
As in the previous cases, the constellation of potential sources of anthropogenic 
environmental degradation implicates a variety of federal and state institutions in the 
process of biodiversity management.  The following section details the various 
governmental agencies involved in natural resource management pursuant to the 
implementation of biological corridors in southeastern Mexico (see Table 4.1: List of 
Policy Makers). 
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CONABIO: Implementing Agency of the CBMMx 
One of the primary agencies in the context of this project, and one targeted in 
project campaigns, is the Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la 
Biodiversidad (National Commission for the Study and Use of Biodiversity or 
CONABIO), an intersectorial commission created under the federal government in 1993 
with the overarching mandate of coordinating biodiversity management.412  CONABIO 
carries out activities such as conducting inventories of national biodiversity stocks and 
assessments of the impact of human activity on natural resources, and since 1997 has 
been delegated as the agency responsible for designing the National Biodiversity Strategy 
and Action Plan, required by states as signatories to the CBD.413  When the CBMMx was 
launched, CONABIO was the agency assigned responsibility for disbursing funds for 
local projects and activities in the areas identified as part of the constituent corridors.414  
Indeed, as described later, CONABIO was a gatekeeper agency in determining which 
zones would be included as areas covered by the CBMMx Project, and hence subject to 
GEF funds.  Later, after the project was created, administrative agencies established 
specifically for the CBMMx were placed under CONABIO’s authority. 
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SEMARNAT, CONAFOR, SAGARPA 
In addition to CONABIO, individual federal agencies participating in natural 
resource management include SEMARNAT, the Comisión Nacional Forestal (National 
Forestry Commission, or CONAFOR) and SAGARPA.  SEMARNAT conducts land-
zoning policies under programs such as Unidades para el Manejo Ambiental de la Vida 
Silvestre (Wildlife Conservation Management Units or UMAs).  When UMAs are created 
and registered, SEMARNAT is responsible for determining what kind of resource 
consumption is appropriate, whether hunting, preservation or agriculture, and governing 
the rates of resource consumption available to incident populations.415  As described in 
Chapter 3, SEMARNAT’s executive agency in CONANP monitors environmental 
processes in protected areas, including in those near to corridor zones.416  SAGARPA 
provides federal resources, such as funds, subsidies and development permits to states 
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 Fuentes Rossi Vida, author interviews conducted March 2008.  Taken from 
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and municipalities for agriculturally based development.417  CONAFOR, created in 2001, 
is an administrative agency of SEMARNAT and manages forestry resources, including 
restoration and conservation activities in corridor zones.418  In particular, these agencies 
were responsible for designing and adopting biodiversity conservation projects under the 
rubric of the CBMMx. 
 
CDI 
Corridor management also impacts on indigenous rights issues, as the majority of 
the population of corridor zones in Quintana Roo, Chiapas and Campeche is indigenous.  
Most of the land within these zones are organized into ejidos, or communally owned 
agrarian areas, wherein the low-income population is highly dependent on subsistence 
and commercial agriculture.419  In these areas, the Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo 
de los Pueblos Indígenas (National Commission for the Development of Indigenous 
Peoples or CDI), a federal agency created in 2003, promotes economically oriented 
projects and activities such as agricultural and artisanal practices.420  In addition, CDI 
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assists in legal advocacy for indigenous communities, particularly in Chiapas, where 
ejidos often lack official documentation and legal recognition of land ownership, placing 
individuals in these areas at risk for land appropriation and dispossession.421  At the same 
time, its role as a target audience for transnational advocacy is comparatively small, and 
limited to the concomitant development of sustainable conservation projects in 
marginalized communities. 
 
State Governments in the CBMMx 
Corridor management involves coordinating activity with state governments, 
which provide technological training and subsidies to local communities for agricultural 
production.  Under the CBMMx, the governor’s office of each state was encouraged to 
formally include references to biological corridors and biodiversity management in their 
periodic State Development Plans, and to incorporate ecological concerns in the 
management and zoning of POETs described in Chapter 3.  In addition, state level 
agencies in natural resource management, such as the Secretariat of Ecology in 
Campeche, inform state governments of appropriate land use management.  Some of the 
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key agencies relevant to the management of biological corridors are listed in Table 4.1: 
List of CBMMx Policymakers.   
 
Mobilization around the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
Emergence of the Network and the Corridor Concept 
The concept of biological corridors, introduced to Mexico through the process of 
transnational activism, was discussed in the United States as early as 1967 in studies 
conducted by Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson.  Wilson argued that the ability of species 
of fauna and flora to thrive was a function of the size of their available habitat.  Even 
when species are placed on protected reserves, fauna and flora become more vulnerable 
to threats, degradation, and predators if the allotted habitat is too small.  Consequently, 
when protected areas are established, care has to be taken to ensure that they do not 
fragment ecosystems into tiny islands of biodiversity, but that they permit the free 
movement of migratory species in “biological corridors.”422   
In the 1980s, international wildlife specialists from the University of Florida and 
the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) observed that ecosystem fragmentation was a 
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common problem in protected areas management in Mesoamerica.423  Concerned about 
the conservation of migratory species, the WCS headed a coalition of actors in 1989 to 
advocate for more effective management under a project called the Paseo Pantera.  The 
Paseo Pantera, which relied on the biological corridor concepts described by Wilson and 
contemporary researchers like Reed Noss of the University of Florida, advocated for the 
creation of a regional biological corridor between Mexico and Panama.  This proposed 
corridor would theoretically allow comparatively safe passage for migratory wildlife 
between established protected areas and preserves.424  Within Mexico, some of the areas 
identified as important to biodiversity management included the Biosphere Reserve of 
Calakmul, near the border of Guatemala.425   
From 1989 through the early 1990s, the TAN advocacy efforts found fertile 
political ground for a regional biodiversity project.  In the buildup to the 1992 Rio UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the Central American states 
and Mexico endorsed the idea of multilateral environmental management through a 
variety of forums and conventions supported by international institutions including the 
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Central American Commission for Development (CCAD).426  Although Mexico was not 
an official member of CCAD, its transboundary forest zone with Guatemala, known as 
the Selva Maya, made it essential to the goal of biodiversity management in the region.427   
In 1993, at the first Wildlife Congress, CCAD and Mexico discussed ways in 
which they could improve the regional management of biodiversity.  Here, experts on 
biological corridors, including Dr. Reed Noss who was attending as part of a legal 
network addressing land use policy, recommended the adoption of biological corridors in 
Mesoamerica.428  At this point, the proposals on biodiversity management advanced in 
the Wildlife Congress made specific reference to including non-mammalian animal 
species, including arthropods and insects, and plants, in ecosystem management, moving 
it beyond the Paseo Pantera project, which was limited to charismatic megafauna.429   
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In February 1996, the CCAD states and Mexico met at the second 
intergovernmental Tuxtla Summit (Tuxtla II) in Costa Rica, and agreed that biological 
corridors were the appropriate management mechanism for improving the regional 
management of biodiversity.  To concretize this goal, the member states issued a 
statement called the “Mechanism of Dialogue and Concertation,” supporting the creation 
of a Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano or 
CBM).430  The Mexican component of this project was titled the Corredor Biológico 
Mesoamericano – México (CBMMx).  With the formal adoption of a plan of action on 
the Mechanism of Dialogue in 1996, the government of Mexico began requesting 
information and research on regional biodiversity from local and transnational experts on 
biological corridors and on biodiversity in Mesoamerica.431  
 
Organizing around Biological Corridors 
These knowledge-building efforts fostered the expansion of the network 
concerned with biological corridor management.  Although civil society organizations 
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were numerically important, the efforts of the federal agency CONABIO were 
instrumental in constituting the network.  CONABIO’s central role emerged in part from 
the fact that the agency had historically been involved in supporting cooperative research 
endeavors between itself and other environmentally oriented investigative institutions.  
For example, CONABIO provided research funds to academic institutions including the 
Intercultural Mayan University of Quintana Roo, the University of Quintana Roo 
(UQROO), El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), and the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) when their purposes overlapped with CONABIO’s 
mandate.432   
In addition, CONABIO recruited over 125 organizations to help the agency draft 
the country’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (Estrategia Nacional de la 
Biodiversidad or ENB).433  Among these 125 organizations included TAN members such 
as: locally active groups Los Amigos de Sian Ka’an, Yum Balám A.C., and Econcienca 
A.C.; regionally active organizations Pronatura A.C. and Simbiosis SA de C.V.; and 
transnational environmental NGOs Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF).  By the late 1990s, these groups 
had become involved in conducting research on Mesoamerican biodiversity by among 
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other things, promoting nutrition and health among rural communities in the Yucatán 
through traditional medicine; monitoring pollution in sensitive ecosystems; and educating 
local communities about the legal framework of natural resource exploitation.434  Finally, 
civil society agencies developed inter-network links autonomous from CONABIO, by 
sharing research on ecosystems and biodiversity in the Yucatán peninsula in the early 
1990s.435   
After the Mexican government agreed to endorse the proposed CBMMx in 1996, 
CONABIO took further steps to constitute a transnational network of experts on 
biodiversity management and biological corridors in Mesoamerica.  In 1996 and 1998, 
CONABIO held a series of CBMMx planning workshops in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas 
and Cancún, Quintana Roo respectively, with ENGOs and institutions such as ECOSUR, 
Pronatura, Los Amigos, and Conservation International, some of whom had already 
established ties with CONABIO.436  In 1999, CONABIO held an additional workshop in 
Cancún, with participants from domestic and international academic institutions 
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including UQROO, UNAM ECOSUR, Oxford University, the University of Central 
Florida, and the California Academy of Sciences.437   
These planning workshops were oriented around organizing an appropriate 
management framework for construction biological corridors in Mesoamerica.  Among 
the issues raised were the identification and siting of ecologically important areas, the 
development of appropriate conservation projects, the choice of appropriate regulations, 
and an appropriate monitoring strategy.  As corridor zones were organized into ejidos, the 
decision was made to use existing ejidos and communities as focal areas for project 
implementation.438  At the 1999 Cancún workshop, CONABIO finalized the project 
proposal for the CBMMx, and submitted it to the GEF.439   
By this time, this informal network which consisted of federal agencies, civil 
society actors, and academics, formed a TAN.  Researchers shared a common policy 
enterprise, namely the development of managed biological corridors in Mesoamerica, 
based on their understanding of the important ecological relationships in the area, and 
built on information exchanges and shared values developed during the the Paseo 
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Pantera project.440  After 2000, other organizations joined in the production of policy 
relevant knowledge, of which a partial list is given in Table 4.2: Partial List of TAN 
Organizations.  The importance of CONABIO in constituting the network is suggested 
in Figure 4.6: Diagram of TAN Links, which indicates that the majority of connections 
within the network were fostered through CONABIO’s work in collecting biodiversity 
relevant information. 
As in the SAM Project epistemic community described in Chapter 3, this network 
was substantially larger than the table indicates.  Los Amigos, a member organization of 
both networks, has a total of 14 members.  ECOSUR has an additional nine involved in 
studying terrestrial ecology and agroforestry and Pronatura A.C. has six members in its 
Yucatán branch who are involved in researching terrestrial biodiversity and conservation.  
Again, the size of the network is larger than the 12 organizations listed below would 
indicate, and a conservative estimate would put the figure at 70 to 120 members, slightly 
larger than the range given for the SAM Project epistemic community.  The CBMMx was 
officially launched in 2000 with the signatures of the World Bank and the government of 
Mexico.   
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Maintaining the Network 
This network was maintained by the same processes as occurred in the SAM 
Project, in part because, as is indicated by comparing Table 4.2 and Table 3.2, there is 
significant overlap between the organizations of the SAM epistemic community and the 
CBMMx TAN.  For example, SAM epistemic community organizations such as TNC, 
UQROO, UNAM, WWF-México and Los Amigos participated in a series of biodiversity 
management workshops, threat analysis exercises, and taxonomic studies, both nationally 
and focused on the Mesoamerican region between 1992 and 2008, along with CBMMx 
specific agencies, such as Pronatura.   
The CBMMx network links were reinforced by institutions that were created by 
CONABIO and the federal government under the project itself.  As part of the 
administration of the CBMMx, CONABIO established agencies in each state called 
Consejos Consultivos Estatales, or CCEs, to identify areas critical for biodiversity 
management, evaluate funding requests for conservation pilot projects, and to 
recommend appropriate environmental regulations and zoning policies in corridor 
zones.441  These CCEs are staffed by locally based participants from ENGO, academic, 
and social sectors including Pronatura, Econciencia, and Intercultural Mayan University 
of Quintana Roo.442  At the local level, the CCEs held several meetings a year, albeit 
                                                 
441
 World Bank, 2000, Project Appraisal Document On A Proposed Grant From The 
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund In The Amount Of $11.5 Million To Nacional 
Financiera, S.N.C. For A Mesoamerican Biological Corridor Project (World Bank), pg 
13; PADEP A.C., 2004, Evaluación Técnica del Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – 
México: Reporte Final (PADEP), pp. 10. 
442
 CONABIO, 2001, Manual de Operaciones (SEMARNAT: México, DF) pp. 4.6; 
  
 
 
 
 
228 
 
described as irregular and infrequent by participants.  At the national level, CONABIO 
held annual meetings with federal agencies, as well as with TAN member organizations, 
such as Los Amigos and WWF-México. 443  These officially mandated meetings thus 
comprised one of the ways in which the networks maintained cohesion throughout the 
project. 
 
Measuring Consensus 
Agreeing to Disagree: Dissensus with the Network 
Although this transnational network, like the SAM and the Cockpit Country 
epistemic communities, was constituted by a growing number of researchers who shared 
a concern about biodiversity management in a specific locale, this TAN did not hold an 
intersubjective consensus on the causal relationships relevant to environmental 
management.  In interviews and project reports, TAN members and scientific 
assessments universally agreed that, despite the shared interest in promoting biological 
corridors, there was no shared agreement on key indicators of biodiversity management 
and the dimensions of the problem.  Simply put, academic researchers disagreed about 
what comprised important biodiversity and how to measure it:  
                                                                                                                                              
Ildefonso Palermo, author interview conducted March 2008. 
443
 CBMMx, 2009, Donacion TF-02437I - Proyecto "Corredor Biológico 
Mesoamericano - México" Plan De Adquisiciones Y Contrataciones (PAC)Contratos 
Sujetos A Examen Posterior Del Banco (available online at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/28/000333
038_20080128025407/Rendered/PDF/422180PROP0SPA101091101071Ver1Final.pdf
). 
  
 
 
 
 
229 
 
A researcher from ECOSUR can have an opinion about the state of 
biodiversity in some region, or state, and it’s not necessarily the same 
opinion as that of a researcher from a national university.  And this has 
happened, it’s happening constantly.444 
 
A series of evaluations conducted by a consultant agency during the process of 
project administration clarified that this lack of consensus had been a constant feature of 
the CBMMx, observed as early as 2000, and again in 2004:  
…[T]here is no unified scientific agreement regarding the role of corridors 
to combine genetic, demographic, and other forces threatening small 
populations nor is there accord on the relative importance of these 
threats.445 
 
…[T]here is still no established baseline [of information]… there are 
absolutely no shared criteria about the geographic demarcation definition, 
there are no shared geophysical, nor political-administrative, nor 
biological, nor ecological, nor land ownership criteria…446 
 
Without a knowledge consensus, this network cannot be considered an epistemic 
community.  However, this case study offers variation from the previous two cases on the 
independent variable consensus, which makes it a useful test of the hypotheses.   
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Measuring Network Socialization with Managers 
High Levels of Socialization with Federal Policymakers 
Having identified a network and measuring the lack of consensus, this research 
then went on to measure the degree of socialization between the TAN and managers in 
the CBMMx Project.  In this case, the data indicate a high degree of formalized 
socialization between the network and managers.   
 
Socialization with CONABIO, Federal, and State Agencies 
The federal agency CONABIO, responsible for, among other things, identifying 
and selecting project areas was comprehensively socialized with the transnational 
network.  This formal socialization extended as well to federal natural resource 
management agencies, such as SAGARPA, SEMARNAT, and CONAFOR, as well as 
state governmental agencies.  This pattern developed because one of the conditions of the 
project was the construction of extensive, formal links between civil society experts and 
governmental policymakers at both levels of government. 
To administer the CBMMx, the Mexican government established an agency under 
CONABIO called the National Technical Unit (Unidad Técnico Nacional or UTN).  The 
UTN is responsible for drafting annual Plans of Action (POAs), assessing the status of 
project implementation, making recommendations for sub-projects, issuing funds for the 
purchase of equipment, and conducting progress reports for the World Bank.447   
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Subordinate to the UTN are two regionally based organizations called Regional 
Technical Units (Unidad Técnico Regional or UTR), organized such that one is 
responsible for all the peninsular states of Quintana Roo, Campeche and Yucatán, and the 
other for Chiapas.  These UTRs work with the aforementioned CCEs, which in addition 
to serving as sites of information exchange between TAN members, are staffed by 
governmental representatives at all levels; municipal, state and federal.  Finally, the local 
generated policy recommendations are transmitted back to the central administrating 
body, CONABIO, after being revised by a national supervisory agency called the 
Consejo Consultivo Nacional or CCN (see Figure 4.1: Diagram of CBMMx 
Agencies).448  The CCN, which provides federal oversight of the project, is constituted of 
federal agencies from the secretariats of environment (SEMARNAT), agriculture 
(SAGARPA), social development (SEDESOL), transport (SCT), agrarian reform (SRA), 
education (SEP), health (SSA) and trade (SECOFI), all of which had formally pledged to 
collaborate in environmental management.449   
Through these myriad agencies, civil society organizations in the TAN are 
socialized with policymakers in generating biodiversity-relevant knowledge at each level: 
                                                                                                                                              
12; World Bank, 2000, Implementation Letter for GEF Trust Fund Agreement re: 
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at the federal level with CONABIO and the CCN; at the regional level with the UTRs; 
and at the state level with the CCEs.  Both the federally-oriented CCN and the state-based 
CCEs have formally established seats for civil society actors to participate in project 
design.  On the CCN, members of the transnational organization WWF and faculty 
members from UNAM and ECOSUR were officially recognized as participants.  At the 
regional level, the UTRs of Chiapas and the Peninsula held a series of knowledge-
generating workshops between 2005 and 2009 with locally recognized ENGOs and 
academics to assist in designing locally relevant projects for biodiversity management.450 
Moreover, the civil society was encouraged to participate in the goals of the 
CBMMx, particularly in the design of biodiversity management projects.  TAN 
organizations such as Simbiosis, Econciencia and Pronatura, and others with locally 
relevant knowledge could submit project requests in areas such as ecotourism, artisanal 
development and sustainable agricultural projects in corridor zones.  Occasionally, TAN 
actors worked directly with federal policymakers rather than through the CBMMx.  For 
example, SEMARNAT, which sought to rationalize ecological zoning through the 
implementation of UMAs, participated in information-gathering seminars with TAN 
members from Simbiosis, Pronatura, UNAM, ECOSUR and UQROO, as well as with 
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state environmental agencies.451  In 2005, Econciencia A.C. worked with CDI to create an 
ecotourism project in the rural ejido of Kantemó, one of the areas identified as relevant to 
biological corridor management.452  As a result, the TAN generated patterns of 
socialization with policymakers at all levels in CONABIO, SEMARNAT, SAGARPA 
and state government agencies.  The following section then tests for the final independent 
variable, issue-framing. 
 
Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community 
The Strategic Choice of Frames: Persuading Natural Resource Policymakers 
In this case, the TAN accepted the idea that biodiversity conservation would have 
to be portrayed as a nationally economic good in order to persuade policymakers in the 
federal and state government to take conservationist action.  To be clear, this perspective 
was advanced by governmental representatives at the planning meetings on biological 
corridor design during the 1990s.   
When biological corridors were proposed as a management approach in the Paseo 
Pantera initiative, it was assumed by ENGO proponents in the WCS coalition that this 
would entail the creation of additional protected areas.  In response, the participating 
governments in the 1996 Tuxtla II Summit indicated concern with what they described as 
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a preservationist approach to protected areas and biodiversity conservation.  Specifically, 
governments in the CCAD coalition asserted that protected areas organized under a 
preservationist, or “no-access” regime would lose political support, as marginalized 
communities and policymakers would fundamentally oppose any regulations preventing 
them from economically exploiting natural resources.453  In Mexico, federal policymakers 
argued that economic developmental pressures would make it very difficult to gain 
governmental support for environmentally restrictive policies. 
The problem is one of development.  How can we provide for the people 
that live in these communities?  We can’t say to them, “don’t sow, don’t 
cultivate, don’t work,” because then they’ll tell us, “ok, then give me 
something to eat.”  We can’t do that.  But at the same time, we have to 
correctly manage the resources.454 
 
Members of the WCS coalition disagreed with the characterization of the Paseo 
Pantera efforts as antithetical to development, if development was linked to the interests 
of local, marginalized communities.  At the 2001 Congress of the Mesoamerican Society 
for Biology and Conservation, Jim Barborak of the WCS linked ecological conservation 
and biological corridor management with the wellbeing of agrarian populations.  
Sustainable, low-impact, environmentally friendly management could lead to sustained 
commerce among marginalized and poor populations, while incorporating locally 
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oriented projects into corridor management could strengthen land tenure claims, 
particularly among indigenous societies.455  While the Mexican government agreed that 
biodiversity management could take place by “increasing economic viability for the 
diversified and ecologically sustainable Mayan rural economy,”456 there was still an 
assertion that biological corridor management should incorporate productive sectors in 
domestic and international markets to receive governmental support.457   
The link between economic value and environmental management was made 
official after the project was launched, when the CCAD commissioned an economic 
valorization of biodiversity management in corridor zones, assessing prices to services 
provided by functional ecosystems.458  This valorization argued the following:  The 
underlying causes of biodiversity loss lay in the failure of the market to recognize the 
economic value of natural resources, a problem widespread among “… thousands of 
individuals acting in a decentralized manner in diverse points.”459  The impacts of 
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biodiversity loss were economic, consisting of the loss of goods such as potable water, 
tourism, artisan goods, and ecosystem damage in commercially important zones.460  
Finally, the appropriate policies relevant to the CBM and corridor management were 
those that acted as a “catalyst for sustainable development,” both for local communities 
and for national economic development.461   
In Mexico, this was conceptualized by linking development to the interests of 
politically important productive sectors.  At the state level, biological corridor 
management was to be incorporated into the state government’s sexennial development 
plans, while at the federal level, biological corridors were to be incorporated into 
prominent industries, namely tourism in the Riviera Maya and the foreign export 
market.462  TAN members agreed, observing that environmental arguments were more 
likely to be politically supported if they were presented as economically oriented:  
I don’t need to tell you what the government thinks about NGOs.  We 
went to the corridor meetings, and we said, “You have to conserve the 
forest, and do so legally and sustainably,” and they said, “Yeah, yeah, it’s 
those treehugger NGOs again.”  …And so we said, “We’re going to get 
certified as a business.”  And as a business, the next meeting we had with 
the government was incredible.  We arrived, and “Oh, it’s those NGOs 
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again.”  “No, no, no,” we said, “We’re a business.  We’re certified as a 
business.”  “Business?  Oh, perfect.”  …And with this in mind, we said 
we’d better continue presenting ourselves as a business rather than as an 
NGO.463 
 
 
This case offers a useful test of hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the 
influence of transnational advocacy networks, particularly since it is the first case to offer 
variation on this variable.  At present, data from the previous cases suggest that 
consensus is insufficient for influence, but this does not necessarily mean that it is 
unnecessary.   
The test of this variable is made stronger by the fact that there is a high level of 
socialization throughout the network advocacy process in this case.  As the previous 
cases suggest, tests of the hypothesis H3: Socialization improves the influence of 
epistemic communities indicate that socialization is necessary for influence.  Since 
socialization is present throughout this case, a measured lack of influence would suggest 
that first, socialization is insufficient and second, that consensus is necessary.  
Conversely, if network influence is measured, this would suggest that socialization is 
sufficient to lead to influence, undermining the necessity for advocacy networks to 
generate consensually held, unquestioned scientific arguments.  Finally, since economic 
framing was used in this case as well, the data allow further tests of the hypothesis H1: 
transnational advocacy networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national 
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economic development in order to influence LDC governments by examining the 
advocacy attempts of the network in Mesoamerican biological corridor management. 
 
Policy Preferences of the CBMMx Transnational Network 
Focus on Community-Based Agriculture 
As indicated above, the CBMMx focused on improving environmental practices 
in ejidos, identified as the relevant focal areas for project efforts.  While oil exploration 
was recognized as environmentally problematic, it was not considered a potential target 
of advocacy, due to the perceived political difficulty in regulating such an important state 
enterprise:  
Well, here, the country depends on [the oil producing entity] PEMEX.  So, 
it’s an issue – criticizing PEMEX is like criticizing the Bible, or 
something like that, right?  Nobody is hearing anything about PEMEX [in 
the CBMMx]; everyone is hearing about the forest fires…  But it really 
has a severe impact, with oil spills and other serious problems.464 
 
Cattle farming lost importance as a threat to biodiversity, largely because after the 
2000 change in administration, SAGARPA recognized that the thin subsoil and poor 
plant conditions in the region were simply incompatible with the needs of cattle farming, 
and thus did not merit additional federal subsidies.465  While cattle farming was still 
taking place in corridor communities and ejidos, the areas affected by cattle farming were 
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an insignificant proportion of the total corridor zone,466 and network advocacy efforts 
focused on the reform of practices and policy governing agricultural activity in the 
Mesoamerican corridor zone.   
 
SAGARPA, SEMARNAT, State Governments: Create Local Projects 
Throughout the project, TAN organizations advocated for state and federal 
support, in the form of funds, subsidies, and market access for sustainably produced 
goods, to assist with the creation of pilot projects in the CBMMx.  These projects, to be 
implemented in ejidos and rural communities, would combine the goals of biodiversity 
conservation and local economic development.  These included activities such as 
promoting ecotourism in the Proyecto Kantemó by Econciencia A.C.; developing a range 
of artisanal, hunting, agricultural and tourism projects by Simbiosis; and generating 
support for ecotourism projects by Yum Balám and Los Amigos.  In interviews, TAN 
members asserted that a key element to pilot project design was the allocation of 
CBMMx funds from state and federal policymakers to environmentally and economically 
vulnerable populations: 
There are communities here in Quintana Roo that receive some economic 
support in order to stop them cutting trees down.  This support allows 
them to develop other activities that, at the same time, conserves – 
activities that are related to the conservation of the forest.  In other words, 
like they’re paying the peasants to care for the forest.  Well, they have to 
do it this way, because the peasants don’t understand the value of 
conserving the forest.467 
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What is needed, is a discourse of the soul, rather than of the economy…  
But at the end of the day, the people are carrying out these projects for 
economics.  And yes, we can speak about the importance of the 
environment, that could be a second point.  But we know very well that if 
we don’t do it like this, if you don’t have [the economic argument], you 
won’t have [environmental management].468 
 
Federal Government: Define Corridor Zones 
Given the importance of the allocation of GEF funds to corridor zones in 
biodiversity management, an essential part of CBMMx management was the selection of 
areas to be officially recognized as constituting the Mexican section of the biological 
corridor.  This process of identifying corridor zones was part of a prolonged campaign 
between the emerging network and federal policymakers in the executive branch and 
CONABIO. 
Over time, the size and number of areas proposed as potential corridor zones 
increased with the size of the TAN.  Between 1989 and 1995, the areas recommended by 
the TAN were fairly small, and focused primarily on the zones proposed in the Paseo 
Pantera efforts, namely in the Selva Maya zone in the two states of Campeche and 
Quintana Roo.  At the 1996 Tuxtla Gutiérrez meeting in Chiapas, the participants 
proposed a total of 10 corridors in four states, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas and 
Yucatán, adding to the zones previously identified near Calakmul.469  In the 1998 Cancún 
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meeting, the network participants proposed a total of 31 corridors in Mesoamerica, 
adding the states of Tabasco, Veracruz and Oaxaca to those four previously considered, 
bringing the total states relevant to the CBMMx to seven.470  At the final conceptual 
workshop in Cancún in 1999, these 31 proposed corridors were submitted in the final 
negotiation for the CBMMx.471  Since the zones that were selected would receive funds 
and support from the state government, the CBMMx institutions and CONABIO, the 
selection of areas was of particular importance, not only to biodiversity management, but 
also the economic wellbeing of marginalized populations, especially in ejidos and 
indigenous communities. 
 
Evaluating TAN Influence 
Lack of Success in Defining Corridor Zones 
However, when the project was launched, the zones accepted by the Mexican 
government and CONABIO differed noticeably from the recommendations presented by 
the CBMMx TAN in 1999.  All identified corridor zones in the states of Oaxaca and 
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Veracruz, as well as some of those in Yucatán were removed from consideration.  Shortly 
before the launch of the CBMMx in 2000, all identified corridor zones in the state of 
Tabasco were excised, reducing the final number of recognized corridors to five, and the 
number of included states to four.  A series of maps illustrating how the outlines of the 
Mexican component of the biological corridors changed over time is available in Figures 
4.2 – 4.5 which demonstrate the changing political geography of the corridor zones.  
Ultimately, the research indicates that this was due to the inability of the TAN to generate 
an intersubjective consensus on the science behind corridor selection. 
 
Mixed Success in the Promotion of Sustainable Projects 
The TAN had some success in promoting state-supported sustainable 
development projects in the zones that had been chosen in the implementation of the 
CBMMx.  In Quintana Roo, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and CONAFOR provided funds 
for sustainable agricultural development in focal area ejidos within the Sian Ka’an-
Calakmul corridor in 2005.472  In Campeche, these agencies also held a series of 
information and awareness-building workshops in ejidal focal areas, to foster local 
support for government-directed sustainable use projects, as well as to evaluate 
ecological zoning under the POET system.473  Ecological certification from the federal 
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government was an important element in generating market demand, as it would add 
value to sustainably produced goods in foreign markets:474   
When you have a certification process – let’s say you’re producing deer 
meat under conditions that don’t allow you to get the environmental 
certificate.  It’s a tremendous difference in price.  And that’s also what we 
want to do with timber, any timber that has the “green seal.”  And with 
this “green seal,” countries that buy the timber pay an enormous price.  
Just like they’re doing with the certification of organic honey.  Germany 
and all those places, especially in Europe, are willing to pay extra for 
honey that is certified organic, and that comes from here.475 
 
The CBMMx and participating agencies promoted goods and services produced in 
corridor zones through a variety of economically oriented publications and events 
between 2005 and 2009.  In 2007, CONABIO and the UTN published a catalogue of 
commodities and services produced in corridor zones for promotion in regional 
markets.476  Between 2006 and 2008, the UTR-Chiapas and the UTR-Peninsula 
participated in a variety of forums linking the CBMMx with lucrative markets, including 
a 2006 forum linking international tourism with the CBMMx in Chiapas, a 2007 forum 
on organic certification and corridor goods, and a 2007 forum between producers of 
corridor commodities and tourist conglomerates in the Riviera Maya.477   
                                                 
474
 Enrique Galvez, author interviews conducted February 2008.   
475
 Dzahuindanda Flores, autor interviews conducted March 2008.  Author’s translation. 
476
 CONABIO, 2007, Comercio Sustentable Por Un Consumo Responsable Y 
Comprometido Con El Medio Ambiente (Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano/México: 
México).   
477
 Grupo Xcaret, 2008, Balance Social, Cultural y Ambiental: Sustainability Report 
(Tourism Bulletin); CBMMx, 2009, Donacion TF-02437I - Proyecto "Corredor 
Biológico Mesoamericano - México" PAC. 
  
 
 
 
 
244 
 
In some areas, such as the management of forest fires caused by slash-and-burn 
practices, economic interests did not play a visible role.  For fire management, federal 
agents in the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR) assisted in the creation of 
forest fire management teams in ejidos in Chiapas and Campeche.478  However, the 
incorporation of corridor commodities in tourism forums, the production of the 
Sustainable Use Commerce series, and the CCAD economic valuation demonstrate the 
continued interest of the federal and state governments in linking corridor management to 
economic development. 
Problematically, from the perspective of biodiversity management, the use of 
economic language confounded the broader goals of biodiversity conservation.  In the 
first place, an evaluation of the goals of the CBMMx found that the emphasis on 
attracting funds from the World Bank for economically oriented projects superseded the 
goal of promoting “…the development of sustainable use projects intended to benefit the 
environment.”479  As observed by Barborak of WCS, some of the later project documents 
focused on economic development such that “if not for a brief mention of the CBM, you 
wouldn’t know that you were talking about a project whose original goal was 
contributing to biodiversity conservation in the region.”480  
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 COMADEP, 2005, Creación De Bases Para El Ordenamiento Ecológico Regional 
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 PADEP A.C., 2004, Evaluación Técnica del CBMMx, pp. 21.  Translated from 
Spanish by author. 
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para la Biología y la Conservación San Salvador, El Salvador). 
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Second, respondents from SEMARNAT and the Quintana Roo CCE noted that 
the inclusion of corridor commodities in existing markets was complicated because, as 
occurred in Jamaica, environmental advocates found it difficult to persuade managers to 
actually invest capital and resources in action that required a longer timeframe for 
economic turnover.  For example, the attempt to promote peninsular ecotourism 
commodities and sustainable development by linking it with the Riviera Maya market 
failed to gather support from the state due to the comparatively low income projected 
from ecotourism.   
…[The] ecotourism projects are of no interest to the state government.  
They don’t compare with the quantity of resources, the demand, the 
number of businesses and the sources of finance there to develop Cancún, 
Tulúm, Playa del Carmen, Cozumel.  That’s a lot of money, it’s a 
tremendous amount in comparison with the few, scanty resources and the 
little capacity invested in the communities where there are also attractions, 
and which could possibly be important.481 
 
If we had the support of the state tourism secretariat, it would be easy.  
But we don’t have it.  There isn’t a center for sustainable tourism in 
Quintana Roo.  The only thing we have is Cancún, Cozumel, because 
that’s where the millions come in.482 
 
The Loss of Legitimacy and Local Support for CBMMx Initiatives 
Moreover, mixed and laggardly influence in creating and implementing projects, 
combined with very low influence in delineating which zones would receive GEF funds 
exacerbated underlying problems affecting corridor management.  At the local level, 
                                                 
481
 Enrique Gálvez, author interviews conducted February 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish by author. 
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 Arturo Bayona, author interviews conducted April 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish by author. 
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TAN organizations such as Simbiosis, Pronatura, Econciencia and Los Amigos had, by 
working with marginalized and indigenous communities in corridor zones and ejidos 
since the 1980s and 1990s, established a broad base of legitimacy within these 
communities.483  In contrast, distrust between ejidal residents and the federal and state 
governments was driven by the history of indigenous marginalization, linguistic barriers, 
problems with land tenure and property rights, and by violent ethnically based conflict in 
the state of Chiapas.484  Simply put, political conflicts and historic disenfranchisement 
created barriers to cooperation between rural communities and federal and state 
policymakers.  In these instances, ENGOs affiliated with the TAN have occasionally 
served as intermediaries between the federal government and local communities, 
encouraging residents to comply with federal and state environmental regulations, and 
serving as advocates for indigenous and rural property rights.485 
However, while TAN organizations could have served as useful intermediaries 
between federal and state agencies involved in corridor management and ejidal residents, 
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 Camacho, Isabel, Carlos del Campo and Gary Martin, 2008, Community Conserved 
Areas in North America: A Review of Status and Needs (Global Diversity Foundation), 
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civil society actors were increasingly ignored in project administration, despite their 
institutionalization in the bodies of the project.  Despite occasional participation in 
project design as described above, and despite official participation in the State Advisory 
Councils (CCEs) and Regional Technical Units (UTRs), project design was dominated by 
governmental interests, leaving TAN members skeptical of the extent of their de facto 
influence:  
Well, if we only get involved at the end of project proposals, we have no 
way to influence how they’re designed and carried out.  It’s done already.  
But that is what is happening.  And that’s how the majority of the council 
members feel, at least in the academic and social sectors...  Why?  
Because it’s not in our hands to call a meeting.  Or set the agenda.  [The 
policymakers] call the meetings; they set the agenda.486 
 
These problems severely undermined project legitimacy.  While the Mexican 
government was supposed to constitute these councils as part of the administration of the 
project, their implementation was laggardly, and the first CCE was launched only in 2003 
in Quintana Roo, a full three years after the start of the CBMMx.487  Due to this delay, 
the World Bank initially refused to release funds to CONABIO, and budgetary 
documents and interviews reveal that project financing did not begin until 2005.488  
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 State Consultative Council member from one of the Yucatán peninsula states, author 
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Author’s translation. 
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 Budgetary plans for the CBMMx from 2005 to 2009, titled Donacion TF-02437I - 
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Unfortunately, the government of Mexico had, in an attempt to “sell” the CBMMx to 
peasant populations, persuaded community members and local stakeholders that the 
CBMMx would lead to significant economic revenue, with resources flowing from 
international funding mechanisms to marginalized communities.  Since these funds were 
unavailable for several years after the predicted start date of the project, and since the 
TAN had little to no control over where funds were being disbursed, ejido residents and 
TAN organizations began doubting the commitment of corridor agencies to needed local 
development efforts.   
[The CBMMx] was planned for seven years.  We’ve gone through almost 
seven years now, about six years.  But for five years, it didn’t operate.  
The resources were there.  The proposal was there.  The personnel was 
there – well, to oversee the political side of it, rather than the practical, 
applied side.  So, the resources weren’t in operation, practically nothing 
was done.  It was stagnating.489 
  
…[The] government thought the CBMMx would be some World Bank 
program, an international program, that was going to bring in funds to this 
zone, because the political decision was to focus on this zone.  But it 
didn’t turn out that way…  We heard our colleagues saying, “They’re just 
paying for consultants, and consultants, and consultants, and they’re not 
carrying out the projects they said they would.”  …And we began to see 
conflicts.  And what happened is, we got to a point where the CBMMx 
lost all credibility.  And we saw various meetings where only two people 
attended.  They invited everybody in the zone, all the businesses and 
everything, but nobody came…  There were large expectations for the 
                                                                                                                                              
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/28/000333
038_20080128025407/Rendered/PDF/422180PROP0SPA101091101071Ver1Final.pdf.  
See also PADEP A.C., 2004, Evaluación Técnica del CBMMx, pp. 10 – 11; Pilar 
Rodríguez, 2007, Promoción de la red de monitoreo ecológico multiescala en el 
Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México (CONABIO); Enrique Gálvez, autor 
interviews conducted February 2008. 
489
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of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish by author. 
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project, and it didn’t meet the expectations.  Even the NGOs began to 
dissent.490 
 
This loss of legitimacy was such that, in corridor zones of Chiapas, ejido residents 
became convinced that the CBMMx was part of a federal government plan to seize 
communally held lands and ejidos for the launch of a regional industrialization project.491  
Since ejidos began resisting the government-led efforts to implement the project, the 
administrative goals had to be changed after 2007, abandoning the previous ideal of 
focusing on ecologically important focal areas, to the implementation of the project in 
those remaining communities that were more likely to “have a good disposition toward 
the project.”492  Overall, despite some success in launching pilot projects, the TAN in this 
case had very low influence over project management. 
 
Conclusion 
In this case, an environmentally oriented TAN emerged in the 1990s to advocate 
for increased biodiversity protection in Mesoamerica through the adoption of biological 
corridors, administered and managed by governmental policymakers and the civil society.  
However, while the TAN introduced the ideas of biological corridors, the network had 
limited success in Mexico in influencing the administration of the CBMMx.  Specific 
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goals of the TAN, particularly in regards to defining ecologically important areas, were 
not realized, and TAN members were critical about the commitment of governmental 
agencies to incorporate their input in project implementation.  Table 4.3: Summary of 
Observed and Predicted Outcomes summarizes the predicted and observed 
relationships between the independent variables: economic framing, consensus and 
socialization, and the dependent variable: influence.  It should be noted that, although the 
table indicates that the network had diffuse success through affecting (albeit in an 
unsatisfactory manner) the design of sustainable conservation projects, this positive 
impact is outweighed by the fact that the network lost influence on the campaign of 
primary importance: the selection of biological corridor zones based on ecological need. 
The loss of influence by the TAN over the selection of project areas supports the 
hypothesis H2: scientific consensus increases the influence of transnational advocacy 
networks, insofar as consensus is necessary for influence, but not sufficient.  While TAN 
respondents admitted that there was no shared consensus among researchers in the 
network regarding the validity of each of the initially submitted areas, they were 
unequivocal in stating that the final selection of important zones in the Mesoamerican 
region was scientifically dubious.  Although the official World Bank project documents 
asserted that the final selection was based on “biodiversity significance,” as well as 
“social viability, technical feasibility and social and political support,”493 TAN 
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respondents argued that the areas selected were not representative of biodiversity:  
What we wanted to include in the corridor, and what was logical was, 
[pointing to map] this is Sian Ka’an, and here is Calakmul.  So, we said 
that… the corridor should take all that’s right here, so Felipe Carrillo 
Puerto, here is José María Morelos, Solidaridad, here is Othón P. Blanco, 
which is the biggest municipality we have, and so on.  And where there 
are more forests, better conserved and everything.  And more biodiversity 
than in the rest of the state.  But then the decision was to take only Felipe 
Carrillo Puerto and José María Morelos.  And a tiny little piece of Othón 
P. Blanco.  But they basically left the whole municipality out.494   
 
There were discussions in which we weren’t all in agreement about the 
project.  And right now, there are some important ecological areas in 
Yucatán for example, that are not connected at all with the rest of the 
Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano.  There are more ecosystems that 
weren’t chosen, and now some people are saying: “What happened?”495  
 
Moreover, some respondents suggested that political calculations, rather than 
ecological considerations, were the primary driving factors inducing area selection.  In 
particular, respondents suggested that the selection of corridor zones was a patronage 
effort by state and federal government agents, who sought to use international funds to 
disburse resources to politically important areas: 
The corridor design had a political function.  Because they wanted to 
focus on Felipe Carrillo Puerto – it’s one of the most politically conflicted 
municipalities of the state… and José María Morelos.  Those two 
municipalities have been a little bit problematic, politically.  So, they were 
basically thinking that they were going to distribute funds with the money 
that the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano project was going to bring in, 
put in a whole heap of things for the people and all that.496 
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There is a concern that what started out as a science-based project has 
become populist-based and less guided by ecological principles.497 
 
…[Around] 1999 or 2000, I was contacted by some people with the World 
Bank and other agencies, who wanted to include me in some research and 
workshops related to design of the Mexican part of the corridor. However, 
when it became clear (through conference calls) that I thought biological 
considerations should drive corridor location, and that new core 
conservation areas had to be part of legitimate corridor design, I was un-
invited from the project.498 
 
Even if insufficient for influence, knowledge consensus is nevertheless necessary, 
as advocacy networks that lack an intersubjective agreement on the causal relationships 
of an emerging problem will find it more difficult to influence policymakers and 
managers to take appropriate action.499   
 
Monitoring Under Low Consensus 
This lack of consensus also negatively affected the TAN’s ability to influence 
other areas of biodiversity management in the context of the CBMMx.  One of the 
primary challenges to network building and information gathering, was the problem that 
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there was no standardized methodology for ecosystem monitoring in place in the 
mobilization of concern around the CBMMx.  Agencies involved in gathering 
information on biodiversity, such as ECOSUR, UQROO, Pronatura, UNAM, and 
governmental agencies in SEMARNAT and SAGARPA, did so in an uncoordinated 
manner, focusing on research specific to their areas of expertise and interest, rather than 
functioning as parts of an integrated monitoring system.500   
Currently in the Corridor, we have a lot of work left to do in coordinating 
methodologies and all that.  I think that in the [SAM Project], we’ve had 
more advances.  I think the synoptic methodology, the synoptic 
monitoring methodology [of the SAM] is a real advance in this sense.  But 
in this area, we have plenty, plenty of work left for the Corridor.  For 
example, various organizations are working in the area of bird and habitat 
conservation, and, well, at this moment there just isn’t an agreed-upon 
methodology to study and monitor bird populations.501 
 
During the administration of the project, CONABIO attempted to remedy this 
situation by contracting in 2005 a study on biodiversity monitoring with the Jorge L. 
Tamayo Center of Studies in Geography and Geomathics (CentroGeo), a Geographic 
Information Science modeling institution in Mexico.  CentroGeo was supposed to 
investigate the possibility of creating a standardized monitoring methodology under the 
CBMMx by, among other things, establishing a standard series of indicators for 
biodiversity health and creating a baseline analysis of the contemporary state of the 
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environment through an “exhaustive investigation of existing methods.”502  In 2006, the 
CBMMx UTR-Peninsula held a workshop to determine whether the diverse monitoring 
methods could be integrated to create a coherent picture of biodiversity in the region.503  
However, at the time of writing, CentroGeo and the CBMMx had yet to propose a 
specific methodology, reiterating instead the need to generate a standard model of 
investigation and baseline monitoring for an accurate picture of terrestrial biodiversity.504    
Further, the data undermine the hypothesis H1: transnational advocacy networks 
must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order 
to influence LDC governments.  In none of the cases studied so far has the use of 
economic rationales independently enabled transnational knowledge networks to 
influence biodiversity governance in developing countries.  In this case, TAN members 
supported the use of economic language to evaluate biodiversity management, an 
evaluative framework that was deliberately advanced by the federal government in the 
CBMMx, yet as described above, the biodiversity management goals of the TAN were 
confounded by the fact that state leaders were not persuaded of the necessity to invest in 
low-return sustainable development. 
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Finally, in testing the hypothesis H3: Socialization improves the influence of 
epistemic communities, this chapter indicates that socialization is a necessary, but 
ultimately insufficient  causal variable in predicting network influence.  In this case, the 
TAN was comprehensively socialized with the array of natural resource policymakers 
responsible for administering the project.  In particular, the formal role the TAN agencies 
played with the CBMMx, CONABIO and the CBMMx institutions suggest that those 
organizations should have had significant influence on the design and selection of 
corridor zones.  However, this was not the case, as what influence was present was 
limited, and undermined by policymaker interests in political constituencies.   
The final question, addressed in Chapter 5, is whether socialization is more likely 
in autocratic or democratic countries.  In this and the previous chapter, Mexico as a post-
transitional and centralized government demonstrated systematically more socialization 
between policymakers and the civil society members of a transnational network than in 
Jamaica.  In the following chapter, I examine a transnational network that attempted to 
influence the management of biodiversity and protected areas in Egypt, the most 
autocratic of the three countries studied. 
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Table 4.1: List of CBMMx Policy Makers 
AGENCY 
JURISDICTION 
EST. THROUGH ACTIONS 
CONABIO  
Federal supremacy 
over biodiversity; 
Constitution; various 
laws on natural 
resources 
Coordinates actions across other 
federal agencies.  Collects 
information on biodiversity.  
Developed National Strategy.  
Housing agency of CBMMx 
institutions 
SEMARNAT  See above 
Establishes UMAs.  Environmental 
monitoring.  Land zoning. 
CONANP 
SEMARNAT 
agency 
Conducts environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs); monitors 
activities in protected areas 
SAGARPA 
1958 Law of 
Ministries and 
Departments 
Assists in regulating UMAs.  
Environmental monitoring.  Funding 
for agricultural development. 
CONAFOR 
SEMARNAT 
agency 
Parent institution to National 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) 
PROFEPA 
SEMARNAT 
agency 
Enforcement of environmental laws 
and compliance monitoring. 
CDI Federal decree 
Evaluates jurisdictional conflicts 
between agencies and ministries in 
relation to indigenous rights.  
Indigenous rights advocacy. 
State Governments 
State authority over 
land use 
management 
Include biodiversity management 
objectives in state development plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
257 
 
Table 4.2: Partial List of TAN Organizations 
ORGANIZATION 
INDIVIDUAL
S FUNCTIONS 
SCIENCE 
TRAININ
G 
Simbiosis SA de CV Martín Balám 
Ecosystem monitoring.  Habitat 
health evaluation.  Project 
development in corridor ejidos. Biology 
 
María Luisa 
Villarreal 
Sonora 
Ecosystem monitoring.  Habitat 
health evaluation.  Project 
development in corridor ejidos. Biology 
Los Amigos de Sian 
Ka’an Various 
Population monitoring (fauna 
and flora); biodiversity 
monitoring; project development 
in ejidos. Various 
The Nature Conservancy Various Population monitoring (fauna).   Ecology 
Conservation 
International Various 
Project development in corridor 
ejidos. Various 
University of Florida Reed Noss Research on biological corridors 
Conservati
on biology 
Wildlife Conservation 
Society Jim Barborak Research on biological corridors 
Conservati
on biology 
Yum Balám Various 
Project development in corridor 
ejidos.  Monitoring. Various 
Pronatura A.C. Various 
Project development in corridor 
ejidos.  Monitoring. Various 
Econciencia AC Arturo Bayona 
Project development in corridor 
ejidos.   Biology 
UQROO Benito Presas 
Population monitoring of fauna 
and flora.  Ecosystem 
monitoring.  Human impact 
studies Biology 
 
Alberto 
Perreira 
Population monitoring of fauna 
and flora.   Biology 
 
María 
Magdalena 
Vásquez 
Population monitoring of fauna, 
arthropods, mites.   Biology 
ECOSUR Various 
Population monitoring of fauna, 
arthropods, mites.  Ecosystem 
monitoring. Human impact 
studies 
Primarily 
biology. 
UNAM Various 
Population monitoring of fauna, 
arthropods, mites.  Ecosystem 
monitoring. Human impact 
studies Various 
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Table 4.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in the CBMMx 
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of CBMMx Agencies505 
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 Taken from a powerpoint presentation held by the CBMMx titled Retos, 
Perspectivas Y Estrategias Del CBMM En La Península De Yucatán. 
Sector Federal
(3 posiciones)
Gobierno Estatal
(3 posiciones)
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ONG's
(2 posiciones)
Sector Empresarial
(2 posiciones)
Consejo Consultivo Estatal
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Figure 4.2: 1995 Map of Relevant Protected Areas to CBMMx According to Los 
Amigos, Including Areas in Tabasco 
 
  
 
 
 
 
261 
 
Figure 4.3: 1996 Proposal from WCS Including Zones on the West Coast of 
Campeche, Tabasco, Northern Third of Quintana Roo506 
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Figure 4.4: 2000 CONABIO Final Selection, Having Removed Zones in West 
Campeche, Northern Third of Q. Roo, and Tabasco  
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Figure 4.5: 2006 Proposed Elements of Mesoamerican Biological Corridor from 
the World Resources Institute, Based on 1996 WCS Proposal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
264 
 
Figure 4.6: Diagram of TAN Links 
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CHAPTER 5  
EGYPT AND THE MIGRATORY SOARING BIRDS PROJECT 
 
Introduction 
This final case study investigates further the factors that allow transnational 
advocacy networks to generate influence over environmental policymaking in LDCs.  
The research indicates that, of the three variables identified: issue-framing, knowledge 
consensus, and socialization; two of these are causally important and necessary for 
influence.  Knowledge consensus functions as predicted by the epistemic communities 
approach by delegitimating competing arguments, while socialization encourages target 
audiences to internalize the perspectives of networks.  Without socialization, target 
audiences may very well believe the claims advanced by knowledge networks, but 
nevertheless resist environmental reform.   
This case offers no new variation on the independent variables, but does address 
the question of whether increased autocracy and political centralization have a positive or 
negative impact on socialization.  Of the campaigns addressed in Jamaica in Chapter 2, a 
small minority demonstrated the presence of socialization between policymakers and 
audiences (see Table 2.3).  As noted in the Introduction, the Jamaican case study took 
place in the most democratic and politically open of the countries studied.  On the other 
hand, as Table 3.3 and Table 4.3 indicate, most of the reef campaigns in the SAM 
Project, and all of the CBMMx campaigns in Mexico demonstrated the presence of 
socialization.   However, Mexico is a historically bureaucratic-autocratic state, and even 
after 2000 is characterized by post-corporatism and greater political centralization.   
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This suggests that the more democratic a state, the less likely that civil society 
networks of experts will socialize with policymakers as knowledge is being generated.  In 
fact, some of the existing literature on knowledge networks suggests that, as politically 
closed states tend to co-opt civil society groups, knowledge networks in autocratic states 
are more likely to have greater access to decision makers.  However, in process tracing 
the efforts of a TAN in an extremely autocratic country, this research indicates that high 
levels of political centralization preclude network influence.  This chapter examines the 
efforts of a TAN to influence natural resource management in Egypt to conserve bird 
species and habitats in Egypt through a GEF funded project titled the Project for 
Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors 
along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway.   
 
Overview of Threats to the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway 
In this case, a TAN emerged in the late 1990s, concerned about an area referred to 
as the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, part of the larger migration route known as the 
African-Eurasian Flyway.  This area can be imagined as an aerial corridor taken by 
migratory birds traveling from states north of the Mediterranean Sea through the eastern 
coast of the African continent, passing through the airspace of several countries, 
including Egypt (see Map 1.4).507.  This area is a crucial zone for global populations of 
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migratory soaring birds (MSBs), as for some species, between 50% and 100% of their 
global population traverses the Red Sea flyway.508  Like the Northern Bald Ibis, several 
of these species are listed on the IUCN Red List.509 
The significance of this area for global biodiversity stems in part from the fact 
that several of these species face extinction.  In addition, effective management of birds is 
likely to lead to improved management overall in sensitive ecosystems.  Predatory MSBs 
often represent the top of a food chain, and so losses in their population may have 
negative ramifications for lower trophic levels and ecosystem equilibrium.510  MSBs also 
serve as indicator species, and severe declines in populations could indicate a disruption 
of the natural ecosystem.  For example, the toxification of sensitive ecosystems, 
including globally important wetlands, has been manifested in mass mortalities of MSBs 
in bottleneck and resting sites.511   
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The origin of the threats to MSBs owes much to the manner in which the birds 
travel in their autumn and winter migrations.  In order to conserve energy on the 
transcontinental route, MSBs fly by soaring and gliding on hot air thermals, flapping as 
little as possible, primarily on ascent.  Because hot air thermals are formed primarily over 
level ground, rather than large bodies of water and mountain ranges, MSBs have very 
restricted migratory paths, and are funneled through identifiable “bottlenecks,” both 
providing spectacular bird-watching possibilities, and exposing large numbers of birds to 
human interference within a compressed time-frame.512  It is in these bottleneck areas that 
MSBs are most vulnerable to human activities.513 
First, since MSBs rely on thermals, they often travel at very low altitudes, easily 
within rifle range.514  Persecution through, for example, unregulated hunting and 
trapping, is one obvious way in which human activities threaten these birds.  In some 
instances, birds fly low enough that trappers need only construct large nets to capture 
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them.515  In addition, the use of lead shot in hunting creates problems when lead pellets 
accumulate in rest areas and are ingested directly or indirectly by MSBs.516   
Second, at rest areas along their migration route, even well-meaning but 
uninformed tourists may disturb exhausted and under-nourished birds, leading to further 
stress and hence death: 
…in Sharm el Sheikh… the biggest majority of the storks from Eastern 
Europe fly through this point, and have a resting place at a sewage farm in 
Sharm el Sheikh.  All these bikers going through the sewage farms are 
scaring the birds away.  They can’t rest, they have to fly further south, 
some of them are exhausted, more of them will die.517   
 
Third, and related, the onset of tourism and urban development in flyway zones 
has exposed birds to toxic chemicals.  This may occur either through improper waste 
disposal in existing bodies of water, or through the creation of standing pools of polluted 
water in, inter alia, sewage treatment plants, which attract dehydrated birds.518  
Pesticides, rodenticides and poisoned bait, ostensibly aimed at pests such as feral dogs 
plaguing agricultural areas, may also kill or harm some species of predatory or carrion 
birds.   
                                                 
515
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Finally, the construction of wind farms along the flyway may create hazards for 
birds that become trapped in powerlines, or collide with wind turbines.  The same wind 
conditions that are most conducive to energy generation are also propitious for soaring 
birds, which either risk collisions or have to detour from the flyway, again increasing the 
chance of exhaustion and death.519   
 
Tensions in National Economic Development 
As in all other cases studied, the anthropogenic threats identified here incorporate 
tensions between economic activity associated with the primary productive sectors of 
Egypt, and economic activity associated with the wellbeing of marginalized populations.  
On one hand, it is clear that the activities of lower-income Bedouin populations who 
reside in the desert of the Sinai Peninsula and along the Red Sea Coast can contribute to 
the stresses described above.  Bedouin tribal groups, most of whom are not nomadic, do 
engage in trapping and hunting of birds.520  On the other hand, prominent economic 
sectors, particularly in tourism, contribute not only the primary sources of stress on desert 
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biodiversity management, but also displace the potential of Bedouin communities to use 
natural resources. 
In some cases, this displacement is indirect.  Waste disposal from tourist sites, or 
excessive water usage reduces the utility of subterranean and groundwater supplies, upon 
which Bedouin communities depend for subsistence agriculture.521  More directly, the 
expansion of coastal tourism in the Red Sea and Sinai governorates has led to the 
physical removal of littoral Bedouin campsites from areas planned for tourist 
development.522   
 
Identifying the Social Actors Involved in Biodiversity Management 
Environmental Management: The MSEA/EEAA and Subordinate Agencies 
The management of these processes falls under the purview of a range of different 
governmental authorities.  Direct environmental management is the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and its executive agency, the 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA).  The EEAA was established in 1994 
under National Environmental Law 4/1994, and in 1997, ministerial restructuring made 
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that agency the executive branch of the MSEA.523  The MSEA/EEAA has various 
mandates, including the issuance of environmental impact assessments (EIAs); the 
generation of national action plans; the setting of pollution standards; and the 
coordination of regulatory activities with other ministries that may have jurisdictional 
overlap in managed territories.524   
Formally, the EEAA’s authority over natural resource management is 
concentrated in the Nature Conservation Sector (NCS).525  The NCS is the focal point for 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) relevant to the management of migratory birds and transitory 
habitats, including the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and the Ramsar 
Convention on the protection of wetlands.526  NCS authority is further delegated to a 
National Biodiversity Unit and a Protectorates Division.527   
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The Biodiversity Unit is charged with conducting national biodiversity 
inventories, and with implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) by 
drafting a National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity (NBSAP).528  Since some of 
the areas important for bird management are found within the network of protected areas, 
and under environmental Law 102/1983, the Protectorates Division has some authority to 
determine entry conditions, regulate hunting permits, and appoint rangers to staff and 
monitor established areas.529   
 
The Governorates and Municipal Management 
In addition, the Protectorates Division is tasked with coordinating management of 
protected areas with Egypt’s governorates, of which there are 29 since 2009 (see Figure 
5.1).530  Three in particular are important to MSB and flyway management: the North 
Sinai, the South Sinai and the Red Sea governorates, although migrating birds have found 
as far inland as Helwan.  Some of the key protected areas addressed in these governorates 
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are: in the Red Sea governorate, the Red Sea Islands; in the South Sinai govenorate, Ras 
Mohammed and Sant Katherin National Parks; in the North Sinai governorate, Zaranik.  
Governors manage local pollution standards, monitor waste management, and have 
oversight over development projects in their jurisdiction.  To coordinate with the NCS, 
governors work through Environmental Management Units established in each 
governorate.531   
 
The Tourist Development Authority and the Military 
Further, some of the conflicts between human activity and migratory soaring birds 
involve management issues in other state bodies, in the Ministry of Tourism and the 
military infrastructure.  The Red Sea and the Sinai Peninsula are major sites of tourist 
attraction.  Of 5 million tourists visiting Egypt annually, approximately 2.1 million of 
these participate in coastal tourism in the Red Sea.532  When measured in terms of 
constructed hotel space, the Red Sea and the South Sinai governorates have 28% and 
24% of the total share of Egyptian tourism respectively.  The North Sinai governorate is 
less important to tourism, with the lowest share of hotel rooms at 0.5% as of 2000.533   
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The Ministry of Tourism and its executive agency the Tourist Development 
Authority (TDA) are responsible for allocating resources and permits for tourist 
development and infrastructure.  Created by presidential decree in 1991, the TDA has an 
autonomous budget and substantial authority to regulate land sales in tourist development 
locations.534   
Finally, the military apparatus has substantial formal regulatory power over 
natural resource management.  Due to the history of the Sinai Peninsula as a site of 
conflict with Israel, as well as due to ongoing border concerns with Sudan, the military 
has “retained use-rights to large tracts of land,” and can restrict at will the mobility of 
researchers, academics and tourists in the interest of security.535  In addition to this 
control, internal management within the military has implications for natural resource 
conservation in Egypt.  Military encampments and stations along the Red Sea coast can 
contribute to the problem of improper waste disposal and the creation of standing pools 
of polluted water, while military personnel have been observed using MSBs for target 
practice.536  These agencies described above are those with the formal responsibility for 
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managing natural resources in the context of MSB conservation in Egypt (see Table 5.1: 
List of MSB Policy Makers).   
 
Political Centralization and Institutional Distortion 
At the same time, actual management authority is centralized to a degree not 
found in either Mexico or Jamaica, and is concentrated in the executive branch (the Prime 
Minister and the President) and the state security apparatus.  The declaration of additional 
land as protected areas is limited, as the Prime Minister has fixed the number and location 
of all current and proposed protected areas in Egypt through the creation of a Land 
Utilization Map in 1997.537  This map currently describes 27 existing and 13 planned 
protected areas, comprising the 40 sites to be declared in 2017 on the Land Utilization 
Map (see Figure 5.2: Map of Protectorates in Egypt, est. 1997 Land Utilization 
Map).538   
The political role played by governors concentrates the decision-making authority 
over natural resource management in the center.  Governors are appointed by the 
President, rather than elected by the mass public, directing accountability toward the 
executive branch.  Further, the military has additional informal authority over natural 
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resource management, as significant numbers of executive appointees to natural resource 
management agencies come from the state security apparatus, regardless of training or 
scientific background.539  Personal ties between apparatchiks in natural resource agencies 
matter significantly in allocating authority over environmental management. 
This personalist system, described as “embedded cronyism,”540 differs markedly 
from the post-corporatist Mexican system and the patron-clientelist Jamaican system.  
The importance of personal relationships and the centralization of land use authority in 
Egypt is greater than those of the centralized, erstwhile bureaucratic-authoritarian 
Mexican government, and the comparatively politically open Jamaican system.  Further, 
as will be indicated below, there are far greater restrictions on autonomous mass public 
political expressions in this case than in the previous two countries studied.  As a result, 
the formal division of authority and institutional jurisdiction gives a distorted view of the 
real allocation of power and authority, which is more arbitrary than indicated in the 
management structure.  It is within this context of de facto centralization and 
personalistic structures of authority that the Project for Mainstreaming Conservation of 
Migratory Soaring Birds developed. 
 
Transnational Mobilization around the Red Sea/Rift Valley Flyway 
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The Emergence of the MSB TAN and Policy Advocacy through the Development of 
the Project 
The emergence of the MSB Project followed the same essential pattern as the 
previous three cases: concern about the management of globally important biodiversity 
developed among a set of core, transnationally organized civil society actors who, in the 
process of mobilizing support for management among target audiences, developed a 
common policy enterprise.  Again, identifiable ENGOs were crucial to the development 
of a nucleus of concerned actors (see Table 5.2: List of TAN Members in the MSB 
Project). 
 
The Emergence of a Network Concerned about MSB Management  
Concern about the bird flyways in the Red Sea and Rift Valley region developed 
among a transnational network of birders in the 1970s.  In 1972, ornithologist R. E. 
Moreau compiled studies to map out the routes of the Eurasian-African flyway.541  The 
Eurasian-African flyway was identified at the time as one of the three globally important 
routes for migratory birds, the other two occurring in the Americas and the Palaearctic-
South Asian flyway (see Figure 1.5).  This study was later cited as a foundational project 
by other ENGOs who became concerned about depleting populations of MSBs in the 
1980s and 1990s, such as Birdlife International.542   
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In the early 1990s, Birdlife and other transnational stakeholders in MSB 
management, such as the IUCN and Wetlands International, began conducting research 
and sharing information to identify emerging threats and problems with the integrity of 
the flyway.  Between 1991 and 1992, Birdlife and Wetlands International, then known as 
the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau, held a series of international 
workshops to conduct threat analyses and map the geographic dimensions of the African-
Eurasian flyway.543  Between 1992 and 1995, Birdlife and Wetlands International 
developed a series of projects to protect bird species in the European section of the 
flyway.544   
At the same time, Birdlife began establishing contacts with domestic sources of 
expertise in Middle Eastern and North African flyway countries, such as Egypt.  These 
contacts between domestic expertise and Birdlife emerged as local actors similarly 
developed concerns about management and populations of MSBs.  In Egypt, a group of 
researchers had created the Egyptian Ornithological Society in the 1980s.  Though small 
and short-lived, the group counted among its members Egyptian experts on birding, such 
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as Sherif Baha el Din and Moustafa Fouda.545  Sherif became affiliated with Birdlife in 
1989, when he married Mindy Rosenzweig, an American ornithologist hired by Birdlife 
to work in Cairo.  In 1990, Birdlife hired Sherif Baha el Din to be the official Birdlife 
Affiliate in Egypt, assigning him the responsibility of conducting research on mapping 
and species identification of birds in Egypt.546 
In the middle to late 1990s, the efforts of the emerging TAN found purchase in 
the international political arena, as governments in the region sought to demonstrate 
compliance with MEAs relating to biodiversity and endangered species management.  In 
1995, Parties to the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species negotiated an MEA 
subordinate to the CMS called the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA).  In 
AEWA, the Parties used the research on bird migration conducted between 1991 and 
1995 from Birdlife, Wetlands International, the WWF and the IUCN, to promote 
improved regional management of migratory birds and habitats among neighboring 
countries in the flyway zone.547  In 1997, the Egyptian government explicitly linked 
AEWA to its efforts to carry out the Convention on Biological Diversity.548   
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As Parties began planning the management and monitoring processes to carry out 
AEWA, member governments drafted Action Plans, created with input from the network 
of ENGOs, to use in situ conservation to protect waterbirds.  In the Action Plan, Parties 
reiterated some of the same concerns generated by Wetlands and Birdlife, highlighting 
the significance of the flyway for global species and ecosystems, and discussing the need 
to ban or phase out environmentally harmful activities such as: the use of lead shot; 
illegal taking of birds; human disturbances in resting sites; and the use of poisoned 
bait.549  After AEWA entered into force in 1999, members of Birdlife, Wetlands 
International, the IUCN and the WWF became officially involved with the institutions, 
by serving on its Technical Committee, and participating as observers in the Meetings of 
the Parties (MOPs).550  
During the late 1990s, Birdlife reinforced connections between the transnational 
pool of knowledge and local expertise in the various countries.  For example, between 
1997 and 2003, Birdlife and the UNDP launched a project to identify Important Bird 
Areas (IBAs) in Africa, defined as those areas in which at least 1% of a global population 
of migratory birds pass through, or areas which function as bottlenecks.551  In Egypt, this 
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was carried out by Sherif Baha el Din, culminating in the identification of 34 IBAs, most 
of which were also identified as sensitive wetlands (see Figure 5.3: Map of BLI 
Registered IBAs).552  As in the AEWA study, this report highlighted the geophysical 
parameters of the flyway, adding specificity to the knowledge of important areas to birds, 
and illustrated anthropogenic threats to MSBs including: tourist development, pollution, 
agriculture and unregulated persecution.553 
 
Creation of the MSB Project 
By the end of the 1990s, reports and studies generated for AEWA, the IBA 
program, and domestic studies indicated that the existing management structure was 
insufficient to protect these birds and their habitats from existing anthropogenic threats.  
In order to address this problem, Birdlife began developing an additional project to 
improve management of all MSBs and habitats in the flyway region, drafting a proposal 
for a GEF-funded effort in 2003.554   
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As conceptualized, the project was intended to focus on those countries with poor 
environmental governance, but which were critical to the effective management of MSBs 
in the African-Eurasian flyway.  These were Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and territories controlled by the Palestinian 
Authority.555  The part of the flyway covered by these countries was called the Rift 
Valley and Red Sea flyway.  Like AEWA, the planned project initially took a site-
specific approach to the in situ conservation of IBAs,556 and was linked to other 
biodiversity related MEAs, such as the CBD and the Ramsar Convention.557   
In order to clarify the needs of the project, Birdlife commissioned a threat 
assessment in 2004.  Building on research conducted by Baha el Din in Egypt, and local 
expertise in other countries, this assessment reiterated the need for improved legislation 
and environmental regulation in the Red Sea/Rift Valley countries.  Further, the 
assessment, carried out by Graham Tucker of Birdlife, identified as significant regional 
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threats some of the same concerns brought up earlier in the AEWA studies and the IBA 
studies, namely unregulated hunting, tourism and improper waste disposal.558   
The project proposal was finalized in 2005.  That year, Birdlife ornithologists 
Graham Tucker and Richard Porter conducted a study on the species of MSBs primarily 
dependent on the flyway, and identified 37 species, which then became the primary 
indicator species for the success of the GEF funded project.559  Thus, by the early 2000s, 
an informally organized network oriented around conserving migratory bird species using 
the African-Eurasian flyway had emerged, part of which was based in Egypt and 
interested in the Red Sea/Rift Valley section of the flyway. 
 
Centralization of Authority and the Management of the Project 
Generally, Birdlife’s modus operandi is to delegate management authority and 
funds garnered from GEF projects to local, affiliated ENGOs.  However, whereas 
countries such as Lebanon had civil society ENGOs approved to work independently on 
migratory bird issues, Egypt did not.  In order to keep Egypt involved in the Birdlife-
developed project, the MSEA/EEAA was made the implementing agency, with the 
understanding that a domestic ENGO would be incorporated later, become an official 
                                                 
558
 Graham Tucker, 2005, Migratory Soaring Birds: Review of status, threats and 
priority conservation actions (Report to Birdlife International) passim.  This report 
noted that, of globally important IBAs in Egypt, only Ras Mohammed was protected.  
The others, including Ain Sukhna, Gebel el Zeit and Suez were not covered by any 
legislation. 
559
 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds 
into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, pp. 9 footnote 1. 
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Birdlife Affiliate, and function as the implementing agency of the MSB Project.560  To 
this end, Mindy and Sherif Baha el Din, along with associates from the Egyptian 
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology and Cairo University created Nature 
Conservation Egypt (NCE) as an ENGO in 2005.   
 
The Creation of the NCE as the Site of Transnational Activism 
NCE became a Birdlife Affiliate, and after 2006, resident birders from Egypt and 
countries such as the United States, Romania and the UK joined the organization, which 
currently numbers 28 members, to advocate for improved MSB and habitat management.  
The network grew further with the creation of an email list called EgyBirdGroup, 
established by Romanian ornithologist István Moldován, also an NCE member, to share 
reports and information on birds with a transnational network interested in Egyptian 
birding.  The EgyBirdGroup network was an important source of technical information 
for the TAN, as some of the ornithologists participating in the EgyBirdGroup mailing list 
included Tom Coles and Nick Williams, both of whom were recognized experts on Sooty 
Falcons (Falco concolor), one of the indicator soaring birds addressed by the project.561   
By 2007, when GEF committed to funding the project, a transnational advocacy 
network (TAN), concerned about managing the African-Eurasian flyway to protect 
                                                 
560
 Mindy Baha el Din, author interview, July, 2006; Hala Barakat, personal 
communication; UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory 
Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, pp. 
15; István Moldován, author interview conducted October 11 – 18, 2008. 
561
 EgyBirdGroup, personal communication; István Moldován, author interviews 
conducted October 11 – 18, 2008;  
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migratory soaring birds (MSBs), had emerged in Egypt (see Table 5.2).  This network 
built on foundational research conducted in the 1970s and concretized between 1991 and 
2003, demonstrating the importance of the flyway to globally endangered MSBs, 
identifying key MSBs to be covered by management efforts, and highlighting the threats 
faced in each flyway country.   
Like the other networks identified in the research, the size of the TAN is larger 
than is suggested in the provided table.  The EgyBirdGroup alone counts 185 members, 
but, like the 270 members of the WRC’s scientist database discussed in Chapter 2, most 
of these actors were not a core part of the network.  During the period of field research, of 
the emails on the list, which included exchanges of draft reports, discussions of threats to 
birds, and requests for hospitality for visiting researchers, most messages were sent by 
ten to fifteen members.  These included seven members of NCE, as well as researchers 
from the Birdlife and from academic institutions in the UK, USA, and Germany.  Given 
that not all members of the NCE are involved in MSB advocacy, an approximation of the 
network suggests that it counts between 30 and 40 members, larger than the Jamaican 
Cockpit Country epistemic community, but smaller than the networks active in Mexico. 
 
Maintaining the Network 
The core knowledge of this TAN was built on transnational research conducted by 
the Birdlife-Wetlands International-IUCN network, and embedded in local research and 
expertise.  In 2009, the Government of Egypt launched the project, with the 
MSEA/EEAA and the NCE listed as the official implementing agencies. 
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The network maintained cohesion primarily through the informational exchanges 
established through the EgyBirdGroup mailing list, and by virtue of the fact that NCE 
recruited members from other institutions, including Cairo University and Birdlife 
International.  The link between transnational and Egyptian knowledge was facilitated by 
the Baha el Dins, who later influenced the creation of the NCE, as well as through 
Moldován’s creation of the EgyBirdGroup mailing list.  In addition, transnational 
researchers conducting field surveys of migratory birds had to work with locally-based 
expertise in remote, desert sites.  For example, Alaa el-Din, a ranger in the Red Sea 
Protectorate, and István Moldován who conducted research near Hurghada, also in the 
Red Sea, were contact points for Birdlife researchers, such as John Grainger and Nick 
Williams, and researchers from other organization, such as Dick Hoek of WWF.  
Notably, the Egyptian network was not maintained by a comparable level of regular 
meetings and formalized processes as occurred in the other networks, especially the SAM 
network.  Nevertheless, the personal connections and informational exchanges were a 
constitutive part of this TAN. 
However, the TAN in this case faced substantial difficulties in translating 
transnationally generated knowledge into meaningful action at the domestic level.  First, 
the TAN failed to generate an intersubjective and scientifically valid consensus on the 
relationship between human activity and MSB population declines.  Second, the political 
system in Egypt, characterized by autocratic centralization, embedded cronyism, and a 
domestically weak civil society, prevented the TAN from generating socialization with 
policymakers. 
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Measuring Consensus Within the Network 
Lack of Consensus within the MSB TAN 
As indicated in the previous chapters and the literature, knowledge consensus is a 
defining feature of epistemic communities.  As this network did not generate an 
intersubjective consensus on the causal relationship between human activity and 
depletion of bird populations, it is not an epistemic community.  The TAN did share a 
pool of common knowledge and a core rationale for action.  By 2003, the transnational 
network generated and shared information about the existence of the African-Eurasian 
flyway, the location of the Red Sea/Rift Valley component, and agreed that human 
activity, such as hunting and waste disposal, was negatively affecting migratory bird 
populations.  In 2006, the network agreed on the main species of MSBs at concern. 
However, at the time of writing, there was still substantial uncertainty within the 
network.  While it was clear that human activity was contributing to declines in global 
populations of MSBs, there was a lack of specificity in this information.  There was no 
clear agreement on how to disaggregate and measure the relative contribution of each 
kind of anthropogenic activity to bird mortality rates at a regional or domestic level, and 
in some cases, disagreement about whether observed mortalities were the result of human 
activity.  In a 2005 assessment of bottleneck sites, Birdlife ornithologist Richard Porter 
noted that: 
Whilst the main threats to soaring birds on migration have been studied 
elsewhere in the world, there is a serious lack of quantitative data for the 
Middle East. For example it is known that the shooting of raptors for the 
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stuffed-bird trade is a common practice in Syria but there is no 
information on the numbers involved.562  
 
The finding of substantial uncertainty was reiterated throughout the development 
of the MSB Project.  In 2005, the final project proposal for the MSB Birdlife project 
noted the “lack of quantitative information”563 giving a clear picture of the contribution 
of specific activities, such as tourism and hunting to MSB populations, observing that 
“…beliefs about what threatens MSBs during migration may not be supported by 
evidence.”564  In 2007, the German Development Bank commissioned an investigation of 
the potential impact of wind farms on MSB populations in Gebel el Zeit in the Red Sea 
governorate.  Like the Porter report, this study concluded that clear, uncontested and 
scientifically valid data on the likely impact of wind turbines on MSB populations was 
not available.565  In 2008, the EgyBirdGroup circulated multiple reports of mass 
mortalities of migrating White Storks near reservoirs in Sharm el Sheikh, a tourist 
destination in the South Sinai governorate.  Within the network, explanations for this 
mortality varied significantly, and the scientists, including some from NCE offered as 
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 R. F. Porter, 2005, Soaring Bird Migration In The Middle East, pp. 141.   
563
 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds 
into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, pp. 9 
564
 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds 
into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, pp. 27. 
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 Bergen, 2007, Ornithological Expert Opinion, passim.  The study concluded with a 
recommendation that, in light of the lack of certainty about the impact of windfarms on 
species, and considering the endangered status of several of migratory birds passing 
through the area “…in terms of strict bird conservation aspects it is highly 
recommended to avoid construction of a wind power plant within the whole 
concessionary area [of Gebel el Zeit]” (pp. 55). 
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potential reasons anthropogenic causes such as: consumption of polluted water; human 
persecution; and natural phenomena, such as bacteria, bird flu and exhaustion.566  The 
correlation between the number of observed storks and actual site mortality was also 
debated, as one birder noted that the arid climate at Sharm el Sheikh desiccates and 
preserves bird corpses, possibly leading to the over counting of bird deaths.   
 
Measuring Network Socialization with Managers 
Barriers to Communication in Egypt 
One of the primary issues addressed by this chapter is whether political 
centralization and autocracy is conducive to greater socialization or not.  The data here 
strongly suggest that high levels of autocracy preclude the possibility of socialization.  As 
described above, the Egyptian political system is very tightly closed.  Formally, there is 
minimal scope for the exchange of ideas and information between the civil society and 
policymakers, and every interview respondent, in the civil society and in policymaker 
agencies, has observed that there is no “mechanism”567 for communication between the 
government and ENGOs.  While Egypt has a few dozen ENGOs, most of which are 
based in Cairo,568 they have little autonomy under the Egyptian legal system.   
                                                 
566
 EgyBirdGroup, personal communication; István Moldován, personal 
communication.  It should also be noted that bird flu was an unlikely cause of this 
mortality, as at the time of the observation, there were no clear reports that White stork 
populations were exhibiting signs of bird flu.  
567
 Hala Barakat.  Taken from hand-written notes. 
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 One study in 1997 puts the number of ENGOs in Egypt at 62.  This figure taken 
from Salwa Sharawi Gomaa, 1997, Environmental Policy-Making in Egypt (University 
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As one example, the 2002 parliamentary Law 84 permits the dissolution of NGOs 
by executive order, and criminalized any association between domestic civil society and 
transnational NGOs without prior permission.569  The allocation of funds for the project is 
similarly controlled by the government, as the MSEA/EEAA has the final authority over 
fiscal management of the MSB Project. 
Exacerbating communication problems associated with formal centralization, 
barriers between the MSEA/EEAA and its subsidiary agencies in the NCS prevent the 
flow of knowledge from the ground up, as ties between the civil society and the NCS do 
not translate into ties between the civil society and executive agencies.  At the time of 
writing, there were formally established ties between the TAN and policymakers in the 
NCS.  The current director of the Nature Conservation Sector is Moustafa Fouda, former 
member of the Egyptian Ornithological Society and erstwhile colleague of Sherif Baha el 
Din.  As of the time of writing, Sherif himself was in the employ of the MSEA/EEAA as 
a technical consultant to the NCS and scientific advisor to the Zaranik Protected Area in 
the North Sinai, making the Baha el Dins and Moustafa Fouda potential points of 
connection between the civil society and policymakers in the NCS.   
                                                                                                                                              
Press of Florida), pp. 20 and Appendix 2.  In 2003, the Egyptian government counted a 
few hundred, giving no specific number, in a GEF-funded project assessing the 
government’s capacity for environmental management in EEAA/UNDP, 2003, Self-
Assessment of National Capacity in Egypt to Manage the Global Environment (Project 
proposal for GEF funding) pp. 3. 
569
 Aziza Hussein, 2002, NGOs and Development Challenges (in M. Riad El-Ghonemy, 
Egypt in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges for Development, New York: 
Routledge) p. 203; UNDP/Institute of National Planning, Egypt, 2008, Egypt Human 
Development Report 2008: Egypt’s Social Contract (Cairo: UNDP) pp. 92 – 94. 
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However, these social links were sharply limited, as first, there was little 
communication between other members of the TAN and Fouda or other policymakers, 
and second, what links were present were described in interviews as ad hoc: 
I think that maybe people like Moustafa Fouda get advice on scientific 
matters on an individual basis, not in any organized manner.  There is no 
science advisory committee for these protected areas.  It is not 
accessorized.570   
 
The isolation of the NCS in environmental policymaking further complicates the 
communication between the civil society and the Egyptian government.  First, as 
described above, environmental authority over protectorates rests with the center and the 
security apparatus through institutions such as personal ties and the power of the 
governorates.571  Second, at the time of writing, the NCS was still chronically 
underfunded, and did not have the authority to independently carry out essential 
functions, such as allocating resources, hiring staff and setting priorities for management 
in established protectorates, whether IBAs or otherwise.  The Sant Katherin National 
Park and Ras Mohammed in the South Sinai governorate generate revenue through the 
imposition of user access fees.  However, these funds are not collected and managed by 
the Protectorates Division of the NCS, but submitted to a centrally controlled 
Environment Protection Fund under the executive branch.572  Of the revenues collected 
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 Mohammed Kassas code.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. 
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 Jeannie Sowers, 2007, Embedded Autonomy Revisited, passim; MSEA/EEAA, 
2006, Biodiversity Conservation Capacity Building in Egypt, pp. 17. 
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 UNDP/NCS, 2008, Strengthening Protected Area Financing And Management 
Systems (GEF Project Identification Form) pp. 4. 
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by protected areas, about 57% are returned to the NCS, and the remainder allocated to 
other projects taken by the MSEA/EEAA, subsidizing the Ministry’s other functions with 
revenue generated in national parks.573  The NCS resources then have to be reinvested 
across all areas, exacerbating the distributional problems in the allocation of funds.  Parks 
and protected areas in Ras Mohammed, Sant Katherin and the Red Sea Islands generate 
approximately 96% of revenue from protected areas,574 yet receive only a fraction in 
return as maintenance and upkeep.575   
 
Measuring the Framing Choices of the Community 
The Strategic Choice of Frames: Persuading Natural Resource Policymakers 
Again, the TAN indicated that successful communication of environmental policy 
to governmental agencies would depend on the use of economic arguments, in particular, 
those that linked environmental management to the interests of prominent economic 
sectors.  Between 2002 and 2005, the GEF began promoting the concept of Biodiversity 
Mainstreaming, described as the: 
…integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use principles 
into policies, plans, programs, and production systems where the primary 
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 UNDP/NCS, 2008, Strengthening Protected Area Financing And Management 
Systems (GEF Project Identification Form) pp. 4; Jeannie Sowers, 2007, Embedded 
Autonomy Revisited, pp. 392 
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 UNDP/MSEA/EEAA, 2010, Strengthening Protected Area Financing And 
Management Systems (Request for CEO Endorsement for Full-Sized Project), pp. 14 
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 In 2006 for example, Ras Mohammed generated US$1.9 million in revenue, of 
which only US$353,000 was reinvested in park upkeep.  See MSEA/UNDP/GEF, 2006, 
Strengthening the National System of Protected Areas (UNDP/GEF) pp. 4. 
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focus has previously been on production, economic activity, and 
development, rather than on biodiversity conservation losses or gains.576 
 
In the development of the MSB Project, one of the primary recognized threats to 
the development of political will for biodiversity conservation was the fact that MSB 
conservation was recognized as an area of very low economic value to the primary 
developmental sectors in participating countries.577  As a result, Birdlife, in the 2003 draft 
of the MSB Project and again in 2005, asserted that effective management would require 
using the concept of “mainstreaming” to link biodiversity conservation with the interests 
of prominent economic sectors.  In particular, engagement with policymakers in the 
tourism sector, namely the TDA and the Red Sea and Sinai governorates was predicated 
on the idea that increasing environmental regulation over waste disposal, waste 
management and tourist access would depend on increasing the economic attractiveness 
of biodiversity conservation by linking it with the tourist industry. 
You can't go to them and talk about conservation.  You have to insert it in 
other things, like ecotourism and so on, to make it sound like 
development.578 
 
…the decision makers understand only the economics.  They don’t believe 
in biology or in the importance of some – you can talk about only money, 
and the importance of it, and how much they are going to lose.  So, we 
have to work for the importance of biodiversity this way, so they can 
                                                 
576
 Global Environment Facility, 2005, Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production 
Landscapes (GEF Working Paper) pp. 2. 
577
 Birdlife International, 2003, Protection of Key Bottleneck Bird Areas for Soaring 
Migratory Birds. 
578
 Hala Barakat, author interviews conducted September 29, 2008.  Taken from 
handwritten notes. 
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understand.  And I think most of it – not most – a lot of people understand 
now, especially in the tourism part.579   
 
Thus, while some degree of political centralization was conducive to civil society 
communication in Mexico, this case suggests that extreme political centralization 
associated with hardline autocracy is detrimental to socialization between networks of 
experts and policymakers.  The literature suggests that autocratic policymakers may 
facilitate communication between themselves and networks of experts as part of the 
process of controlling the production of policy relevant knowledge.  However, it is clear 
from this case that the risk faced by civil society networks in autocratic countries is that 
the exercise of political control over information may disenfranchise experts, even in 
comparatively politically innocuous issue-areas.  As described above, the political 
organization of the state left the MSB TAN isolated. 
The fact that the network also failed to generate an intersubjective consensus also 
suggests that the influence exercised by the MSB TAN in this case is likely to be low.  
While the community adopted economic language as a strategy for policy advocacy, the 
previous three cases argue that this would be unlikely to overcome the barriers presented 
by scientific dissensus and low political socialization. 
 
Policy Preferences of the CBMMx Transnational Network 
Shifting from Site-Specific Management to Sectoral Approaches 
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 Tahr Issa, author interviews conducted September 20, 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording.  Emphasis in original recording. 
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By the launch of the project in 2009, the goals of the TAN had changed.  Between 
2005 and 2009, Birdlife and the UNDP agreed that a site-specific approach focusing on 
protected areas management would have been inappropriate, in part since MSBs 
exhibited some variation in flight patterns and resting arrangements.580   While still 
necessary, protected areas management of key sites was to be complemented by a 
“double-mainstreaming” effort, where practices conducive to the conservation of MSBs 
would be adopted by ongoing projects in key development sectors.  For example, since 
tourist development had negative implications for MSB conservation, tourist 
development projects in the Red Sea governorate were targeted by the TAN to become 
more flyway friendly.  All the sectors targeted for the “double-mainstreaming” approach 
in Egypt were: hunting and persecution; poisoning from agricultural cultivation; improper 
waste management; and collision with energy structures, including wind turbines and 
power lines.581  The following section explains how these double-mainstreaming efforts 
were carried out.   
 
 
Improving Protected Areas Management 
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 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, pp. 
4 
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 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, pp. 
4; Ministry of Environment [MoE] Lebanon, 2008, National Report on the African-
Eurasian Waterbird Agreement [AEWA] (Beirut) pp. 5 – 6. 
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Although shifting away from an exclusive site-specific approach, the management 
of protected areas remained central to the goals of the TAN.582  Of the 34 IBAs identified 
in Egypt, 15 are in currently existing protected areas, and 3 lie within future proposed 
areas to be established by 2017.583  At the same time, only 6 of these were identified as 
“receiving adequate protection”584 in 2000, leaving considerable scope for improved 
management.  TAN members advocated for reform of protectorate management, albeit in 
an ad hoc manner.  For example, István Moldován of NCE and EgyBirdGroup 
participated occasionally in the training of rangers involved in protectorate management 
in the Red Sea.585   
 
Reforming Tourism and Promoting Ecotourism 
The reform of tourist practices was key to TAN advocacy efforts.  As described 
above, the Red Sea and Sinai governorates are important areas for both tourism and MSB 
management, as the Red Sea governorate has 9 of the officially identified IBAs in Baha 
el Din’s study, while the North and South Sinai governorates have 5 each.586  As a result, 
TAN efforts focused on mainstreaming MSB concern into ongoing projects in these 
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 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, pp. 
203. 
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 Sherif Baha el Din, n.d., Important Bird Areas, pp. 245. 
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 Sherif Baha el Din, n.d., Important Bird Areas, pp. 245. 
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 Sherif Baha el Din, n.d., Important Bird Areas, pp. 245. 
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areas, largely by promoting ecotourism organized around MSB bird watching.  Through 
this effort, policymakers in the TDA, NCS and governorates could regulate tourist 
incursions into bird habitats and resting areas by promoting greater awareness of bird 
sensitivity among visitors.587   
For example, one of the tourist projects in the Red Sea is the Livelihood and 
Income from the Environment (LIFE) project, a USAID funded effort to assist the Tourist 
Development Authority (TDA) to develop sustainable tourism.588  This further builds on 
earlier efforts started by the TDA, the Red Sea governorate, and the MSEA/EEAA to 
launch ecotourism-driven development in the Red Sea in 2003.589  This project was 
specifically chosen by the TAN as a potential demonstration case of the feasibility of 
mainstreaming in tourism in Egypt, and the GEF funded efforts by TAN members to 
undertake activities toward this end.590  As part of this effort, Birdlife funded a manual 
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 R. F. Porter, 2005, Soaring Bird Migration In The Middle East. 
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 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006, Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds, pp. 
13; USAID, 2004, Biodiversity Conservation: USAIDs Biodiversity Conservation 
Programs, Fiscal Year 2003 (USAID), pp. 37 – 38; Sherif Baha el Din, c. 2008, Where 
to Watch Birds in Wadi el-Gamal National Park and Neighboring Areas 
(USAID/Egypt).  As indicated in Sowers’ article on nature conservation in Egypt, the 
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Embedded Autonomy Revisited). 
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compiled by Sherif Baha el Din promoting eco-friendly birdwatching in the Wadi el 
Gamal National Park on the Red Sea coast.591   
Ecotourism, if supported by the government, would not only contribute to 
national economic revenue generation and biodiversity conservation, but would also 
contribute additional benefits through the inclusion of marginalized populations, 
primarily of nomads and Bedouins.  By acting as tour guides, Bedouins could contribute 
local knowledge and expertise to protected areas management, and be compensated 
through user access fees.  This was an important step in improving governance, as local, 
marginalized populations contributed significantly to stressors such as unregulated 
hunting and excessive pesticide use while having historically been excluded from 
management by autocratic park managers.592   
 
Energy Management 
Finally, the TAN sought to incorporate MSB concerns into the planned 
construction of wind farms in Egypt, by having the government locate turbines in areas 
less likely to interfere with the flight pattern of migrating birds.  The main wind farm 
project launched in the period of the project was a 2006 effort funded by the German 
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 Sherif Baha el Din, c. 2008, Where to Watch Birds in Wadi el-Gamal National Park 
and Neighboring Areas (USAID/Egypt). 
592
 MSEA/EEAA, 2006, Biodiversity Conservation Capacity Building in Egypt, pp. 48; 
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Development Bank in Gebel el Zeit, an IBA in the Red Sea governorate.593  This farm 
was intended to contribute a significant amount of energy to the power grid of Egypt – 
potentially in excess of 3,000 MW.  As part of the planning effort, the German 
Development Bank commissioned a feasibility study from a team of ornithologists, led 
by a German specialist in migrating birds, Gudrun Hilgerloh, from Johannes Gutenberg 
University, and followed up with a later review in 2007.594  Hilgerloh, who had been 
exchanging information on the EgyBirdGroup list, divided the proposed construction area 
into three zones, and argued that construction should be limited to the northern-most 
zone, the area least likely to lead to substantial losses in bird populations.595   
 
Evaluating TAN Influence 
Lack of Success in Influencing Protected Areas Management 
Using these examples of environmental advocacy, the data suggest that the TAN 
was unable to influence environmental management in the context of this project.  The 
results are summarized in Table 5.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes.  
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 Ministry of Electricity and Energy, 2007, Feasibility Study for a Large Wind Farm 
at Gulf of Zayt: Ornithological Field Monitoring Report (NREA/Decon), p. 4; Gudrun 
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594
 Frank Bergen, 2007, Ornithological Expert Opinion as a part of the Feasibility 
Study for a Large Wind Farm at Gulf of el Zayt, Egypt (Germany: Report for Deutsche 
Energie-Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH Norsk-Data-Straße 1 [DECON]); Ministry 
of Electricity and Energy, 2007, Feasibility Study for a Large Wind Farm at Gulf of 
Zayt: Ornithological Field Monitoring Report (NREA/Decon). 
595
 Ministry of Electricity and Energy, 2007, Feasibility Study for a Large Wind Farm 
at Gulf of Zayt: Ornithological Field Monitoring Report (NREA/Decon); Gudrun 
Hilgerloh, 2009, The Desert at Zeit Bay, Egypt. 
  
 
 
 
 
301 
 
While TAN members may have been occasionally included in ranger training, the 
network had minimal success in influencing the reform of protectorates.  Interviews with 
former protectorates managers indicate that such collaborations between the civil society 
and the government was under supported at best, and discouraged at worst.   
If you follow the governmental system, you have to communicate to the 
higher level of management.  You are not allowed to communicate with 
journalists, for instance.  You are not allowed to communicate with 
people, or elected officials.596   
 
In addition, the general system of protectorate management is complicated by the 
fact that the NCS remains marginalized within the MSEA/EEAA.  As described above, 
this means that the ostensible policymaking authorities on protectorate management are 
limited in their ability to set management priorities in protected areas, regardless of civil 
society participation. 
Since the late 2000s, the government of Egypt has taken some steps toward 
reforming protectorates management, and improving the autonomy of the NCS.  In 2008, 
the government submitted a proposal for a GEF-funded project, slated to begin in June of 
2010, to improve protected areas management relevant to IBAs and migrating birds 
covered by the MSB Project.597  As part of this project, the government has endorsed the 
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 Former Red Sea protectorates manager, author interviews.  Taken from transcript of 
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 UNDP/NCS, 2008, Strengthening Protected Area Financing And Management 
Systems (GEF Project Identification Form) pp. 3; UNDP/MSEA/EEAA, 2010, 
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Endorsement for Full-Sized Project), pp. 29 
  
 
 
 
 
302 
 
delegation of further authority and autonomy to the NCS, a key step to improving policy, 
and necessary to close existing institutional gaps.598   
However, the historic implementation of protected areas management in Egypt 
shows a considerable gap between legislation and practice. As observed by a prominent 
Egyptian biologist from the UNESCO Man and Biosphere program,599 and a former 
director of Red Sea protectorates, formally passed policies may go unfulfilled:  
“…[the law] says that each nature reserve must have a Board of Directors.  
No Board of Directors has been appointed until now for any one of the 27.  
Only a Director.  Number two; it says that the Ministry must designate a 
buffer area around the natural reserve – this has not been done yet – in 
which the Ministry has authority to control activities that will… affect the 
nature reserve.  So, according to that law, which is not implemented, you 
can’t have a factory which will send air or water which is polluted to the 
natural reserve.  You shouldn’t do that, if you apply that law to the letter.  
But it hasn’t been implemented.”600 
 
…in Egypt, you can find a lot of protected areas, you know.  They have 
everything, you know.  They have the infrastructure, they have the 
management plan, but they don’t have the mentality, the good mentality of 
the managers.  Some of them are not even – they don’t know why these 
protected areas are established.601   
 
 
 
                                                 
598
 UNDP/MSEA/EEAA, 2010, Strengthening Protected Area Financing And 
Management Systems, pp. 29. 
599
 This is a UNESCO funded effort to improve knowledge about biodiversity 
management 
600
 Samir Ghabbour, author interviews conducted October, 2008.  Taken from transcript 
of digital voice recording. 
601
 Former director of Red Sea protectorates, author interviews conducted September, 
2008.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. 
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Minimal Success in Promoting Tourist Reform 
As described above, members of the TAN, particularly Sherif Baha el Din, had 
some input in the design of formal ecotourism projects and in the inclusion of MSBs as a 
developmental concern in the Red Sea area.  However, TAN members indicated that this 
inclusion was ephemeral at best.  In particular, respondents indicated that gaining full 
state support would rely on projecting improbably large and rapid returns on promoting 
ecotourism based on bird-watching.  Failing this, the project risked a loss of institutional 
support.602  This was especially problematic, given that, as described in interviews, 
commitment to improved management tended to fade when initial impetus – such as 
funding generated from USAID and LIFE projects – ended.603   
Another problem with these funded projects – I think they’re great when 
the project is still funded, because they’re constantly putting in money.  As 
soon as they leave, all the money coming in, is gone.  There’s no way to 
maintain what is established.604 
 
Further, despite the LIFE project’s inclusion of MSB management, the Egyptian 
Tourism Federation, a public-private partnership between the Ministry of Tourism and 
hoteliers, did not mention MSBs in their ecotourism plans in the Red Sea coast.605  
Finally, as described below by a former protectorates manager from the South Sinai and a 
                                                 
602
 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds 
into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, p. 9. 
603
 See Jeannie Sowers, 2007, Embedded Autonomy Revisited, pp. 394. 
604
 Ahmed, author interview conducted September 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
digital voice recording. 
605
 UNDP/Birdlife, 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds 
into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, pp. 11. 
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study on biodiversity capacity building in Egypt, the problem with ecotourism 
implementation in Egypt is that policymakers and managers may use the term to refer to 
a broad array of practices, even those which are contrary to the spirit of environmentally 
sustainable management: 
…all the hotels in Sharm say that they have an ecotourism.  Because the 
people come and enjoy the open air, the nature.  But over there is not 
completely – it’s not ecotourism.  Ecotourism is going in your virgin 
places and trying to not hurt that virginity, and using whatever minimum 
resources…  But you go over there, one guest over there in Sharm uses 
about 2, 3 cubic meters of water daily, and about, let us say, 10, 20 
kilowatts of electricity.  So, it’s not ecotourism.606  
 
While “ecotourism” has become a fashionable term used in the 
development realm, its practical implementations have been of variable 
quality.607 
 
Integrate Biodiversity with Energy Management 
The primary success in the TAN’s efforts to influence biodiversity conservation 
and mainstream MSB concern occurred with energy management in the Red Sea.  The 
German Development Bank responded favorably to Hilgerloh’s suggestion, banning 
construction in the southern three zones, and committing to search for alternative sites for 
future construction in Egypt.608  In that case, the recommendations of the civil society 
became practice.  However, the fact that this took place in an area not administered by 
                                                 
606
 Former manager of South Sinai protectorate, author interviews conducted September 
2008.  Taken from transcript of digital voice recording. 
607
 MSEA/EEAA, 2006, Biodiversity Conservation Capacity Building in Egypt, pp. 
155. 
608
 EgyBirdGroup, personal communication; See also http://www.wind-
watch.org/documents/huge-wind-farm-in-the-migration-bottleneck-of-zait-bay-egypt/. 
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governmental agencies emphasizes the fact that the civil society had little influence in the 
design and implementation of governmental policymaking in biodiversity conservation in 
this case. 
 
Conclusion 
Formally, the effort of the TAN to “mainstream” concern about migratory soaring 
birds in various sectors in Egypt was successful.  As indicated above, concerns about 
MSB conservation and habitat management were incorporated into existing plans for 
protected areas management, including bilateral tourist development projects in the Red 
Sea, national biodiversity management objectives, and into energy management plans.   
However, the TAN remained dissatisfied with the actual institutional response to 
MSB management.  First, despite the formal recognition of MSB concerns in policy 
documents and national strategy plans, the actual governmental response to new 
information remained hampered by centralization and institutional distortions in natural 
resource management.  The Protectorates Division and the NCS continued to suffer from 
a lack of resources and low institutional autonomy.  The long-term commitment of the 
MSEA/EEAA to MSB mainstreaming, beyond verbal inclusion in project documents was 
not considered meaningful by TAN interview respondents. 
Second, with few exceptions, the TAN remained excluded from the policy 
decision process.  Although the NCS maintained some ties with members of the MSB 
TAN, including Sherif Baha el Din and Mindy el Din, this communication did not extend 
to the rest of the NCE, or the MSB oriented network.  Despite the formal inclusion of the 
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NCE in the MSEA/EEAA’s efforts, interview respondents were unanimous in stating that 
the NCE had no formal input into the implementation of the project, the allocation of 
resources, or the priorities set in management.  The one sector that evinced TAN success 
was in wind farm construction, and that occurred primarily because ornithologists were 
able to influence the German Development Bank, the funding agency behind wind farm 
construction in Gebel el Zeit, not due to any success in persuading Egyptian 
policymakers directly.  At the local management level, members of the TAN were 
occasionally able to make contact with park rangers in, for example, Red Sea 
protectorates and Sant Katherin for training sessions and information exchange, but these 
successes were unorganized, and unsystematic. 
To some extent then, the failure of the TAN in this case may be overdetermined.  
As argued in the previous chapters, there is no support for the idea that using economic 
arguments will improve TAN influence in developing countries: H1: epistemic 
communities and advocacy networks will be comparatively successful in influencing 
environmentally friendly management in LDCs if they use economic arguments to justify 
action.  In addition, the network did not generate an intersubjective consensus, nor was it 
able to socialize with policymakers in relevant natural resource management agencies.  
Thus, both H2: epistemic communities will be more successful in generating influence 
than other kinds of TANs and H3: Socialization improves the influence of epistemic 
communities would indicate that the TAN would have limited chance of success in this 
case. 
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Here, the data suggest that low socialization, more so than a lack of consensus, 
prevented the TAN from influencing management. In this case, the exclusion of the MSB 
TAN from de facto project management, and the lack of support from the MSEA/EEAA 
presented a barrier to the network’s information generation efforts.  As suggested, 
socialization between the civil society and policymakers, as well as the ability of the civil 
society TAN to generate a knowledge consensus, were undermined by the personalist, 
autocratic Egyptian natural resource management regime.   
 
Implications for Effective Environmental Governance 
As described in this and the previous three chapters, the domestic governance of 
globally relevant biodiversity was influenced by the advocacy efforts of transnational 
networks of experts.  These networks were constituted when various researchers around 
the world became concerned about ecosystem health in sensitive areas, and drafted or 
participated in the design of GEF-funded projects aimed at supporting state capacity to 
implement Party obligations to the CBD.  As described throughout, these obligations 
included carrying out activities such as state-driven in situ conservation and conducting 
biodiversity taxonomies.  Despite the beliefs of transnational advocates and 
policymakers, strategically designed arguments highlighting the purported economic 
attractiveness of environmental management had no independent impact on the influence 
exercised by networks of experts. 
When transnational networks generated an intersubjective consensus on the causal 
dimensions of an environmental problem, and when they were able to socialize with 
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policymakers in natural resource management agencies, state bodies were more willing to 
undertake real reforms in biodiversity management.  In addition, this chapter indicates 
that the domestic political organization of the state also matters.  Since socialization is 
crucial to transmitting knowledge and beliefs from transnational networks to managers, 
modes of political organization that preclude socialization, such as extreme political 
centralization and autocracy, are not likely to support epistemic community influence.   
While the reforms proposed by epistemic communities and advocacy networks 
may not, in the long run, solve the problems of biodiversity governance in their 
respective issue areas due in part to exogenous factors,609 epistemic communities and 
advocacy networks can persuade states to take action where otherwise they might not 
have.  In other words, transnational networks of concerned experts contribute to the 
effectiveness of international biodiversity governance.610  Indeed, as described in these 
cases, understanding how transnational advocacy function is key to understanding how 
states understand and implement MEAs. 
                                                 
609
 For example, with respect to Chapter 4 and the SAM Project, coral reefs are 
sensitive to increasing ocean temperatures, which are driven by global climate change.  
Therefore, even with unprecedented action by managers in Mexico, rising temperatures 
could lead to a loss in coral reef coverage in the Mesoamerican basin. 
610
 Using positive change short of full compliance under a treaty as a measure of 
environmental effectiveness is used throughout the literature on global environmental 
governance, including in: Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993, 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental Protection (Cambridge: 
MIT Press); Ronald B. Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation, 
Compliance, and Effectiveness, in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed., 
International Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press); Carsten 
Helm and Detlef F. Sprinz, 2000, Measuring the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(5): 630 – 652). 
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The implication then is that other factors are less important in explaining effective 
global governance.  In particular, this conclusion differs from schools of global 
environmental governance that attribute effective management to regime characteristics, 
including the specificity of requirements, procedural transparency, and capacity building 
in weak states.611  When regimes are improperly designed, states will be less willing to 
carry out cost prohibitive management.  This is particularly likely in environmental 
problems such as biodiversity governance, where the global benefits of effective 
management are dispersed, but the costs concentrated.   
The following chapter therefore engages with the question of regime design, to 
investigate whether variation in regime design explains the variation in state commitment 
among these cases to carrying out domestic policies for biodiversity governance.  As 
mentioned in the Introduction and throughout, while all three states have signed the CBD, 
it is not the only international or regional MEA relevant to the projects described.  Each 
participating case is situated in a sui generis complex of international agreements and 
declarations, including the Tulúm Declaration in Mexico and AEWA in Egypt.  As such, 
it is entirely possible that variations in the characteristics of the MEAs relevant to each 
country will explain variations in the state behavior described here.  
 
 
 
                                                 
611
 See Ronald B. Mitchell, 2006, Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the 
Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, (Global 
Environmental Politics, 6 (3): 72 – 89); Ronald B. Mitchell, 1994, Regime Design 
Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance (International Organization 
48(3): 425 – 458). 
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Table 5.1: List of MSB Policy Makers 
AGENCY 
JURISDICTION 
EST. THROUGH ACTIONS 
Governorates (esp. Red Sea 
and Sinai) 
Political Geographic 
divisions 
Tourist regulations; municipal 
management 
Tourist Development 
Authority Executive power 
Tourism regulations and support for 
tourist development 
MSEA/EEAA 
Law 4/1997l Law 
102/1983 
Allocation of funds for environmental 
regulation; Lead agency of NCS 
NCS 
Agency of 
MSEA/EEAA; Law 
102/1983 
Management of protected areas (in 
Protectorates Division); Regulation of 
biodiversity, including taxonomy (in 
Biodiversity Unit) 
Executive Branch 
Formal and informal 
executive power 
Land use zoning, allocation of funds, 
de fact political centralization of 
power 
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Table 5.2: List of TAN Members in the MSB Project 
ORGANIZATION 
INDIVIDUAL
S FUNCTIONS 
SCIENCE 
TRAININ
G 
Birdlife International Graham Tucker 
Threat assessment, species 
monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Richard Porter Species monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Sherif Baha el 
Din (also NCE)  
Ornitholog
y 
 
Mindy Baha el 
Din (also NCE) Species monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
Cairo University 
Mohammed 
Kassas (also 
NCE) 
Protected areas ecology; 
biodiversity studies Ecology 
NCE Hala Barakat  
Ornitholog
y 
 
Mary Megalli Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
John Grainger 
(also 
EgyBirdGroup) Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Mohammed 
Amin Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
EgyBirdGroup 
István 
Moldován 
Ranger training / habitat 
monitoring/species monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Tom Coles Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Nick Williams Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Dick Hoek Species and habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
 
Alaa El-Din 
Habitat monitoring and 
protected areas management Ranger 
 
Gudrun 
Hilgerloh Habitat monitoring 
Ornitholog
y 
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Table 5.3: Summary of Observed and Predicted Outcomes in MSB Advocacy 
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Figure 5.1: Map of Governorates of Egypt612 
 
 
 
                                                 
612
 This map does not show the Helwan governorate. 
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Figure 5.2: Protectorates in Egypt, est. 1997 Land Utilization Map 
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Figure 5.3: Map of BLI Registered IBAs 
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Figure 5.4: Diagram of MSB TAN Links 
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CHAPTER 6  
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters argue that the commitment of state policymakers to 
environmental governance can be influenced by the actions of transnational knowledge 
networks.  As indicated, networks that generate socialization between themselves and 
target audiences, as well as an intersubjective consensus, will be more likely to persuade 
policymakers and managers to adopt their policy recommendations and act accordingly.  
However, while policymakers, academics and advocates may believe that economic 
framing increases the likelihood that networks will be able to influence state 
environmental management, there is no support for this argument.   
This gives a constructivist explanation for global environmental outcomes.  
Changes in environmental behavior are attributed to the ability of transnational networks 
to generate norms and persuade policymakers and managers to internalize these norms 
and act accordingly.  Consequently, the analysis here is engaged primarily with the 
interplay between the transnational level of norms and knowledge and the domestic level 
of local politics and civil society participation.  As described throughout, this multi-level, 
normative approach has implications for the study of international environmental 
relations, by offering explanations of how governments respond to their obligations under 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).   
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Conversely, a level of analysis that examines the relationship between states and 
international institutions is discounted as not offering explanatory power.  This focus on 
transnational processes should be justified, as approaches at the international level argue 
that state behavior is conditioned, not by norms deployed by non-state actors, but by the 
structures and rules of international institutions.  In general, state-centric approaches 
argue that international outcomes can be meaningfully shaped by institutions that are 
designed such that they, among other things, provide financial incentives to laggardly 
actors; clarify appropriate rules; and specify requirements for compliance.613  The study 
of international institutions has to include a two-level perspective, as obligations and 
incentives have to be translated through domestic implementing agencies in relevant 
cases.  Nevertheless, from this perspective, the international regime, consisting of the 
actions, expectations, rules and negotiations of states, comprises the “basic unit of 
analysis,”614 so that variations in regime design explain variations in state behavior.   
This argument should be tested, as the cases studied here in Jamaica, Mexico and 
Egypt were embedded in different complexes of international institutions.  These 
                                                 
613
 See inter alia, Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime 
Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press); Helmut 
Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing International 
Environmental Regimes from Case Study to Database (Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran 
Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes 
(Cambridge: MIT Press); Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993, 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, ed., 1996, Institutions 
for Environmental Aid (Cambridge: MIT Press).   
614
 Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing 
International Environmental Regimes from Case Study to Database (Cambridge: MIT 
Press) p. 229. 
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complexes vary significantly in regards to their design structure, despite a common 
concern with protected areas and biodiversity management.  As indicated in Table 1.1 in 
the Introduction, and as discussed in the chapters throughout, the projects emerged 
subsequent to biodiversity-oriented MEAs and institutions.  Some of these are held in 
common across all cases, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), while others, such as the Ramsar Convention and the Convention on Migratory 
Species (CMS) are only relevant to some.  Consequently, in each of these cases, the 
governmental natural resource agencies discussed throughout could be responding 
primarily to the incentives and obligations contained in these institutions, rather than to 
the norms and knowledge deployed by transnational networks.   
In order to have confidence in the utility of the transnational network approach, it 
is necessary to test the explanatory power of the institutionalist approach.  The following 
sections explain how institutions constrain state behavior, and then examine the 
integration of natural resource agencies in international institutions across cases. 
 
The Explanatory Power of International Institutions 
Constraining State Behavior 
The international institutionalist perspective argues that institutions, such as 
international organizations, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), secretariats, 
and Conferences of the Parties (COPs) can constrain the behavior of states.  Institutions 
do this by structuring incentives for action, generating shared expectations, coordinating 
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behavior, and formalizing rules and obligations to which states generally abide.   As such, 
institutions can contribute to the effective management of global problems, by 
encouraging states to take needed action where they otherwise would not.615  This applies 
even if the behavioral change observed stops short of some ideal metric of compliance.616   
Of course, the existence of an institution is not sufficient to cause changes in 
behavior.  Institutions have to be constructed in such a way as to maximize the likelihood 
that governments and their regulatory agencies will carry out the domestic requirements 
of institutional compliance.  For example, where institutions provide clearer obligations, 
link regime requirements to issues of concern to states, and establish greater financial 
assistance, the behavior of participating governments will be more likely to converge on 
the desired behavior of a given regime.   
 
Designing Effective Institutions 
The literature gives a fairly consistent set of explanations as to how institutions 
may structure incentives for states to comply with international obligations.  Effective 
institutions, that is, those most likely to influence state behavior, are theorized to be those 
                                                 
615
 Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting 
Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press); Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R. Young and 
Michael Zürn, 2006, Analyzing International Environmental Regimes from Case Study 
to Database (Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
616
 Ronald Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation (in Urs Luterbacher 
and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed., International Relations and Global Climate Change, 
Cambridge: MIT Press); Arild Underdal, 2002, One Question, Two Answers (in Miles 
et al, Environmental Regime Effectiveness, Cambridge: MIT Press). 
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exhibiting the “three C’s” described in 1993 by Haas, Keohane and Levy.617  That is, 
effective environmental institutions will be those that provide or foster concern among 
participating governments, a contractual environment conducive to making credible 
commitments, and the capacity of participating states to carry out their requirements.  
These are found in institutions that, among other things: provide financing or a funding 
mechanism to needy states, establish clear and well-defined requirements, create a 
credible monitoring and reporting system, and encourage the participation of NGO and 
civil society experts.618  No single one of these features is sufficient, and in fact these are 
inter-related and self-reinforcing.619  The following elaborates on the mechanics of 
providing the “three Cs.” 
 
                                                 
617
 Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, 1993, Institutions for the Earth: 
Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press).  See Andrea K. Gerlak, 2004, One Basin at a Time: The Global Environment 
Facility and the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics, 
4: 108 – 141) for a recent discussion on the three C’s as applied to biodiversity 
management institutions. 
618
 See inter alia, Ronald Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation (in 
Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz, ed., International Relations and Global Climate 
Change, Cambridge: MIT Press); Oran Young and George Demko, 1996, Improving 
the Effectiveness of International Environmental Governance Systems, in Oran Young 
et al, eds. Global Environmental Change and International Governance (Hanover: 
University Press of New England); Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes; Ronald B. Mitchell, 2006, Problem Structure, 
Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Agreements, (Global Environmental Politics, 6 (3): 72 – 89); Ronald B. Mitchell, 1994, 
Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance 
(International Organization 48(3): 425 – 458).  
619
 Oran Young, ed., 1999, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes 
(Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 20. 
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Concern 
One of the fundamental obstacles to implementing the obligations of 
environmental institutions is a lack of political will among the relevant governmental 
agencies tasked with carrying out domestic regulation.  After all, while the goal of 
institutionalist approaches is to explain state behavior, international treaties are 
implemented when governments translate requirements into domestic action.  As a result, 
effective regimes should promote sufficient concern about the need to take necessary 
action among implementing states and their regulatory agencies and influential domestic 
actors.   
With regard to carrying out biodiversity-oriented MEAs, concern can be 
generated in several ways.  Within implementing states, the management of ecosystems 
could be linked domestically to the interests of privileged sectors, such as tourism and 
trade industries.  In addition, the concern of the central government itself could be raised 
by linking ecosystem management to other MEAs, such as those dealing with climate 
change, land degradation or deforestation, thus raising the profile of a given issue.   
An important component of concern as well, is whether credible, institutionalized 
knowledge is available to all stakeholders.  Institutions that provide a forum for 
centralized knowledge gathering, and disseminate expert information to central 
governments and to domestic sectors can lead to a growing awareness among key actors 
of the severity of environmental problems and the need for urgent action. 
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Capacity Building 
One of the primary obstacles to generating positive change in environmental 
policy and practice is the fact that without sufficient resources, even the most 
environmentally sympathetic government will find it difficult to carry out needed 
reforms.  As a result, effective regimes should promote capacity in key states and 
domestic actors.  A prominent recommendation for building capacity in global 
biodiversity management is the provision of a funding mechanism to relevant parties, 
particularly developing countries.620  As observed earlier, one of the challenges facing 
biodiversity governance is the fact that the costs of implementing regulations pursuant to 
biodiversity MEAs are borne by LDCs, while the benefits received, whether aesthetic, 
moral, or pharmaceutical, are dispersed globally.  Providing sufficient funds to LDCs to 
offset the costs of regulating and protecting the environment is thus critical.  Financial 
incentives are not the only means of capacity building, however.  Accurate technical 
knowledge, training, up-to-date information, and recommendations for effective 
management practices can all contribute to the capacity of states to manage emerging 
problems, by clarifying the most effective courses of action. 
 
                                                 
620
 For a recent synopsis of various arguments on enhancing capacity and aid, see in 
particular Stacy D. VanDeveer, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. 2001. It’s Capacity, Stupid: 
International Assistance and National Implementation (Global Environmental Politics 
1: 18– 29).  See Simon Lyster, 1996, Effectiveness of International Regimes Dealing 
with Biodiversity from the Perspective of the North, (in Oran Young et al, eds. Global 
Environmental Change and International Governance) for a specific discussion of the 
role of financial assistance in generating capacity and will in LDCs pursuant to 
biodiversity management. 
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Contractual Environment 
Finally, a hospitable contractual environment provides the ability for states to 
make credible commitments, fulfill requirements, and generate converging expectations 
of appropriate behavior.  Again, this is a multidimensional metric, depending on several 
interrelated factors.  For states to make credible commitments, regimes should be 
constructed so that it is possible to monitor the activities of states’ that impinge on the 
goals of constructed regimes.  Regular monitoring and reporting not only verifies when 
states are in violation of treaty requirements, but may also assist states in gathering 
information on domestic environmental activity.  For example, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) requires 
Parties to collect data on the status of domestic legislation on species and habitat 
management, while identifying and maintaining national records on the transit of species 
governed by the Convention.621  Similarly, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), as part of their reporting and 
monitoring requirements, have to create national monitoring centers, using 
methodologies created by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to 
evaluate domestic contributions to global climate change.622 
However, having states monitor and report on compliance efforts will not 
necessarily lead to effective management unless it is clear what compliance entails.  For 
                                                 
621
 Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Article 7, 13 March 1992. 
622
 See relevant decisions in Kyoto Protocol, Articles 5, 7 and 8, and the 3rd Conference 
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/CP/1997/7.Add.1 Decision 2/CP.3 
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example, a requirement that Parties take a specific step toward treaty implementation, 
such as requiring a 30% cut in sulfur emissions or transboundary fluxes among 
neighboring European states,623 allows actors to make accurate assessments about 
whether or not states are fulfilling their obligations.  Conversely, broad, open-ended 
obligations, for example exhortations that Parties improve governance, allow for 
substantial ambiguity in measuring compliance.  Thus, the more specific the requirements 
for treaty implementation are, the more the treaty enhances the contractual environment 
of compliance. 
 
The Role of the Global Civil Society 
Institutionalists do address the potential participation of the global civil society.  
As dynamic sources of information, civil society actors such as ENGOs and epistemic 
community networks can contribute to all dimensions of effective regime design.624  As 
proselytizers about emerging problems, the civil society can contribute to state concern.  
As sources of expertise and knowledge, they may contribute to state capacity to respond 
to emerging problems.  Finally, by contributing to monitoring and reporting, the civil 
society may enhance the contractual environment of regimes by ensuring that infractions 
will be recorded. 
                                                 
623
 Taken from the Helsinki Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (UN ECE LRTAP). 
624
 See Edward L. Miles et al, ed., 2002, Environmental Regime Effectiveness: 
Confronting Theory with Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
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This argument, while asserting some agency to non-state actors and transnational 
NGOs, differs from the cognitivist-ideational approach taken by the dissertation.  The 
global civil society matters in regime design, not because they influence how states 
conceptualize of their interests and identities, or because of their ability to shape the 
normative assessments of emerging environmental problems, but because they can 
contribute a knowledge base necessary for rational decision making.625  While potentially 
important to the conduct of regimes, their inclusion in institutions is purely functional, 
and again constrained by the rules of participation allowed by states.626  Thus, rather than 
shaping norms and commonly held understandings, networks of experts function as 
problem-solvers.  At the same time, understanding how regimes and institutions constrain 
states still requires that some attention be paid to the actions of non-state actors, such as 
ENGOs. 
 
Comparing Regimes: Variation in Project Embeddedness 
With this in mind, the following section describes the institutions invoked by the 
projects studied.  As described above, each of the projects examined in the case studies is 
embedded in a different constellation of international institutions; each references 
ecosystems, species, and management approaches that invoke different international and 
regional MEAs created to manage, inter alia, fish, flora, coral reefs, wetlands and 
                                                 
625
 Arild Underdal, 2002, One Question, Two Answers. 
626
 See in particular, Kal Raustiala, 1997, States, NGOs, and International 
Environmental Institutions (International Studies Quarterly, 41: 719 – 740) 
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rainforests.  Some projects invoke specific obligations of MEAs, some are only 
tangentially related.   
In the following section, I identify which MEAs are invoked by the GEF Projects.  
I measure how each constellation of MEAs generates concern, provides capacity, and 
enhancing the contractual environment among Parties in the interest of global 
biodiversity management.  In particular, I examine how these MEAs and obligations are 
incorporated into the natural resource agencies discussed in each case.  As indicators of 
concern, I examined whether the relevant institution linked biodiversity management to 
other local or international issues, and disseminated promotional information on the state 
of the environment.  To measure the capacity building strength of the institution, I 
examined whether the institution provided financial support for project implementation, 
or fostered the production of expert knowledge linked to effective project management.  
This was enhanced if the institution made recommendations of best practices in 
environmental management.   
Finally, to identify whether the contractual environment of an institution was 
conducive to carrying out biodiversity management, I examined the goals of the 
institution to see if they reinforce and replicate the goals of the project.  For example, 
institutions will enhance the contractual environment of a project if they call on Parties to 
take action in specific geographic locations, or to protect the species identified in the 
GEF-funded projects.   
The indicators of concern, capacity-building, and the hospitableness of the 
contractual environment were measured by examining the features of the various 
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institutions invoked by the projects.  These features included the texts of treaties and their 
associated Protocols, resolutions, and recommendations adopted at various Conferences 
of the Parties (COPs).  I also examined domestic and international institutions created 
pursuant to the various treaties, including domestic standing technical or scientific 
bodies; funding mechanisms; and central clearing houses of information.  In each case, 
the mechanisms through which the institution promotes the three Cs are explained below.   
 
Regime Design: the CBD and the GEF 
Since the projects were established pursuant to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), these 
institutions are the first addressed here.  All parties are members of the CBD, and all have 
received funds from the GEF for carrying out these projects.  As a result, the ratification 
of these institutions will not predict variation between the Parties in their commitment to 
the domestic implementation of global biodiversity obligations.  Nevertheless, insofar as 
they contribute to the ability of states to carry out biodiversity management, the CBD and 
the GEF are discussed below. 
 
Concern 
As currently designed, the CBD has a variety of mechanisms that were designed 
with the purpose of promoting greater concern about biodiversity in participating states.  
First, the Parties to the CBD created mechanisms to promote and disseminate information 
highlighting the global importance of biodiversity conservation.  At the first Conference 
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of the Parties (COP-1) in 1994, member states cited Article 18.3 calling on Parties to 
create a central clearing house of information within the Convention, called the Clearing 
House Mechanism (CHM).627  Between 1994 and 1999, the CHM entered into a pilot 
phase, and succeeding COPs elaborated on the function of the institution.  COP-2 
recommended that Parties establish national CHM focal points as part of a global 
information exchange network,628 and COP-4 requested that Parties promote the 
inclusion of knowledge generated from local and indigenous communities.629   
These and other recommendations emphasizing the decentralized collection of 
biodiversity-related knowledge and the dissemination of such knowledge among Parties 
were adopted after the end of the pilot phase at COP-5.630  Currently, the Information 
Centre of the CHM continues the mandate of disseminating knowledge by producing 
synthetic reports on the state of global biodiversity, including the Global Biodiversity 
Outlook and assorted newsletters. 
Second, the CBD and the GEF have attempted to link biodiversity conservation 
with other international obligations as a means of generating concern.  At COP-6, the 
Secretariat of the CBD linked biodiversity loss with the goals of other MEAs, including 
the Convention to Combat Desertification, the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (reiterated at COP-10), the Cartagena Convention, and the Ramsar Convention 
                                                 
627
 UNEP/CBD/COP/1/Decision I/3 
628
 UNEP/CBD/COP/2/Decision II/3.4, Decision II/3.5 
629
 UNEP/CBD/COP/4/Decision IV/2.10 
630
 UNEP/CBD/COP/5/INF/3 
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on Wetlands.  This was carried out to highlight the synergy between the CBD and other 
MEAs, some of which are specific to the countries discussed in the dissertation.631  As 
suggested above, the fact that multiple treaties invoke the same, or overlapping 
obligations, arguably reinforces the concern of member states to carry these obligations 
out.   
Further, pronouncements made at COP-6 and COP-7 of the CBD recommended 
that parties link biodiversity management with important domestic concerns, especially 
those with economic development implications, such as tourism, trade and labor.632  The 
link between domestic development and biodiversity was reinforced in 2006, when the 
GEF promoted “biodiversity mainstreaming,” or the integration of “the sustainable use of 
biodiversity into the sectors of the economy that strongly impact biodiversity outside of 
protected areas,”633 pursuant to a recommendation made by its Scientific and Technical 
Advisory Panel (STAP).634   
 
Domestic Internalization 
In each case, this concern was incorporated into domestic natural resource 
management agencies.  Pursuant to Article 18.3 and decisions taken at COP-2, the 
                                                 
631
 UNEP/CBD/COP/6/Decision VI/15/Annex II.14 
632
 UNEP/CBD/COP/6/Decision VI/15/Annex II.15; UNEP/CBD/COP/7/Decision 
VII/14 
633
 GEF-4 Biodiversity Strategy, pg. 8. 
634
 GEF-4 Biodiversity Strategy, pg. 8. 
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relevant countries created national Clearing House Mechanisms as part of a global 
information-sharing network.  There was, however, some difference across cases in the 
relationship between the national CHM and the government.  In Jamaica, the national 
Clearing House Mechanism was a quasi-independent institution, housed in the Institute of 
Jamaica (IOJ), a governmental cultural organization.  In contrast, the national CHMs of 
Mexico and Egypt were more directly involved in natural resource management.  The 
Egyptian CHM is located in the Nature Conservation Sector, a branch of the 
environmental ministry (MSEA/EEAA), while the Mexican CHM is situated in the 
Comisión Nacional para el Uso y Conocimiento de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO).635  As 
described in Chapters 3 through 5, the MSEA/EEAA and CONABIO are two of the 
major policymaking institutions in the MSB Project in Egypt, and the CBMMx Project in 
Mexico respectively, while the Jamaican CHM functioned primarily as an additional 
actor within the epistemic community network.  Nevertheless, this process indicates the 
interplay between domestic level structures and international institutions. 
 
Capacity 
The primary capacity building institution within the biodiversity regime is the 
GEF, administered financially and technically by the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).  The GEF was created specifically to transfer funds and technical expertise to 
                                                 
635
 Information on the location of the national CHMs is taken from the CBD’s webpage 
on the Clearing House Mechanism, retrieved online, February 2011 from 
http://www.cbd.int/chm/ 
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developing countries, under the rationale that most of the terrestrial biodiversity exists 
within the jurisdiction of LDCs, and that urgent action within these countries is central to 
effective conservation of biodiversity.636  While the World Bank and the UNDP are the 
prominent financiers of GEF activity,637 the UNDP and UNEP also engage in capacity 
building, through project support, and conducting technical training with natural resource 
agencies in Parties.638  In the most recent funding cycle for GEF, for 2006 – 2010, the 
organization allocated $2.8 billion for biodiversity management projects in Parties to the 
CBD.639   
 
 
 
                                                 
636
 UNEP Global Biodiversity Assessment, cited in Rosendal, Interacting International 
Institutions pg. 3; see also Lyle Glowka et al. 1994.  A Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (IUCN: Gland, Switzerland) p. 1.  This conclusion has also been 
reiterated in meetings of the administrative bodies of the Convention, including the first 
Conference of the Parties (COP-1): “The genetic resources are, to a large extent, found 
in the developing countries” (UNEP/CBD/COP/1/Inf.9).  The Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) was chosen to act as an interim mechanism in the first COP meeting, 
and was finalized through a Memorandum of Understanding as the permanent financial 
mechanism in the third COP meeting.  See UNEP/CBD/COP/3/10, which contains a 
reproduction of the Memorandum. 
637
 According to GEF OPS4 as of 2009, the share of World Bank funds as part of GEF’s 
budget has declined from a high of 58% during the pilot phase, to less than 30% 
currently. 
638
 Andrea Gerlak, 2004, One Basin at a Time: The Global Environment Facility and 
the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics 4: 108 – 141) 
639
 GEF, 2010, OPS4. 
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Domestic Internalization 
This capacity building process was further incorporated into domestic natural 
resource management agencies.  In the projects studied, the GEF provided substantial 
funds to actors within the participating states.   Again, there was substantial variation 
between cases in regards to the incorporation of this capacity building exercise into 
domestic institutions.  In Jamaica, the GEF provided US$200,300 to Birdlife 
International for the Project for Sustainable Conservation in the Cockpit Country.640  
This project was to be carried out primarily by partnerships between Birdlife 
International and local NGOs, including Birdlife Jamaica and the Windsor Research 
Centre (WRC), and natural resource managers in the Forestry Department and the 
National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA).   
In comparison, the GEF provided more direct capacity building to national 
regulatory agencies in Mexico and Egypt.  The funds for the CBMMx Project in Mexico, 
in the amount of US$14,840,000, were provided to the governmental financial agency, 
Nacional Financiera A.C. to be distributed to CONABIO.641  In Mexico, GEF provided 
US$680,000 directly to the MSEA/EEAA as the implementing partner, and another 
                                                 
640
 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Facility 
Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important 
Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared Resource 
(retrieved October 2005 from www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 
26 
641
 World Bank, 2000, Mexico: Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (World Bank 
project document), pp. 1 
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US$1,100,000 through the Red Sea Governorate Project for MSB double-mainstreaming 
efforts in Egypt.642 
 
Contractual Environment 
While the GEF and the CBD institutions do contribute to generating concern 
among parties, and have established mechanisms for capacity building, the institutions 
have a weak contractual environment.  The GEF has made ratification of the CBD a 
condition for receiving funds for the ongoing projects discussed in the research, thus 
establishing clear rules for compliance, and a system of incentives for doing so.  
Formally, the Convention is a binding treaty, and has specific obligations of which 
compliance can be measured.   
However, the substantive obligations of the CBD are vague enough that there is 
sufficient scope for Parties to equivocate in practice, while formally complying with the 
procedural requirements of the treaty.  The primary specific requirement of the CBD is 
the creation by Parties of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) to 
outline the participating government’s approach to managing biodiversity 
conservation,643 but the actual content of domestic implementation is left to the discretion 
of states.  Further, there is a monitoring mechanism for the CBD, which is carried out by 
the Convention’s Subsidiary Body for the provision of Scientific, Technical and 
                                                 
642
 UNDP/Birdlife International [Birdlife], 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of 
Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea 
Flyway (UNDP Project Document), pp. 102 
643
 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 5. 
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Technological Advice (SBSTTA).644  However, the SBSTTA depends largely on self-
reporting by the Contracting Parties to perform this function, rather than on conducting 
independent monitoring.645   Thus, on this metric, the CBD and the GEF provide a very 
weak contractual environment for regime implementation. 
 
Domestic Internalization 
Although the contractual obligations of the CBD and the GEF Projects were 
minor, they were nevertheless incorporated at the domestic level into governmental 
institutions.  As mentioned above, the national governments of Jamaica, Mexico and 
Egypt all ratified the CBD prior to receiving funds for project implementation.  In 
addition, in all cases, natural resource regulatory agencies were directly involved in 
drafting the NBSAPs, the Article 6 requirement.  In Jamaica, the NBSAP was drafted by 
NEPA, in consultation with local experts;646 in Mexico, the NBSAP was drafted by 
                                                 
644
 The SBSTTA also holds regular meetings, first meeting in 1995, having held 13 
meetings to date.  Taken from the Convention website on the SBSTTA, found at 
http://www.cbd.int/sbstta/. 
645
 Andrea Gerlak, 2004, One Basin at a Time: The Global Environment Facility and 
the Governance of Transboundary Waters (Global Environmental Politics 4: 108 – 141) 
646
 National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA), 2003, National Strategy and 
Action Plan on Biodiversity in Jamaica [NBSAP]. (National Environment and Planning 
Agency: Kingston); 
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CONABIO;647 in Egypt, by the Biodiversity Unit, a subsidiary body of the NCS and the 
MSEA/EEAA.648 
However, the CBD and the GEF are not the only institutions in which the projects 
are embedded.  The following section describes the other MEAs relevant to the 
management of biodiversity in each of the countries carrying out the GEF-funded 
projects.  In each case, the MEAs cited were taken from the ratified treaties listed by the 
Ministry of Environment of each country.  The MEAs contribute either generally to 
biodiversity management pertinent to the project issue area, or contribute specifically to 
iterated goals within the project, as illustrated below. 
 
Jamaica and Cockpit Country Management 
Of the four case studies, the project carried out in the Jamaican Cockpit Country 
is the least embedded in additional international biodiversity institutions.  Aside from the 
CBD and the GEF, the biodiversity MEAs invoked in this project are: 1) the Convention 
for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region649 (Cartagena Convention), 2) its 1990 protocol on specially protected areas and 
                                                 
647
 CONABIO, 2000, Estrategia nacional sobre biodiversidad de México 
648
 MSEA/EEAA, 1998, Egypt: National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity 
649
 Defined in Article 2 of the Cartagena Convention as “…the marine environment of 
the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea and the areas of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent 
thereto, south of 30 deg north latitude and within 200 nautical miles of the Atlantic 
coasts of the States referred to in article 25 of the Convention.” 
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wildlife (SPAW Protocol),650 and 3) the Ramsar Convention.  A summary table of the 
impact of these institutions on the management of biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is 
given in Table 6.1: Summary Impact of Institutions on Cockpit Country 
Management.  The following section explains how the concern, capacity and 
contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect with the 
goals of the Project on Sustainable Conservation and local natural resource managment. 
 
Concern 
As discussed above, COP-6 of the CBD linked the biodiversity management goals 
of the Ramsar Convention with the CBD.  While Cockpit Country management does not 
involve wetlands or littoral ecosystem management, this association arguably raises the 
profile of biodiversity management in Jamaica, as it is a signatory to the Ramsar 
Convention.  In addition, NEPA, the environmental regulatory agency of Jamaica, is the 
national Ramsar Administrative Authority.  While the Ramsar sites in Jamaica are all 
located on the south coast, there is some evidence that participation in this MEA has 
contributed to concern for ecologically-oriented biodiversity management in the national 
government.  For example, the text of the Ramsar Convention and the 1999 COP-4 call 
                                                 
650
 Kayenne Taylor, Report on the Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit 
Country Conservation Project (Kingston), pp. 10, 76; (UNEP), Global Environment 
Facility Project Document for project titled Sustainable Conservation of Globally 
Important Caribbean Bird Habitats: Strengthening a Regional Network for a Shared 
Resource (retrieved October 2005 from 
www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1604) pp. 88. 
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on Parties to manage wetlands in part to conserve migratory birds.651  Since then, NEPA 
has carried out bird monitoring in Ramsar sites, most recently in 2010.652  As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the integration of ecosystem management with bird welfare was an 
important component of the Project for Sustainable Conservation.  However, this 
contribution to direct concern for biodiversity management in the Cockpit Country is 
marginal. 
The Cartagena Convention, drafted in 1983, was established subsequent to the 
1979 Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP-UNEP), one of UNEP’s Regional Seas 
Programmes.  Cartagena establishes general obligations for Contracting Parties to 
conserve and sustainably manage marine ecosystems in the Caribbean Sea,653 to limit 
land-based sources of marine pollution,654 and calls on Parties to establish additional 
protocols augmenting regional environment.655  While the Cartagena Convention is 
primarily focused on conserving marine ecosystems, subsequent Meetings of the Parties 
                                                 
651
 Ramsar Convention, Article 5; Ramsar Convention COP-4, Recommendation 4.4 
and 4.12. 
652
 NEPA, 2010, Wetland bird and habitat monitoring of 2 RAMSAR sites in Jamaica.  
Retrieved online, February 2011 from 
http://www.nepa.gov.jm/projects/description/wetland_bird_habitat_monitoring.pdf 
653
 Cartagena Convention, Articles 3 and 4. 
654
 Cartagena Convention, Article 7. 
655
 Cartagena Convention, Article 4. 
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(MOPs) of the Convention have illustrated the linkage of biodiversity conservation to 
other global concerns, including climate change and coastal management.656   
As a Party to the Cartagena Convention since ratification in 1987, chair of the 
Monitoring Committee in 2000, and as host to the offices of the CEP-UNEP, Jamaica has 
been central in the promotion of concern about biodiversity under the Cartagena 
Convention.   
The SPAW Protocol also tangentially links marine biodiversity management to 
coastal and terrestrial ecosystems in the wider Caribbean ecoregion.657  As described in 
the 1999 Legal Assessment of land use policy,658 Hayes-Sutton’s 2004 PAMP study,659 
and in the GEF project documents,660 the SPAW Protocol could be invoked as a reason 
for conserving the Cockpit Country, insofar as the downstream degradation of mountain 
ecosystems could negatively impact coastal management.   
Moreover, these elements of concern have also been incorporated at the domestic 
level in the Jamaican political system.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the finding that 
downstream degradation from mountainous ecosystems was harmful to coastal 
management was reiterated in the 1999 NBSAP studies conducted on behalf of the 
                                                 
656
 UNEP(DEC)/CAR IG.19/6 
657
 Preamble, Articles 4 and 5 of the SPAW Protocol. 
658
 Kayenne Taylor, Report on the Legal Imperatives and Implications of the Cockpit 
Country Conservation Project 
659
 Patrick Yugorsky and Ann Sutton, Categorization of Protected Areas in Jamaica 
(The Nature Conservancy: Kingston, 2004), pp. 7 - 8 
660
 UNEP, GEF Project Document, pp. 88. 
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NRCA/NEPA.  More directly, the Jamaican national government is carrying out its 
obligations under the Cartagena Convention through domestic natural resource agencies 
involved in the Cockpit Country Project, namely NEPA and the Forestry Department. 
Under a National Plan of Action drafted in 2003,661  NEPA is tasked with coordinating 
environmental management to reduce, among other things, coastal sewage disposal 
relevant to the goals of the Convention.  In addition, the Forestry Department has the 
mandate to declare additional Forest Reserves in coastal zones needing protection.  
However, language associating mountainous ecosystems to marine management is not 
found within the SPAW Protocol itself, indicating again only a marginal connection 
between the MEA and the goals of the Project for Sustainable Conservation. 
 
Capacity 
Neither the Cartagena Convention, nor the SPAW Protocol, nor the Ramsar 
Convention has established mechanisms for capacity building relevant to Cockpit 
Country management.  The information collected by the Secretariats for environmental 
management pertains to marine ecosystems; mountainous ecosystems such as the Cockpit 
Country, are not addressed.  The primary capacity building efforts in regards to Cockpit 
Country management stem from the CBD and GEF funds provided for the Project for 
Sustainable Conservation. 
 
                                                 
661
 NEPA, 2004, Jamaica’s National Programme of Action for the Protection of the 
Coastal and Marine Environment from Land-Based Sources of Pollution (Kingston: 
NEPA). 
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Contractual Environment 
Similarly, none of the above listed MEAs impacts the contractual environment of 
the Project for Sustainable Conservation.  Although terrestrial ecosystems are mentioned 
as potentially relevant to marine management in the SPAW Protocol, the Cockpit 
Country is not specifically mentioned, nor are mountainous ecosystems in general. 
 
Mexico and the Mesoamerican Reef System 
The SAM Project and the CBMMx Project both invoke Mexico, and so there is 
substantial overlap among the institutions in which they are both embedded.  The 
institutions pertaining to the SAM Project are: 1) the Cartagena Convention; 2) its SPAW 
Protocol; 3) its Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities 
(LBS Protocol); 4) The Ramsar Convention; 5) The Tulúm Declaration; 6) the 
Centroamerican Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD); and 7) the 
Caribbean Environment Programme of the UNEP (CEP-UNEP). 
A summary table of the impact of these institutions on the management of 
biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is given in Table 6.2: Summary Impact of 
Institutions on SAM Management.  The following section explains how the concern, 
capacity and contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect 
with the goals of the SAM Project. 
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Concern 
Concern about managing the Mesoamerican reef region is enhanced by the fact 
that several MEAs and institutions highlight the importance of governance in this area to 
myriad international obligations.  The Ramsar Convention, as described above, raises the 
profile of biodiversity management in wetland ecosystems such as the Sian Ka’an 
Biosphere Reserve, part of the SAM Project’s focal points.  As in Jamaica, local 
regulatory agencies associated with GEF Project management have been incorporated 
into the country’s obligations under the Convention.  Mexico designated SEMARNAT 
and CONANP as the Administrative Authority and Focal Point respectively of the 
Ramsar Convention, requiring these agencies to participate in the regular Conferences of 
the Parties.   
The Cartagena Convention, ratified by Mexico in 1985, links marine management 
in the Caribbean Sea, part of which includes Mexico’s territorial waters in the 
Mesoamerican basin, to the broader goals of global biodiversity conservation.  As 
described above in Jamaica, the Cartagena Secretariat holds regular MOPs, highlighting 
the importance of global marine management, and Article 7 of the Convention calls on 
Parties to prevent or reduce land-based pollution of marine ecosystems.  SEMARNAT is 
the implementing agency of the Cartagena Convention 
This concern in turn was reinforced by the adoption in 1999 of a Protocol 
Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities (LBS Protocol) to the 
Cartagena Convention.  The LBS Protocol requires states to cooperate bilaterally or 
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regionally to limit transboundary marine pollution,662 hold regular meetings of the 
Parties663 and report to UNEP on the implementation of the agreement.664  Like the SAM 
Project, the LBS Protocol is concerned with limiting terrestrial sources of marine 
pollution.  The contribution of these protocols to concern in domestic agencies in Mexico 
is minimal however; the federal government has not to date ratified either of them. 
Finally, the SAM Project took place in part due to a regional agreement between 
the four Mesoamerican countries.  The 1997 Tulúm Declaration, described in Chapter 3, 
committed the participating countries to take jointly coordinated action to conserve the 
shared ecoregion in the Mesoamerican basin.665  The Declaration linked sustainable 
development and Agenda 21 to the conservation of the reef ecosystem as a site of 
globally important biodiversity, a buffer zone against coastal erosion, and as relevant to 
tourist development.666   
Beyond MEAs and declarations, the institutions of the CCAD and CEP-UNEP 
also raise the profile of marine management in the Mesoamerican reef.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, CCAD asserted in 1996 that the regional governments of Central American 
                                                 
662
 LBS Protocol, Article V and IX. 
663
 LBS Protocol, Article XV 
664
 LBS Protocol, Article XIII. 
665
 UCP, 2001, Plan Operativo Anual Período: Julio 2001 – Junio 2002 (Belize City: 
SAM) pg. 1 
666
 Declaración de Tulúm.  Reproduced in Unidad Coordinadora del Proyecto (UCP), 
2004, Políticas de Desarrollo Sustentable de los Recursos Pesqueros, Turismo y Áreas 
Marinas Protegidas Transfronterizas en el Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (Belize 
City: SAM), pp. 3 – 4. 
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countries and Mexico should cooperate for improved, multilateral environmental 
management, particularly for transboundary ecosystems.  In addition, CEP-UNEP, 
established to promote regional cooperation in the Caribbean for marine governance, 
produces promotional material for Parties illustrating the need to conserve marine species 
and environments, including, since 2008, quarterly reports on environmental 
management.  However, the Declaration of Tulúm and the CCAD were not well 
integrated into domestic regulatory agencies; the Mexican government only has observer 
status at CCAD, and the Declaration was signed by the then president of Mexico, Ernesto 
Zedillo, rather than a representative from SEMARNAT. 
 
Capacity 
The LBS Protocol and the CEP-UNEP further enhanced the capacity of states to 
respond to problems associated with coastal environmental degradation from land-based 
sources.  The CEP-UNEP functions as a standing scientific body for the Protocol, 
publishing information on the causes and types of marine pollution in the Wider 
Caribbean Region, including 48 technical reports since 1989.  In 1994, it concluded a 
technical report highlighting the contribution of sedimentation, hydrocarbons, sewage 
and agricultural runoff to marine environmental degradation, all of which pertain to 
marine management off the coast of Quintana Roo.667  In addition, the organization 
maintains highly technical information for Parties, such as databases on marine litter, 
                                                 
667
 CEP-UNEP, 1994, Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the 
Wider Caribbean Region (Kingston: CEP Technical Report No. 33. UNEP Caribbean 
Environment Programme). 
  
 
 
 
 
345 
 
protected areas management, and surveys on pollution loading in the Mesoamerican 
basin.668 
The capacity to manage ecosystems relevant to the SAM Project is also enhanced 
by this MEA.  To assist in the implementation of Ramsar, the Parties established a 
standing investigatory body, the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), after 
COP-5 in 1993,669 and since then, Mexico has had a national representative on the STRP 
investigative body.670  In addition, the Mexican government is required to establish a 
National Focal Point for the STRP, which is currently situated in the Institute of Ecology.  
The STRP has, since 1994, held irregularly scheduled meetings (at least twice per 
triennium) to, among other things, collect and centralize information on the management 
of invasive species and propose guidelines on the appropriate management of wetlands.   
The STRP has also promoted capacity building in Mexico by incorporating local 
actors and ENGOs in information gathering pursuant to biodiversity management.  In 
2002, COP-8 of the Ramsar Convention reformed the STRP in order to institutionalize 
the relationship the body had with civil society ENGOs such as Wetlands International 
and Birdlife International, both of which are engaged in promoting conservation in the 
                                                 
668
 CEP-UNEP, 1994, Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the 
Wider Caribbean Region, pp. 14. 
669
 COP-5, Recommendation 5.5 
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 For example, the 2006 – 2008 Mexican representative was Francisco Contreras of 
the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. 
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Sian Ka’an Reserve.671  Currently, the STRP holds periodic workshops on Thematic 
Working Areas (TWAs) on issues such as wetlands management and climate change. 
 
Contractual Environment 
The contractual environment of regimes pertinent to SAM management is 
improved as well by the SPAW Protocol and the Ramsar Convention, both of which give 
additional specificity in defining international regime compliance.  Articles 5 and 11 of 
the SPAW Protocol call on Parties to take specific conservation measures, including the 
prohibition of activities harming endangered species of flora and fauna, the regulation or 
prohibition of coastal sources of pollution, and the regulation of tourist and recreational 
activities.  Some of these species listed in the Annexes to the SPAW Protocol include the 
coastal mangroves and seagrasses, all of which were identified as crucial to coastal 
ecosystem management in the SAM Project.672   
The Ramsar Convention also enhances the contractual environment pertaining to 
the SAM Project, as it calls on Parties to take action in regions relevant to SAM 
management in order to be in compliance with the regime.  As a signatory to the Ramsar 
Convention, Mexico is required to identify wetlands of international importance, 
designate them as such in a centrally recognized List,673 and create domestically 
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 Ramsar Convention, COP-8, Resolution VIII.28. 
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 SPAW Protocol, Annexes. 
673
 Ramsar Convention, Article 2 
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established measures for conservation of the area through its Administrate Authority, 
SEMARNAT and CONANP.674   
Between 1990 and 2003, the time period of the generation of concern about SAM 
management, the Ramsar Convention evolved further, developing more specific 
recommendations about wetland designation.  At COP-4 in 1990, in a Strategic Plan 
drafted at COP-6 in 1996, and at COP-7 in 1999, the Contracting Parties agreed that the 
kinds of ecosystems that could be considered for Ramsar certification should be extended 
to include areas such as spawning grounds for fish and coral reefs, which were identified 
as relevant to global biodiversity, and an important part of the SAM Project.675  As of 
2010, several of the areas involved in the SAM Project are Ramsar sites, including the 
Sian Ka’an Reserve (declared 2003), National Parks at Xcalak (2003), Puerto Morelos 
(2004), Banco Chinchorro (2004) and Cozumel (2005). 
 
Mexico and the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano 
The CBMMx Project is embedded in similar institutions as the SAM Project.  
These are 1) the Action Plan of the Tuxtla Gutiérrez II Summit; 2) the Ramsar 
Convention; and 3) the CCAD.  A summary table of the impact of these institutions on 
the management of biodiversity in the Cockpit Country is given in Table 6.3: Summary 
Impact of Institutions on CBMMx Management.  The following section explains how 
                                                 
674
 Ramsar Convention, Articles 3 and 4. 
675
 See COP-4, Recommendation 4.1; Ramsar Convention Strategic Plan 1997 – 2002 
(available online at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/key_strat_plan_1997_e.pdf). 
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the concern, capacity and contractual environment found within these MEAs and 
institutions intersect with the goals of the CBMMx Project. 
 
Concern 
Like the Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM) Project, the efforts toward 
managing the Corredor Biológico Mesoamericano – México (CBMMx) emerged in the 
background of regional efforts to coordinate environmental management, and as such, 
several regional institutions raised the political profile of action in the biological corridor 
region.  The 1996 Tuxtla II Summit mentioned in Chapter 4 comprised a multilateral 
meeting between the heads of state of Mexico and the Central American countries to 
coordinate transboundary activity in security, trade and the environment.  Subsequent to 
this summit, the Central American states and Mexico issued the Tuxtla Declaration, 
which called on states to promote the establishment of the Corredor Biológico 
Mesoamericano.   
First, the Tuxtla Declaration enhanced the level of concern around the eventual 
CBMMx Project, in that it linked regional environmental cooperation to the broader goals 
of regionalism and interdependence in matters of trade, transboundary crime, and social 
development.676  Second, the CCAD, established to promote regional integration in 
Central America and Mexico, similarly linked coordinated environmental management to 
                                                 
676
 Declaración Conjunta y Plan de Acción de la Cumbre Tuxtla Gutiérrez II, Preamble 
(26). 
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economic, social and ecological sustainability, and regional development.677  However, 
like the SAM Project, these pronouncements were not directly integrated into the 
practices of natural resource management agencies.  As described earlier, Mexico only 
has an observational relationship with CCAD, and the Tuxtla Declaration, like the Tulúm 
Declaration, was an inter-presidential agreement. 
 
Capacity 
There is some capacity building in the institutions in which the CBMMx is 
embedded.  As described above in the SAM Project, the Ramsar Convention has 
institutionalized a base of technical knowledge on wetlands in the STRP.  As some of the 
regions in the CBMMx, such as parts of the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, are wetlands, 
this base of technical pertains to CBMMx management.  Again, SEMARNAT and 
CONANP, natural resource management agencies implicated in the implementation of 
the CBMMx, are Administrative Authorities of Ramsar.   
 
Contractual Environment 
The Ramsar Convention also contributed to the contractual environment of 
biodiversity management pertaining to the CBMMx as the Convention calls on Mexico to 
take action in areas designated as Ramsar sites that comprise parts of the biological 
corridor, specifically the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve.  Finally, the Tuxtla Declaration 
indicates which areas are to be managed by Parties signatory to the Declaration, by 
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 CCAD, Políticas del Desarrollo Sustentable, pp. 6. 
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defining the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor as the area running from the neovolcanic 
zone in Mexico to Panama (Figure 6.1: Map of Neovolcanic Zone in Mexico).678  
Although this zone was not well-defined, it nevertheless included areas in the southern 
states of Mexico that eventually were subsumed in the CBMMx Project. 
 
Egypt and the Management of Migratory Soaring Birds 
The MEAs signed by Egypt that impinge on the management of the MSB Project 
are: 1) the Ramsar Convention; 2) its Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat; 3) the African Convention on 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; 4) the Convention on Migratory 
Species (CMS); 5) the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement (AEWA); 6) the Protocol 
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean 
(under the Barcelona Convention); 7) the Protocol Concerning the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of Protected Areas in the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Aden (under the Jeddah Convention).  Of these seven MEAs, the Ramsar 
Convention, CMS and AEWA were specifically cited in MSB Project documents, while 
the remaining four reference elements of biodiversity management that are pertinent to 
governance in the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway.  Finally, the World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre of UNEP (UNEP-WCMC) provides additional support for 
biodiversity management to Egypt.  A summary table of the impact of these institutions 
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 Declaración Conjunta y Plan de Acción de la Cumbre Tuxtla Gutiérrez II, Article 
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on MSB management is given in Table 6.4: Summary Impact of Institutions on MSB 
Management.  The following section explains how the concern, capacity and 
contractual environment found within these MEAs and institutions intersect with the 
goals of the MSB Project. 
 
Concern 
Concern for MSB species and habitat management in Egypt is highlighted by the 
following factors: several institutions and MEAs raise the profile of biodiversity 
management in the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway by reinforcing the importance of 
migratory bird and bird habitat management to the goals of international environmental 
governance.  Moreover, concern is channeled through domestic regulatory agencies, in 
particular the MSEA/EEAA of Egypt, which is at the center of the country’s steps in 
carrying out international environmental obligations. 
In 1998, concerned about the burden of national reporting requirements, UNEP 
and the secretariats of the CBD, the CMS, the Ramsar Convention, CITES, and the 
World Heritage Convention (WHC) commissioned the WCMC to undertake a study on 
the possibility of harmonizing reporting requirements between those five biodiversity-
oriented MEAs.  In response, WCMC issued a report in 1998 asserting that biodiversity 
management required effective coordination between the goals of those MEAs, all of 
which were signed by Egypt, as well as potential future agreements and protocols.679  
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 World Conservation Monitoring Centre [WCMC], 1998, Feasibility Study for a 
Harmonised Information Management Infrastructure for Biodiversity-related Treaties 
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Subsequent to this report, UNEP-WCMC held harmonization workshops in 2000680 and 
2004681 with the Secretariats of the following MEAs: the CBD, CMS, Ramsar 
Convention and AEWA, all of which were cited by the MSB Project documents as 
relevant to biodiversity management in the flyway.   
These workshops asserted a common interest of these treaties in biodiversity 
management, thus linking the goals of the CBD with migratory bird management under 
the CMS and AEWA, and with wetlands conservation under Ramsar.  As described in 
Chapter 5, several of the ecosystems used by MSBs as resting points, particularly in the 
North Sinai, are wetlands, and several resting areas are important to migratory 
waterfowls.  As in Jamaica and Mexico, the major environmental agency in this case, 
namely the MSEA/EEAA through its Nature Conservation Sector (NCS) is the 
Administrative Authority for the Ramsar Convention. 
The importance of management within the flyway is further reinforced by the 
Protocol Concerning Special Protected Areas of the Barcelona Convention (henceforth 
                                                                                                                                              
wcmc.org/convent/treaties.pdf; UNEP Division of Environmental Law and 
Conventions [UNEP-DELC] and UNEP-WCMC, 2008, Joint Core Reporting Elements 
of Biodiversity-related Conventions and Agreements (Report from the UNEP 
Knowledge Management Project), accessed January 2011 from http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/conventions/docs/Report%20on%20joint%20core%20report%20elements_3
_Mar_08.pdf. 
680
 UNEP-WCMC, 2000, Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting (Report of 
a workshop convened by UNEP), accessed January 2011 from http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/conventions/harmonization/workshop/REPORT.pdf. 
681
 UNEP-WCMC, 2004, Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting to 
Biodiversity-Related Treaties (Report of a workshop convened by UNEP), accessed 
January 2011 from http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/conventions/harmonization/workshop04/Workshop_report.pdf. 
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the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas), and the Protocol Concerning the Conservation 
of Biological Diversity and the Establishment of Network of Protected Areas in the Red 
Sea and the Gulf of Aden (henceforth the Protocol Concerning Biological Diversity in the 
Red Sea). The Protocol Concerning Protected Areas asserts that littoral ecosystems, 
including coastal wetlands, are crucial to the management of the Mediterranean Sea and 
the broader goals of the CBD,682 while the Protocol Concerning Biodiversity in the Red 
Sea asserts that management of coastal and littoral ecosystems in the Red Sea is 
necessary, due to the occurrence of globally important migratory species in this region.683  
Finally, the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature calls on Parties to 
conserve natural resources, including fauna and flora,684 while Article III of the CMS 
calls on Parties to “endeavour”685 to conserve endangered and threatened migratory 
species and their habitats. 
 In all these cases, the NCS as lead agency of the MSEA/EEAA is directly 
involved in the administration of these MEAs.  Reports to the CMS are drafted by the 
NCS, in particular by Moustafa Fouda and Sherif Baha El Din in their current capacity as 
                                                 
682
 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean, Articles 1 and 2. 
683
 Protocol Concerning the Conservation of Biological Diversity and the Establishment 
of Network of Protected Areas in the Red Sea, Article 7. 
684
 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Articles 
VI, VII, and VIII. 
685
 CMS, Article III.4 
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NCS staff.686  Consequently, the concern building exercises of these treaties are grounded 
in the regulatory agencies relevant to MSB Project management. 
 
Capacity Building 
As described above in the SAM Project, the Ramsar Secretariat has established a 
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), pursuant to Conferences of the Parties, 
that collects information on wetlands management, and has formalized the incorporation 
of technical knowledge from ENGOs, including Birdlife International and Wetland 
International.  Like Mexico, the Egyptian government has a National Focal Point for the 
STRP.  However, the Egyptian focal point is again located in the national government, 
namely the NCS and the MSEA/EEAA, rather than in an academic institution, grounding 
the knowledge produced in the STRP more directly in governmental agencies.   
As the Egyptian project focuses more strongly on migratory species than the 
projects in Jamaica or Mexico, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) and its 
subsidiary African-Eurasian Waterbirds Agreement (AEWA) are considered particularly 
relevant to the project.687  Like the CBD, the CMS focuses on improving the role of 
science and information as a tool to promote effective treaty implementation.  Article 
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 See for example various submissions to the CMS Secretariat by El Din and Fouda, 
including, for example, the 2002 National Report of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Cairo: 
MSEA/EEAA). 
687
 See multiple references to the CMS in the GEF Project Document: UNDP/Birdlife 
International [Birdlife], 2006.  Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring 
Birds into Key Productive Sectors along The Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway (UNDP 
Project Document) passim. 
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VIII of the CMS established a Scientific Council, which, based on ongoing research, can 
make recommendations to COPs to include species in Appendix I and II.  In 1997 for 
example, COP-5 adopted the Lesser Kestrel (Falco naumanni), one of the migratory birds 
using the Red Sea/Rift Valley flyway, on Appendix I pursuant to a recommendation by 
the Scientific Council.   
Much of this information gathering and management recommendations overlaps 
with the functions of AEWA.  As with the CMS, AEWA identifies particular species 
whose conservation is of global concern, which includes falcons and birds of prey 
covered in the GEF Project.  To carry out its mandate, AEWA has a Technical 
Committee that performs parallel functions for AEWA Parties as does the CMS’ 
Scientific Council.  Some of the Action Plans adopted by CMS were adopted 
concurrently by AEWA in its own meetings.   
Further, the CMS and AEWA, in the interest of attaining expert information on 
migratory species management, encouraged the official participation of ENGOs in the 
functions of the treaties.  The IBAs identified by Birdlife, and wetlands highlighted by 
Wetlands International were referenced as important in AEWA and CMS documents, 
including the 2007 CMS Action Plan.688  As such, the CMS and AEWA Secretariats 
facilitate the promotion of scientifically validated, current information on the status of 
endangered species relevant to treaty implementation.   
Finally, the efforts of the CMS and AEWA Secretariats to gather information on 
migratory species for implementing Parties are supplemented by UNEP-WCMC.  The 
                                                 
688
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WCMC conducts synthesis reports based on national submissions from Parties to the 
CMS, and developed the Information Management System for the CMS, a database of 
parties covered by the Convention.  
 
Contractual Environment 
The contractual environment is highlighted by the following institutions which 
specify which species are to be conserved, as well as giving recommendations regarding 
how to sustainably manage biodiversity.  By doing so, the institutions clarify what 
appropriate compliance entails.  Moreover, the species and ecosystems specified by the 
listed MEAs all pertain to the goals of migratory soaring bird management as discussed 
in the goals of the MSB Project. 
The Ramsar Convention highlights key areas within the Red Sea/Rift Valley 
flyway as meriting conservation.  The Ramsar site in Egypt that falls within the flyway is 
Lake Bardawil in the Sinai Peninsula (declared 1988), which is also identified as a 
Birdlife Important Bird Area (IBA).689  Like SEMARNAT and CONANP in Mexico, 
Egyptian environmental governmental agencies are the relevant Administrative 
Authorities of the Convention.   
In addition to the Ramsar site in the Sinai, several other MEAs specify which bird 
species need conservation, as well as recommending what kind of protection is 
warranted.  The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature calls on ratifying 
                                                 
689
 Khalil, Magdy T. and Kamal H. Shaltout.  2006.  Lake Bardawil and Zaranik 
Protected Areas.  Cairo: State Ministry of Environment, Publication of Biodiversity 
Unit, no. 15; Ramsar Site List, available online at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/sitelist.pdf 
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states to ban the hunting and killing without prior approval of several endangered species, 
including storks, pelicans, cranes and vultures, all of which are covered by the MSB 
Project.690  In addition, the Protocol Concerning Protected Areas calls on Parties to 
protect, conserve and manage endangered species and their habitats.691  Bird species 
listed by name in this Protocol include the Dalmatian Pelican (Pelecanus crispus), one of 
the species identified in the MSB Project.692 
The CMS, an MEA to which Egypt is a signatory, similarly illustrates the 
importance of conserving identified species, which are listed in Appendices I and II to the 
Convention.693  These goals have been elaborated upon at the triennial COPs, as parties 
have proposed that additional, critically important species be included in the Appendices, 
and recommended that states take action to conserve them and their habitats.  Some of the 
species adopted at COPs include species adopted at COP-5 in 1997, such as the Steppe 
Eagle (Aquila heliaca), the Dalmatian Pelican (Pelecanus crispus), and the White Stork 
(Ciconia ciconia), all of which were listed in Graham Tucker’s 2005 study on migratory 
                                                 
690
 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature, List of Protected Species under 
Class A. 
691
 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean, Articles 3 and 4. 
692
 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the 
Mediterranean, Appendix II. 
693
 CMS, Article III and IV distinguish between Appendix I (endangered) and 
Appendix II (species that have an unfavorable conservation status) species, yet note that 
species may be cross-listed between the two.   
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soaring birds for the MSB Project.694  By the early 2000s, in conformity with several 
resolutions passed at the COPs, the Appendices singled out several of the MSB species 
that traversed the Palaearctic-African flyway and the Red Sea/Rift Valley region of Egypt 
and East Africa as meriting additional attention from parties.695   
In 2005, member states of the EU proposed a recommendation to COP-8 of the 
CMS calling on Parties within the African-Eurasian flyway zone to cooperate to conserve 
migratory birds.  This recommendation focused primarily on raptors, owls, and their 
habitats, and also called on parties to focus on specific threats, including poisoning and 
shooting.696  In 2007, the CMS drafted an Action Plan calling on Parties to protect birds 
in the African-Eurasian flyway zone, including recommendations that, “where possible,” 
Parties ban exposed poison bait, prevent the disturbance of rest sites, and create protected 
areas in identified zones; in Egypt, these zones were the IBA sites identified by Birdlife 
in the early 2000s.697  More generally, COPs have illustrated certain anthropogenic 
activities as problematic for migratory species, as did COP-7, which passed a Resolution 
calling on Parties to assess the impact of wind turbines on migratory birds.698   
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 CMS COP-5, Recommendation 5.1 
695
 Appendix I and II of the CMS; Graham Tucker, 2005, Migratory Soaring Birds: 
Review of status, threats and priority conservation actions (Birdlife). 
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 UNEP/CMS/Rec. 8.12/Rev 1. 
697
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Comparing the Embeddedness of Projects in International Institutions 
As described above, the cases studied in this dissertation exhibit substantial 
variation in the embeddeness of the projects in international institutions.  The institutions 
vary in particular with respect to concern and capacity engendered; some institutions 
identify specific areas as of interest to global biodiversity management, some highlight 
particular animal and plant species.  Indeed, some institutions single out threats and make 
recommendations for what action is necessary for biodiversity conservation.  A 
comparison of Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 indicate the degree in which each country’s 
GEF-funded project is embedded in MEAs and international institutions. 
 
The Implications of International Institutions 
As indicated, the case with the highest degree of international institutional 
embeddeness is the Migratory Soaring Bird (MSB) Project in Egypt.  First, the Protocol 
on Protected Areas, the African Convention for the Conservation of Nature, the CMS and 
AEWA highlighted particular species of MSBs as meriting conservation, including those 
covered by the eventual GEF Project.  Second, the African Convention on Nature, the 
CMS, its COPs, and the Action Plans adopted by the bodies also illustrated certain threats 
as germane to MBS conservation, while the Ramsar Convention described one site, Lake 
Bardawil, as a site of particular concern.  The UNEP-WCMC reports also highlighted the 
synergy between all the MEAs cited by the MSB Project: the CMS, AEWA, Ramsar 
Convention and the CBD.  Third, several of the institutions pertinent to the MSB Project, 
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namely the CMS, AEWA, and the UNEP-WCMC, contain standing scientific bodies 
aimed at generating up-to-date technical information on biodiversity and environmental 
degradation in areas directly related to the project.   
All of these treaties are then grounded in the national environmental agency, the 
MSEA/EEAA by virtue of the fact that it is the administering agency of the relevant 
MEAs, as well as the implementing agency of the MSB Project.  In addition, the 
MSEA/EEAA is more directly involved in the capacity-building exercises of the Ramsar 
Convention by virtue of the fact that this case is the only example of a governmental 
agency functioning as the National Focal Point for the Convention’s STRP.  Of the four 
cases, this project benefits from the most international concern related to project 
management, when considering the number and specificity of the MEAs concerned. 
The SAM and CBMMx Projects are somewhat less embedded than is the 
Egyptian project.  In regards to the SAM Project, both the LBS and SPAW Protocols of 
the Cartagena Convention illustrate the importance of marine management, reef 
ecosystems, and terrestrial zones including mangrove habitats.  CEP-UNEP, functioning 
as the standing scientific body of the LBS Protocol, has also arguably improved the 
capacity of participating states to respond to environmental degradation through its 
dissemination of technical information. Further, the SPAW Protocol called on states to 
address conservation of specific fauna and flora species, including mangrove species 
involved in the SAM ecosystem.  The Ramsar Convention as well demonstrated the 
importance of coral reefs, and the Tulúm Declaration reinforced the call for regional 
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management of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System.  In contrast to Egypt, however, 
the Focal Point for the STRP is an academic institution, not a governmental agency. 
In regards to the CBMMx Project, the Ramsar Convention, through the STRP, 
provided institutions aimed at improving the capacity of states, as well as highlighting the 
importance of key sites to global biodiversity.  Further, the Tuxtla II summit highlighted 
the regional importance of biological corridor management, and the Ramsar Convention 
highlighted the international importance of terrestrial zones in the Yucatán Peninsula. 
The least embedded project of the four was the Cockpit Country Project in 
Jamaica.  International references to this region as important for global biodiversity were 
oblique, at best.  Neither the SPAW Protocol nor the Cartagena Convention explicitly 
references the Cockpit Country, although they do indicate the need for states to consider 
the integration of downstream terrestrial processes on marine environments.  As a result, 
an analysis of the thickness of institutions bearing on projects, including dimensions such 
as the specificity of recommendations, would suggest that Egypt would be most likely to 
fulfill the requirements of the GEF-funded project, and Jamaica the least likely. 
 
Ranking Observed Variation 
However, a qualitative analysis of project performance indicates that Egypt was 
the most laggardly enforcer of the goals of biodiversity conservation.  The declaration of 
a protected area at the Important Bird Area (IBA) of Lake Bardawil, though identified as 
a Ramsar site, required no change in behavior by the Egyptian government to be 
protected.  Isolated and remote, the site was described in interviews with Egyptian 
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Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) officials as being protected by virtue of the fact 
that people could not easily access the area.   
Interviews with ENGO representatives and scientists indicate that the government 
was less than committed to improved environmental management in MSB sites.  The 
formal passage of legislation was not matched by enforcement on the ground, as 
protected areas did not contain adequate management due to the lack of political will in 
natural resource agencies.  Potential regulatory bodies and actors were excluded from 
contributing to environmental management in the flyway; the central Egyptian 
government maintained strict control over project funds and management, preventing 
access not only by ENGOs, but also by the enervated Nature Conservation Sector (NCS).  
As described in Chapter 5, despite calls by the CMS and AEWA for participation by 
ENGOs in domestic efforts at biodiversity governance, the closed political society of 
Egypt precluded any civil society participation. 
The CBMMx fared slightly better, as the government of Mexico did commit 
additional resources to corridor management zones highlighted in the project.  The 
federal government committed funds for project development in ejidos and rural 
communities demarcated by the CBMMx.  Further, evidence that institutions mattered in 
this case is supported by the fact that the failure of the Mexican government to carry out 
some of its obligations under the project was met by credible sanctions from the GEF.  
However, it should be noted that the transnational advocacy network of experts has been 
highly critical of the areas that were selected to be covered by the project, and has argued 
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that ecosystem management in the Mexican section of the biological corridor is 
problematic.   
The SAM Project demonstrated remarkable activity by the Mexican government.  
Management plans of already established protected areas were reformed to improve the 
quality of biodiversity governance.  The state adopted new regulations governing the 
extraction of fish species, in order to mitigate the tendency of fishing communities to 
overharvest.  Finally, the environmental ministry, and then the federal government passed 
reforms protecting the coastal mangroves from being cleared for hotel construction.   
Jamaican environmental management pertinent to the Cockpit Country also 
improved noticeably.  Most critically, after 2007, the government passed legislation 
declaring the Cockpit Country a protected area, despite the fact that this represented an 
economic opportunity loss for the JBI, a quasi-state agency.  The management of forestry 
extraction also improved, as forest management was linked to broader biodiversity 
conservation. 
 
Assessing the Institutional Explanation 
Certainly, the institutional explanation could explain the commitment of the 
Mexican government, in particular SEMARNAT and CONANP to improved reef 
management in the Mesoamerican basin under the SAM Project.  Regional and 
international organizations raised the profile of reef management in the Mesoamerican 
basin, and contributed to capacity building among member states.  The obligations of 
some MEAs, such as the Ramsar Convention, the LBS Protocol, and the SPAW Protocol 
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specified which species needed to be conserved in order to comply with the treaty.  
Moreover, these organizations were directly invoked by the MEAs, and intimately 
involved in SAM Project management.  As such, it is not surprising from an 
institutionalist perspective that Mexico committed political and economic resources to 
managing and conserving the SAM, including steps such as legislation protected 
spawning sites for fish, and the passage of substantial reforms to protected areas 
management.  
However, the institutionalist approach is undermined by the difference in project 
implementation and biodiversity governance between Jamaica and Egypt.  The Egyptian 
MSB project, while linked to several institutions improving the concern, capacity and 
contractual environment associated with improved biodiversity management, performed 
far worse than the Jamaican Cockpit Country project.   
As described above, the institutions associated with the Cockpit Country project 
only tangentially referenced the area, and did not emphasize particular species of flora, 
nor fauna.  In addition, while NEPA was involved in concern and capacity building 
through the Ramsar Convention and the Cartagena Convention, the Forestry Department, 
one of the most proactive regulatory agencies in the Cockpit Country, was only 
tangentially connected to either MEA.  Moreover, as indicated above, the Ramsar 
Convention and the Cartagena Convention are only minimally connected to the goals of 
biodiversity conservation in the Cockpit. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent the adoption of meaningful reform from 
Jamaican natural resource management agencies.  While the adoption of a ban on bauxite 
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mining resulted less from persuasion of policymakers in bauxite agencies, and more from 
political mobilization of the mass public, the fact is that the transnational network 
functioned as a catalyst for the generation of political pressure that led to the bauxite 
reform.  The institutionalist approach therefore, would underpredict the likelihood that 
the Jamaican government would adopt meaningful regulation in the Cockpit Country, 
while overpredicting the commitment of the Egyptian government. 
More fundamentally, however, focusing on international institutions as a predictor 
of behavior obscures the fact that in the context of biodiversity management, what 
comprised “appropriate behavior” was negotiated not at the international level and then 
translated to domestic regulatory agencies, but transnationally among networks.  While 
international institutions such as the CBD, GEF, the CMS, AEWA and the Ramsar 
Convention may have contributed to state willingness to launch biodiversity projects, the 
state and transnational networks engaged in occasionally acrimonious contestations over 
the geophysical dimensions of appropriate management.   
This can be observed in the debates in Mexico between the civil society and 
governments over the inclusion of corridor zones in the CBMMx, or in Jamaica between 
the civil society and bauxite regulatory agencies over the size of the Cockpit Country.  As 
expressed in the concern of transnational networks, government commitment to declaring 
protected areas and issuing management plans would have meant very little for improved 
biodiversity governance, if these areas were not carefully selected, and/or if the plans 
were not adequately designed to meet the needs of local biodiversity.699  Thus, the 
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analytic utility of the institutionalist approach in this research is further undermined by 
the fact that focusing on institutional design obscures how the interpretation of 
international obligations can be continually contested at the domestic level, and that this 
interpretation has significant outcomes for the goals of environmental governance.   
 
Conclusion 
This research focuses on the role of transnational networks, part of an emerging 
phenomenon referred to as the global civil society.700  As indicated in this chapter, 
examining the role of transnational networks and the global civil society confers benefits 
on the study of global environmental governance beyond that proffered by a state-centric, 
                                                                                                                                              
in environmental regimes and institutions.  While using “effectiveness” to describe 
regimes that lead to positive changes in state behavior is parsimonious and (insofar as 
advocates of environmental management want states to adopt new regulations) logical, 
it is difficult to justify using this term to refer to institutions that do not lead to positive 
changes in environmental outcomes.  For discussions on contemplating regime 
effectiveness, see: David Victor, 2006, Toward Effective International Cooperation on 
Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions (Global Environmental Politics 6 
(3): 90 – 103); Roland Mitchell, 2001, Institutional Aspects of Implementation, 
Compliance and Effectiveness.  International Relations and Global Climate Change 
(Cambridge: MIT Press); Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz, 2000, Measuring the 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (Journal of Conflict Resolution 
44 (5): 630 – 652). 
700
 See inter alia, Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997, 
Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics (New York: Syracuse University 
Press); Sanjeev Khagram, James Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, 2002, Restructuring 
World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press); Paul Wapner, 1995, Politics Beyond the State: 
Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (World Politics, 47: 311 – 340); Paul 
Wapner, 1996, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (Albany: SUNY 
Press); Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for 
Water and Power (New York: Cornell University Press). 
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institutionalist approach.  First, transnational networks may contribute to the 
effectiveness of regimes and institutions in ways not predictable by an analysis focused 
on international negotiations and the top-down implementation of regime obligations.   
Jamaica, as described above, was the case with the thinnest level of institutional 
embeddeness.  Nevertheless, a transnational epistemic community, motivated by a shared 
understanding of appropriate action, and informed by a scientific consensus, was able to 
persuade natural resource managers in the state to adopt meaningful environmental 
regulation through a combination of direct influence on policymakers, and through the 
popular mobilization of domestic constituencies.  As a result, agencies in the Jamaican 
government were more willing to carry out reform than those in Egypt, the case with the 
thickest.  Variations in characteristics of transnational networks can also explain 
variations in environmental governance efforts in the same political system; while the 
Mexican federal government was carrying out both the SAM and the CBMMx Projects, 
the SAM epistemic community contributed to what was described in Chapters 3 and 4 as 
more effective governance in the reef region.  
Second, and related, this research supports ongoing approaches that are critical of 
arguments that limit the search for solutions to governance through the creation or reform 
of international institutions.701  Institutions certainly matter, and the provision of 
technical and financial capacity through the GEF, UNEP, and Secretariats of various 
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 See Jacob Park, Ken Conca and Matthias Finger, eds. 2008, The Crisis of Global 
Environmental Governance: Towards a New Political Economy of Sustainability (New 
York: Routledge Press); Gabriela Kütting and Ronnie Lipschutz, 2009, Environmental 
Governance: Power and Knowledge in a Local-Global World (New York: Routledge 
Press).  
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MEAs were important in supporting the Project for Sustainable Conservation, the SAM 
Project, the CBMMx Project, and the MSB Project.  Regardless of political will and 
commitment, monitoring the isolated and rugged terrain of the Cockpit Country, the 
marine ecosystems off the coast of the Yucatán, and the desert migrating spots in the Red 
Sea/Rift Valley flyway can be prohibitively expensive to the Forestry Department in 
Jamaica, CONANP in Mexico, and the Egyptian NCS respectively.  However, using 
institutions as the analytic focus of global governance marginalizes the importance of the 
global civil society in interpreting and implementing treaty obligations, ignores state-
society relations, and reifies the state as the arbiter of “correct” behavior.   
This leads to potential distortions in implementing the environmental goals of 
international institutions.  Top-down requirements by the GEF, UNEP and the World 
Bank for ENGO inclusion in project management were abrogated by the governments of 
Mexico and Egypt, in the CBMMx and MSB Projects respectively, in the interests of 
state leaders and vested political constituencies.702  Without actual commitment by state 
leaders to include the civil society in project implementation, there is little the GEF can 
do to avoid the de facto marginalization of ENGOs in project implementation.703   
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Policy: The Global Environment Facility at Work (in Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. 
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This has an impact on global environmental management as the provision of 
international institutional support to governments through mechanisms that do not pay 
sufficient attention to state-society relationships and non-state actors may lead to perverse 
outcomes in the goals of environmental governance.  Without the localization of norms 
by transnational networks, governments will find it more difficult to sustain 
environmental projects, which is problematic insofar as GEF funds are finite.704  Further, 
as demonstrated in Egypt and in the CBMMx Project in Mexico, governments and natural 
resource agencies that have not internalized environmental norms are nonetheless still 
seen as legitimate arbiters of the allocation of financial and technical assistance (FTA) in 
the form of GEF funds, and are able to set the terms of project management.  The result is 
that the governance of sensitive ecosystems may be hijacked by vested political and 
economic interests, to the detriment of environmental sustainability.  This is an inefficient 
and counterproductive use of GEF funds. 
Thus, in the interest of environmental sustainability, actors in the global civil 
society, such as transnational networks of environmental advocates, should be 
meaningfully incorporated into the theory and practice of global governance.  As argued 
above, transnational networks of committed individuals can foster the needed political 
commitment in participating states to carry out international environmental agreements.  
                                                                                                                                              
Steel, ed., Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration, New York: 
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This emphasizes the importance of norms and norm entrepreneurs in shaping state 
behavior; as transnational networks generate shared understandings about appropriate 
action among state leaders, they can lead to more comprehensive action than might have 
been expected when examining institutions alone.  At the same time, the previous 
chapters make it clear that the meaningful participation, and hence influence, of these 
transnational networks is in turn constrained by internal characteristics of the networks, 
and external political factors.  Internally, a shared consensus improves the likelihood that 
the claims of transnational networks will be taken seriously.  Externally, the ability of 
networks to socialize with policymakers will probably be sharply limited in autocratic 
polities.  By responding effectively to internal and external challenges, transnational 
networks of environmental advocates can contribute meaningfully to global 
environmental governance.  
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Table 6.1: Summary Impact of Institutions on Cockpit Country Management 
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Table 6.2: Summary Impact of Institutions on SAM Management 
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Table 6.3: Summary Impact of Institutions on CBMMx Management 
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Table 6.4: Summary Impact of Institutions on MSB Management 
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Figure 6.1: Map of Neovolcanic Zone in Mexico 
 
 
 
The area below Line B comprises the neovolcanic zone of Mexico.  It includes areas in the states 
Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas and the Yucatán Peninsula 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Non-State Actors, Transnational Networks, and Governance 
The primary question addressed here is: under what conditions do norms and 
networks matter to global governance as carried out by less developed countries 
(LDCs)?705  To answer this question, this dissertation covers research carried out on four 
globally important biodiversity management projects funded by the Global Environment 
Facility, and implemented in Jamaica, Mexico and Egypt as pertinent to their obligations 
under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.  In each country, a TAN advocated for 
what it considered appropriate biodiversity management under the rubric of the project, 
often requiring substantive changes in the implementing government’s environmental 
management approach.  However, in only two of the four projects studied did the TAN 
succeed in persuading state leaders to adopt new norms and thus influence behavior 
concomitant to the goals of the UN treaty.  When are transnational networks more 
effective in LDCs?  What cognitive or material factors contribute to their ability to offer 
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 LDCs are particularly important to global biodiversity governance, as most of the 
world’s biodiversity is found in the developing world.  See inter alia, Marc Williams, 
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118) pp. 110.  See in particular, Marian Miller, 1995, The Third World in Global 
Environmental Politics, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner) for a discussion of the Third World 
as a negotiating bloc in global biodiversity governance. 
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interpretations of reality that are accepted by policymakers?  How are networks 
constrained by domestic politics of the state that is the subject of transnational advocacy 
campaigns? 
 
Hypotheses: TANs and Domestic Politics in LDCs 
The first hypothesis predicting how TANs influence policymakers in LDCs is 
derived from scholarship on environmental governance in the Global South.  Academics 
such as Marian Miller and Lawrence Susskind argue that the relationship between LDC 
government and the environment is conditioned by the global history of development and 
industrialization, the worsening environmental North-South split in the years after 
UNCED, and LDC concerns about the inequitable distribution of global wealth and 
ownership of capital.706  LDCs are highly indebted, yet rely heavily on the production of 
primary goods, which means that LDC efforts to ‘catch-up’ with the process of 
industrialization launched in the developed world depend on the immediate 
overexploitation of natural resources.  In order to ensure that LDC governments will take 
environmentally friendly action, networks have to link environmental management to the 
interests of economic development.  H1: transnational advocacy networks must frame 
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 Marian Miller, 1995, The Third World in Global Environmental Politics, Lawrence 
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environmental policy as relevant to national economic development in order to influence 
LDC governments. 
This hypothesis was tested concurrently with other theories predicting how 
knowledge generated by civil society networks becomes adopted by policymakers.  The 
epistemic communities literature links influence to the ability of networks of experts to 
develop a scientific consensus on the causal dimensions of an emerging problem area,707 
leading to the hypothesis: H2: scientific consensus increases the influence of 
transnational advocacy networks.  Studies on the politics and sociology of turning 
information into policy suggest that for policymakers to adopt knowledge claims, they 
have to be socialized into the process of knowledge generation through processes such as 
multisectoral workshops.708   That is, H3: socialization increases the influence of 
transnational advocacy networks. 
Having established these hypotheses, the research tested their explanatory power 
by process-tracing the implementation of the four projects.  In each case, transnational 
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networks of environmental advocates participated in multiple campaigns to persuade 
policymakers and managers in various sectors, allowing variation on each of the 
independent variables: issue-framing, knowledge consensus, and socialization.   
 
The Results 
An Overview of the Conclusions 
The conclusions strongly support the second and third hypotheses: both consensus 
and socialization were necessary for networks to generate influence, but neither was 
sufficient.  However, there was no support for the first hypothesis: H1: transnational 
advocacy networks must frame environmental policy as relevant to national economic 
development in order to influence LDC governments.  Economic issue-framing does not 
correlate either positively or negatively with changes in environmental management 
approaches taken by policymakers and managers.  As a result, it has no independent 
explanatory power in predicting the ability of networks to generate influence over 
environmental management. 
In fact, arguments relying on an economic valorization of environmental 
management are potentially counterproductive, in that they reify an environmental 
epistemology that is likely to be harmful to the interests of sustainable, long-term 
management.  A description of the cases follows, indicating when networks used 
economic frames, generated consensus, and socialized with natural resource managers.   
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Comparing the Cases: The Jamaican Cockpit Country 
In Jamaica, a transnational network emerged in the 1990s, concerned about 
biodiversity loss among globally important bird populations residing in the Cockpit 
Country, a mountainous rainforest region in the northwestern section of the island.  The 
transnational network generated an intersubjective consensus on the causal dimensions of 
biodiversity loss.  The network then participated in the design and implementation of the 
Project for Sustainable Conservation of Globally Important Bird Habitats, a regional 
GEF-funded project simultaneously carried out in the Dominican Republic and the 
Bahamas.   
The primary threats identified were bauxite mining and decentralized agricultural 
activity.  The network campaigned to persuade the following actors to adopt 
environmentally friendly reforms: 1) agricultural policymakers in the Forestry 
Department; 2) mining policymakers in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jamaica 
Bauxite Institute (JBI), and 3) protected areas policymakers in the Ministry of 
Environment and the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA). 
However, despite the presence of a recognized knowledge consensus on the 
dimensions of the environmental threats to the Cockpit Country, the network managed to 
persuade only the Forestry Department to change their environmental practices.  In that 
case, the Forestry Department was also the only agency with which the epistemic 
community was able to generate socialization processes.  Moreover, the demonstrated 
success in banning bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country had little to do with persuasive 
powers of the epistemic community, but was rather dependent on the political 
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mobilization of a TAN concerned about the cultural and social impact of bauxite mining 
in the ecoregion.  While the TAN mobilized around claims and knowledge publicized by 
the epistemic community, the power and influence deployed was political in nature, not 
cognitive.   
In addition, this case suggested that economic framing had little impact on 
epistemic community influence.  While the network made a conscious effort to use 
economic arguments to persuade policymakers in bauxite management agencies to limit 
mining activities in the Cockpit Country, these arguments were ineffectual. 
 
Mexico and the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
The following chapter discusses a similar case of transnational advocacy around 
protected areas management and biodiversity.  In the 1990s, an epistemic community 
emerged to advocate for biodiversity management in Mexico through the implementation 
of the Proyecto para el Sistema Arrecifal Mesoamericano (SAM Project).  In the SAM 
Project, the network generated an intersubjective consensus about the primary threats to 
biodiversity in the Mesoamerican reef system, namely fishing, tourism, and coastal 
development.   
In this case, the network participated in campaigns to persuade various 
policymakers and managers to adopt environmental reforms.  These consisted of 1) 
protected areas policymakers in la Secretaría de Manejo Ambiental y Recursos Naturales 
(SEMARNAT) and la Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP); 2) 
fishing policymakers in la Comisión Nacional de Pesquería (CONAPESCA) and la 
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Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, y Pesquería (SAGARPA); 3) 
civil society quintanarroense fishing cooperatives; 4) tourism policymakers in the 
quintanarroense state government; and 5) transnational hotelier associations (see Table 
3.3).   
Again, this epistemic community had limited success in influencing 
environmental management, albeit qualitatively moreso than their analogue in Jamaica.  
The network successfully persuaded all actors, with the exception of recalcitrant 
policymakers in the state government and transnational hotelier associations, to adopt 
environmental reform.  As in Jamaica, the successful campaigns depended on the 
presence of both a recognized knowledge consensus and socialization between the 
community and target audiences.  Where socialization was absent, as in the case with the 
quintanarroense state government, the network found itself without influence.   
In addition, economic arguments had no discernible impact on network influence.  
The network did successfully use economic arguments in the campaign to persuade 
CONAPESCA and fishing cooperatives to change management practices and policy but 
in the first place, the network also managed to generate both consensus and socialization 
with target audiences in these populations.  Second, the use of economic arguments in 
those cases depended on linking environmental sustainability with the economic 
wellbeing of domestic populations, rather than with the interests of transnational capital 
and the primary economic productive sectors of the state.  As shall be indicated, linking 
environmental sustainability to transnational capital interests rather than domestic actors 
is a strategy that threatens to undermine the logic of conservationism.   
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Mexico and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 
The following chapter, focusing on the Proyecto para el Corredor Biológico 
Mesoamericano (CBMMx Project), clarified that demonstrated that, while insufficient, 
knowledge consensus was nevertheless necessary.  In this case, the TAN participated in 
campaigns to persuade 1) policymakers in the federal biodiversity agency la Comisión 
Nacional de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO); 2) agricultural management in la Secretaría 
de la Ganadería, Agricultura, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA); 3) 
protected areas managers in SEMARNAT and CONANP; and 4) state and municipal 
governments (see Table 4.3).   
Here, the TAN created substantial social links with policymakers in key agencies, 
namely CONABIO, SEMARNAT and SAGARPA, through joint participation in 
institutions created to administer the project.  Moreover, the network consciously adopted 
economic arguments to persuade policymakers to adopt environmental reforms, such as 
targeted projects for biodiversity conservation.  However, since the TAN was unable to 
generate a knowledge consensus on the threats faced by biodiversity in corridor zones, or 
on the relevant elements of what constituted important biodiversity, policymakers in 
CONABIO and the federal government overrode the network’s recommendations for 
corridor management. 
 
Influential Causal Variables: Consensus and Socialization 
Thus, the previous three chapters indicate that, for TANs to increase the 
likelihood of influencing environmental policymaking in LDCs, the members of the 
  
 
 
 
 
384 
 
network should generate an intersubjective consensus on the causal dimensions of the 
problem at hand, and that they should be socialized with policymakers and target 
audiences.  As indicated here, the socialization processes needed include participating in 
knowledge-building workshops, exchanging staff members, and participating in joint 
research projects.  This is not an exhaustive list, and other kinds of processes are certainly 
possible.  However, without either consensus or socialization, transnational networks will 
find it extremely difficult to persuade policymakers to adopt significant environmental 
reforms.   
Consensus, TANs and Epistemic Communities 
Consensus functions as expected in the epistemic communities literature, in that it 
undermines competing arguments, legitimates the claims of activists, and provides 
boundaries on considerations of accepted policy.  As a result, networks of scientific 
epistemic communities are theorized to occupy a privileged role in the process of 
environmental advocacy. 
However, TANs that are not organized exclusively around scientific reasoning 
can also play a significant catalytic role in environmental advocacy as occurred in both 
Jamaica and Mexico.  In Jamaica, organizations within the Cockpit Country TAN, such 
as the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ) and associations of Accompong 
Maroons, provided funds and information to the development of the Nature 
Conservancy’s (TNC’s) Parks in Peril Project.  As described in Chapter 2, the Parks in 
Peril Project assisted the epistemic community in generating scientific information on the 
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Cockpit Country, and in building inter-network links between allies in different 
institutions. 
Moreover, this influence was not limited to the provision of resources for 
knowledge building.  After the epistemic community’s campaigns in the Project for 
Sustainable Conservation began, the TAN mobilized public political opposition through 
the Cockpit Country Stakeholder’s Group (CCSG) against the issuance of mining leases 
in the Cockpit Country.   
Similarly, the epistemic community in the Mexican SAM Project developed its 
shared reef monitoring methodology through participating in workshops held by TAN 
organizations in the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) and the Atlantic-Gulf Reef 
Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) networks.  While ICRI and the AGRRA networks were 
also science-based institutions, they were not directly involved in the policy debates over 
appropriate coastal management in Quintana Roo, and were thus not part of the epistemic 
community network.  Nevertheless, the TAN in this case provided important 
informational resources to the epistemic community, including data that contributed to 
the emergence of a scientific consensus and shared policy platform.  Thus, the roles of 
TANs and epistemic communities are mutually supportive.  Epistemic communities 
provide authority and legitimacy to environmental arguments, while TANs provide 
material and political support to epistemic community knowledge building.  The 
transnational dimension of these different is also important, insofar as links to advocates 
in other countries give TANs a broader resource base, cognitive, informational, and 
material than would otherwise be the case.   
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Since consensus matters, a question relevant to the study of transnational 
environmental advocacy is: when are epistemic communities likely to emerge within 
broader networks?  Can scientific consensus be, if not deliberately engineered, at least 
fostered?  The failure of the Egyptian TAN to generate an intersubjective consensus also 
suggests that the generation of a knowledge consensus may be curtailed by the technical 
difficulty of collecting information.  This is highlighted in the failure of the MSB TAN to 
generate a knowledge consensus, as this problem was caused in part by the inability of 
the network to gain access to needed administrative and material support. For example, in 
attempting to identify the cause of bird mortalities at Sharm and other recorded instances 
of mass deaths, members of NCE and EgyBirdGroup reiterated a common concern, that 
convincing analysis was impossible without extensive technical support.  The 2005 Porter 
study on bird bottlenecks noted the difficulties of data gathering:  
…to undertake a comprehensive count at any site would require a 
commitment to watch for an entire season for at least eight hours per day. 
Two observers present for all of the time would be essential and up to four 
when there are large numbers passing. They would need to be capable of 
total concentration for searching for high flying birds against a brilliant 
blue sky, for counting large and wheeling flocks and, of course, tricky 
identification.709 
 
For this to occur, there would have to be sufficient resources, support, and 
autonomy allocated to researchers to gather the kind of quantitative and qualitative 
information that would be conducive to generating an intersubjective consensus.  
Theoretically, governments can provide these kinds of resources to prominent scientific 
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research institutes as is the case in the United States, with the National Science 
Foundation (NSF).  More modestly, the federal government of Mexico, along with the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), created and funded the Centro de 
Investigaciones de Quintana Roo (CIQRO) which later became el Colegio de la Frontera 
Sur (ECOSUR), one of the primary research organizations of the epistemic community 
active in the Mesoamerican reef system.  However, this kind of institutional support to 
the civil society is simply not present in Egypt.   
In Egypt, like in the rest of the world, scientists would be willing to do 
research if they had funds.  Scientists, for instance in Egyptian 
universities, have no university funds that will support large-scale research 
projects.  And large-scale research projects need to be supported, either by 
EEAA, or supported by bilateral aid programs, like joint American-
Egyptian universities.710 
 
Consensus Is Not Enough: the Importance of Socialization 
At the same time, socialization between networks and managers is needed.  In 
describing how global environmental assessments become influential, Clark, Mitchell 
and Cash argue that: “the process by which information is generated and delivered affects 
the potential of that information process to influence outcomes.”711  Actors who are 
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socialized in the generation of information and knowledge associated with an emerging 
problem are therefore more likely to adopt the normative implications associated with 
that knowledge and consider the conclusions relevant to their own interests.  Despite the 
scientific credibility of the network, Jamaican policymakers in the bauxite mining sector 
were resistant to arguments for comprehensive protection of sensitive ecosystems in the 
Cockpit Country, and consensus in the SAM Project was insufficient to overcome 
environmental recalcitrance by policymakers in the quintanarroense government, or 
transnational hotelier associations.   
Finally, in none of the cases did economic framing correlate with the ability of 
networks to exercise influence over policy.  TANs and epistemic communities shaped 
behavior when economic framing was not used, and in one instance when framing was.  
Consequently, it is not an independent predictor of network influence.   
The only case in which socialization and consensus did not lead to influence 
occurred in the case of the SAM Project, where the epistemic community failed to 
persuade hoteliers to change practices and adopt a more sustainable model.  This does not 
necessarily undermine the argument presented here.  In the first place, social science 
arguments are probabilistic, not determinative.  In the second place, as will be argued 
below, the goals of sustainable resource management cannot be incorporated into the 
logic of transnational capitalism. 
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The Role of Democracy in Fostering Socialization 
In examining the previous three cases, it is apparent that the civil society had 
more success socializing with a greater number of natural resource managers in Mexico 
than in Jamaica, even while Mexico has a more recent history with autocracy, only 
transitioning away from a bureaucratic-authoritarian model in 2000.  One possible 
explanation is that increased centralization improves the likelihood that powerful political 
elites will socialize with civil society researchers in the production of policy-relevant 
knowledge.  By doing so, they may be more likely to perceive of such knowledge as 
legitimate, and share perspectives with civil society actors.   
 
Egypt and the Red Sea/Rift Valley Flyway 
The final chapter was selected primarily to test whether increasing levels of 
political centralization were inimical or not to the process of socialization between 
managers and civil society network members.  In Chapter 5, a transnational network 
attempted to influence biodiversity management in Egypt by campaigning to change the 
management structure of 1) the Ministry of State of Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and 
the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA); 2) the Nature Conservation Sector 
(NCS); 3) the governorates of the North Sinai, the South Sinai, and the Red Sea; and 4) 
the Tourism Development Authority (TDA).   
However the failure of the network to generate any meaningful influence in this 
case suggests that while moderate levels of political centralization may enhance the 
influence of networks of experts, extreme centralization and autocracy prevents expert-
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government socialization.  Of the campaigns addressed, the network failed to generate 
socialization with any of the natural resource management agencies, except the NCS, 
which was marginalized and ineffective.  Closed decision making, governmental 
antipathy to the civil society, and political cronyism hampered the free flow of 
knowledge from experts to decision makers by isolating civil society experts, and 
marginalizing the environmental agencies most likely to be receptive to ecological 
arguments.   
While greater democracy may not be necessary, autocracy is directly harmful.  
This suggests that the effect of political centralization on the exercise of influence by 
civil society experts is shaped like a Kuznets Curve.  Under increasing levels of 
centralization, policymakers are likely to be more engaged in knowledge production, and 
hence more likely to socialize with civil society knowledge networks.  At a certain point, 
however, autocracy and centralization calcifies the state and precludes the possibility that 
civil society researchers will have necessary access to policymakers.  However, given the 
fact that this research provides only four data points, this hypothesis will have to be tested 
with further research. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Implications for Theory: Disaggregating Influence 
This research clarifies the importance of taking a multilevel approach to 
understanding how epistemic communities and knowledge networks influence global 
environmental governance.  While authors such as Betsill and Corell restrict the study of 
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network influence to focus on the impact of advocacy on international environmental 
negotiations,712 it is clear that biodiversity management is shaped by the actions and 
practices not only of policymakers, but also of transnational corporations, networks, non-
state governance structures such as the International Organization of Standards ISO 
14000 series and local, community-based organizations (CBOs).713  Studying the effect 
of epistemic communities on environmental management requires paying attention not 
just to the impact of networks on national policymakers, but also on subnational actors 
and other transnational interests, including transnational capital.  
Expanding the parameters of global environmental management to consider 
multiple sources and levels of political action further gives a clearer picture of how and 
when knowledge deployed by networks exerts influence on governance.  As indicated in 
the dissertation, framing matters, although not in the way originally theorized.  Epistemic 
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economy of sustainability (New York: Routledge). 
  
 
 
 
 
392 
 
communities were successful in Jamaica and Mexico when they reframed biodiversity 
loss as integrated with broader problems of ecosystem integrity and threats to sustained 
resource use for domestic populations.  Conversely, epistemic communities and TANs 
were unable to translate knowledge into action when they framed biodiversity loss as 
relevant to the interests of transnational capitalism.   
What this suggests is that the choice of which frames are relevant to 
understanding a politically contested issue-area is more than just a rhetorical exercise.  
Different frames or discourses privilege different courses of action, and by extension 
different constellations of political actors.  In the process of policy advocacy and project 
implementation, epistemic communities and the project institutions, that is the GEF, 
UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank, are attempting to change the policies and practices of  
government agents, domestic populations, and transnational capitalists.  However, these 
target audiences do not necessarily have isomorphic goals.  The choice of how problems 
are framed thus affects which of these interests is validated in environmental 
management; framing a problem involves determining what values and worldviews are 
associated with inputs and outcomes.  Thus, while an intersubjectively held consensus is 
an important element in predicting when networks exercise influence, the persuasive 
power of a scientific consensus may be attenuated or conversely strengthened by the 
social relationships of knowledge production, and by the power dynamics implied by 
accepted problem frames.  
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Implications for Policy: Rethinking the Link between Biodiversity and Economics 
The constraining effect of frames on the exercise of knowledge is demonstrated in 
differences between epistemic community success in persuading policymakers and local 
actors in Jamaica and Mexico, and failure in persuading transnational capital interests in 
the same cases.  Simply put, environmental frames privileged anti-environmental logic, 
and minimized the chance of success of epistemic communities to persuade target 
audiences.   
As indicated throughout, transnational capitalism is intimately connected with 
environmental degradation in the cases studied here.  Jamaican biodiversity in the 
Cockpit Country was threatened by transnational aluminum production; Mexican coastal 
and terrestrial biodiversity in the Mesoamerican region was threatened by transnational 
tourism; Egyptian biodiversity in the Red Sea region was threatened by transnational 
tourism and energy, and in all cases, these stated interests benefited from a privileged 
relationship with the state.   
Economic arguments were adopted, but failed to convince transnational capitalist 
managers in any of these cases to adopt environmental reforms.  Conversely, ecological 
sustainability arguments which did not depend on privileging the interests of 
transnational capitalism were adopted in Jamaica by the Forestry Department, and in 
Mexico by SEMARNAT, CONANP and fishing cooperatives.   
What this means is that arguments by the GEF and other international 
environmental institutions to use “biodiversity mainstreaming” as a counterweight to 
transnational capitalism subordinate environmental management to the economic 
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interests of elites.  This is contrary to the goals of sustainable development.  Economic 
frames that privilege the worldview of transnational capitalism advance elite preferences 
for natural resource use to the detriment of local populations, and further mean that 
concern for substantive environmental reform is likely to be transient.  At the end of the 
day, transnational elites do not have a comparative cultural, emotional or historic 
attachment to sustained natural resource management to that held by local actors, 
preferring instead to maximize short-term economic exploitation.  Interviews with 
Alfredo Arellano, chair of the National Reef Committee in the SAM Project, and 
Ildefonso Palermo, member of the Quintana Roo Comité Consultivo Estatal in the 
CBMMx Project point to this calculation by transnational capital holders: 
Traditionally, in the case of tourism in coastal development in Mexico, the 
expectation of a return on investment among the major hotel developers, is 
a return in six, seven, eight years.  In sustainable development, the plan for 
a return on investment of resources and benefits, we’re talking about the 
long-term, possibly 15 years.  To the way of thinking of the investor, it’s a 
notable difference.  …Unfortunately, with globalization, the hotel chains – 
Spanish, Italian and German – are looking for the exploitation of short 
term resources…  And this brings more than environmental impacts, this 
also has social impacts.714   
 
…You’re going to have very destructive actions in the name of 
development.  Very negative…  Because they talk about nature as if it 
were segmented or fragmented, where you have nature on one side and 
man on another…  So you utilize nature to the maximum because, after 
all, under this idea, the short term is going to predominate, and of course, 
profit.  Immediate profit.  A return on investment as soon as possible.  
This is pure business.715 
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 Alfredo Arrellano Guillermo, author interviews conducted March 2008.  Taken from 
transcript of digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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 Ildefonso Palermo, author interviews conducted July 2008.  Taken from transcript of 
digital voice recording.  Translated from Spanish. 
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Consequently, sustainable biodiversity management is better served by a policy 
framework that empowers local actors as the primary stakeholders.  This is qualitatively 
different from the stated goals of biodiversity mainstreaming as described by the GEF, 
which calls for linking sustainable biodiversity management policies to elite economic 
interests “where the primary focus has previously been on production, economic activity, 
and development, rather than on biodiversity conservation losses or gains.”716   
First, the successful adoption of frames that privilege and empower local interests 
raises the possibility that transnational knowledge networks will gain political allies in 
the campaign for improved environmental management.  As indicated in Jamaica, local 
communities in the Cockpit Country mobilized in support of the biodiversity 
conservation goals of the Project for Sustainable Conservation, lobbying ardently for a 
moratorium on bauxite mining through the CCSG.  Similarly, locally based fishing 
cooperatives in Mexico were highly supportive of the SAM Project and the sustainable 
use of marine resources promoted by the TAN.  In those cases, local actors, aware of the 
impact of transnational capitalism on their long-term resource use objectives, provided 
political support to epistemic communities.  
Second, taking a management approach that focuses on empowering local actors 
minimizes the possibility of local obstructionism in natural resource conservation.  If 
local actors feel alienated from the goals of environmental management, as occurred in 
the CBMMx Project, they could effectively withdraw from and undermine conservation 
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efforts.  In short, local support grounds transnational norms in a specific political context, 
described as “norm localization” by Acharya.717   
 
Specific Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
Given these constraints on the efficacy of scientific knowledge, namely the need 
to attain socialization, consensus, and to empower local actors, the following section 
gives specific recommendations to the GEF and to networks to improve the influence of 
transnational knowledge-based communities over global environmental governance.  As 
described below, these recommendations focus on enhancing the impact of knowledge 
networks on the domestic implementation of MEAs and environmental norms.  As such, 
while drawn from these specific cases, they are relevant to environmental issue-areas 
characterized by similar relationships between international obligations and domestic 
practices. 
 
Restrict the Focus of Transnational Research 
First, it is essential that advocacy networks, in order to give their claims authority, 
base their arguments on sound scientific claims.  Second, the importance of knowledge 
consensus in legitimating claims is demonstrated here and in the literature, where 
epistemic communities have more persuasive power than other kinds of networks.  Thus, 
networks should take steps to encourage the development of an intersubjective consensus. 
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In order to facilitate the emergence of a knowledge consensus, it is essential that 
transnational knowledge networks restrict the research agenda such that scientists have a 
commonly shared baseline for understanding emerging problems.  The efficacy of a 
restricted research agenda in generating a workable consensus is demonstrated in the 
emergence of a knowledge consensus in a transnational epistemic community constituted 
around the depletion of stratospheric ozone.  After the negotiation of the framework 
Vienna Convention on the ozone layer, Mostafa Tolba, who was adamant about deriving 
a binding agreement, used UNEP’s offices to commission studies on ozone depletion 
from transnational scientific working groups.   
Scientists within these groups focused their research on seven ozone depleting 
substances, and adopted a program focused on a chlorine-loading model of the 
stratosphere, all of which comprised a truncated view of the environmental problem.718  
This program fostered a core set of agreed-upon principles and arguments called the 
Würzburg Consensus, which then strengthened the arguments made by pusher states for a 
strong regulatory protocol.719   
In the cases studied here, the networks that developed a standardized or restricted 
research agenda similarly developed a scientific consensus on relevant causal processes, 
thus becoming epistemic communities.  In Jamaica, the Nature Conservancy (TNC) and 
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the Windsor Research Center (WRC) developed a shared methodology, which was then 
later shared with other ENGOs, such as the Southern Trelawny Environment Association 
(STEA) and the Forestry Department.  In Mexico, the reef monitoring methodology used 
by the network was developed over a period of several years, by the ICRI workshops in 
the mid-1990s, and the Atlantic Gulf Reef Rapid Assessment (AGRRA) initiative from 
1998 onward, before the SAM Project was formally created.  The methodology was later 
formally adopted as a component of the project under the Programa de Monitoreo 
Sinóptico (PMS) in 2002. 
In contrast, the transnational advocacy network in the Mexican CBMMx project 
did not start trying to generate a shared methodology until after the launch of the project, 
after federal policymakers had already asserted their preferences over project 
management.  The lack of a shared research program prevented the network from 
generating a shared conceptualization of, and hence knowledge consensus on, 
biodiversity loss in the CBMMx.   
As of the time of writing, the network still had not developed a commonly held 
methodology on understanding biodiversity loss in Mexican Mesoamerica.  Although the 
project has since formally ended, the CBMMx TAN should foster and generate an 
intersubjective consensus through a shared understanding of biodiversity.  If the TAN 
demonstrated a scientific consensus on the importance of additional areas to biodiversity 
conservation in Mesoamerica, the network would have an additional cognitive tool to 
lobby for additional funds from the GEF, as well as to undermine competing arguments 
for limited biodiversity protection.  
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 Institutional Empowerment of Transnational Knowledge 
The research also shows that institutions such as the GEF can and should play a 
formative role in fostering a knowledge consensus.  First, as occurred with Mostafa 
Tolba’s influence over the ozone scientific network’s focus on limited ozone depleting 
substances, institutions can, under the mandate of gathering useful policy relevant 
information, constrain the research agenda taken by transnational networks.  By doing so, 
institutions may encourage the adoption of a standardized approach to understanding 
environmental problems among scientists.   
Second, the GEF should ensure that local and transnational networks of experts 
have sufficient resources to ensure that scientific knowledge is credible.  As described 
above, the Egyptian TAN was unable to generate an intersubjective consensus, in large 
part due to the absence of validated information on the anthropogenic causes of bird 
mortalities.  An effective, direct transfer of resources to Nature Conservation Egypt 
(NCE) would have aided the network in conducting research, overcoming the gaps 
characterizing the current state of knowledge.  Moreover, engaging directly with 
domestic NGOs would obviate the need of experts to depend on antipathetic state 
agencies.  Again, by facilitating consensus, international environmental organizations 
would improve the chance that networks of experts would influence environmental 
management and contribute to effective reform. 
Third, the institutions of environmental governance, including the GEF, should 
refrain from uncritically advancing arguments for environmentalism based on the 
interests of economic capital.  As a result of the focus on capitalist growth as a metric for 
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appropriate policy the key stakeholders named by the GEF and the World Bank 
documents all included the same transnational interests that were motivated to cause the 
environmental problems studied in the first place.  As environmental problems in LDCs 
involve local natural resource use, this is not appropriate; rather the primary stakeholders 
should always be identified as the local users of resources, particularly if they are 
subsistence or traditional users.  In order to include these kinds of actors as proper 
stakeholders, rather than engage in tokenism, environmental projects should create 
standing administrative institutions that formalize their participation in project design and 
management.  The CCEs or the National Reef Committee created in Mexico for the 
CBMMx and the SAM Projects respectively serve as potential templates, as long as the 
participatory issues described in the chapter on the CBMMx are addressed. 
 
Improving the Level of Socialization 
As knowledge consensus is insufficient, international organizations should also 
promote substantive socialization between governmental agencies and civil society 
networks of experts in generating policy relevant knowledge.  This should be carried out 
by credibly threatening to withhold project funds unless state agencies effectively 
integrate local experts into planning and management strategies.  While the GEF did 
include mechanisms for civil society-government interaction in its biodiversity 
management projects, insufficient attention was paid to the quality of civil society 
participation, particularly in Egypt.   
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In that case, the GEF funded a project in which the network of civil society 
advocates universally asserted that there was no substantive communication between 
experts and natural resource managers in the government.  In fact, during the 
development of the MSB Project, project partners in Birdlife International recognized 
that there was no domestic civil society ENGO that could act as an implementing agency.  
While the Nature Conservation Egypt (NCE) was established shortly after the design of 
the MSB Project, as described in Chapter 5, they were given only a formal role in project 
participation, with no authority over agenda setting and project design.   
However, as seen in the case of the CBMMx, the GEF can exercise leverage to 
persuade governments to take a more active role in including civil society participation.  
As described in Chapter 4, the threat issued by the World Bank to withdraw GEF funds 
persuaded la Comisión Nacional de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO) to finally create the 
Consejos Consultivos Estatales (CCEs), institutionalizing them as forums of participation 
for civil society experts.  At best, projects that lack effective expert participation are 
likely to lead to inefficiently spent resources.  At worst, given the centralization of power 
in Egypt in a government characterized by embedded cronyism, this is likely to 
perpetuate harmful patterns of resource use by empowering environmentally antipathetic 
actors.  The GEF should therefore refuse to transfer additional funds to Egypt for the 
MSB Project unless these concerns are meaningfully addressed, and should take a similar 
stance in countries characterized by analogous relationships between the state and 
environmentally exploitative actors.  While the Mubarak regime is no longer in power, 
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this does not necessarily mean that the cloistered political system will liberalize to 
empower environmental activism without prodding from external economic actors. 
 
Technocracy versus Democracy? 
As a final note, critical theorists observe that the privilege accorded to scientific 
inquiry may lead to technocratic policymaking.  This is problematic when science 
delegitimates local participation, and hence local democracy, especially when the 
networks carrying transnational claims and norms to the developing world are rooted in 
Northern countries.  Moreover, as the above policy suggestions indicate, transnational 
networks may be empowered or facilitated by international financial institutions like the 
GEF and the World Bank, which have been amply criticized as embodying Northern, 
capitalist interests.  As indicated throughout the dissertation, the transnational networks 
active in environmental advocacy in Jamaica, Mexico and Egypt are based, at least in 
part, in ENGOs, academic institutions and scientific communities from the United States, 
the UK and continental Europe.   
The preponderance of apparent Northern actors in these transnational networks is 
not obviated by observing that the language used by the networks is based on scientific, 
ostensibly universal epistemologies.  Authors such as Kütting and Lipschultz 
problematize the authority accorded to scientific inquiry as a rationalist epistemology that 
de-legitimates worldviews based on, for example, cultural or emotional 
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epistemologies.720  Additionally problematic, science is validated in ways that tend not to 
acknowledge the fact that scientific inquiry itself is driven by normative biases.   
However, this research indicates that concerns about the potential anti-democratic 
nature of transnational expert advocacy may not be warranted.  In practice, domestic 
policymaking and natural resource management in developing countries may frequently 
be non-democratic, even where policymakers can claim a public mandate.  Khagram721 
and Moog Rodrigues722 both illustrate cases of popularly elected governments in India 
and post-transitional Brazil respectively, where domestic natural resource management 
policy created tremendous costs for marginalized rural populations.   
A similar logic adheres in the cases described here.  While Egypt cannot plausibly 
make the claim to be a representative government, Jamaica and Mexico, especially after 
2000, are administered by governments that can credibly base their legitimacy on their 
electoral support by the mass public.  Nevertheless, the erstwhile stances taken by these 
government officials over natural resource management have clearly negative 
consequences for local populations.  Bauxite mining in the Cockpit Country, if it took 
place, would have resulted in the loss of economic livelihood among Maroons and 
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agricultural populations who resided in areas of bauxite deposits. Indeed, as the research 
indicates, bauxite companies were allegedly seeking to relocate residents, before public 
outcry and a responsive administration halted bauxite expansionist plans.  Similarly, the 
ongoing concern among coastal fishing populations in Quintana Roo was that hoteliers 
continuing the pattern of large-scale resort construction would damage marine 
ecosystems to the extent that fishing would become impossible.   
Consequently, the anti-democratic assertions of critical theorists can be alleviated 
by noting that transnational knowledge networks in practice may oppose transnational 
and domestic forces that marginalize local populations.  Indeed, as suggested here, 
transnational knowledge networks are likely to meet their environmental policy goals 
when they adopt frameworks and strategies that empower local populations and improve 
their autonomy over natural resource management.  By doing so, transnational science-
based activism can contribute not only to global environmental governance, but also to 
comparatively democratic policymaking in LDCs. 
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